Evaluation of Gavi's Private Sector Engagement Strategy 2021-2025

Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance

23 October 2026



FINAL REPORT

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ACRONYMS

Acronym	Definition
AHO	Advancing Health Online
AI	Artificial Intelligence
AMC	Advance Market Commitment
BARDA	Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
BII	British International Investment
CEPI	Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations
CIFF	Children's Investment Fund Foundation
COVAX	COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access Facility
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
DFI	Development finance institution
EPI	Expanded Programme on Immunization
EQ	Evaluation Question
UK FCDO	United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FTE	Full-Time Equivalent
HSIS	Health Systems and Immunisation Strengthening
HSS	Health Systems Strengthening
INFUSE	Innovation for Uptake, Scale and Equity in Immunisation
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ITU	Innovation Top-Up
KII	Key Informant Interview
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
NBC	New Business Committee
NPHCDA	National Primary Health Care Development Agency
PCV	Pneumococcal conjugate vaccine
PSE	Private Sector Engagement
PSI	Private Sector and Innovation (Gavi Secretariat)
RM	Resource Mobilisation
ROI	Return on Investment
SCM	Senior Country Manager (Gavi Secretariat)
SUF	Gavi Innovation Scale-Up Facility
STEP	Strategic Training Executive Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VFM	Value for Money
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview

Cambridge Economic Policy Associates (CEPA) and Philanthropy Advisors (PA) evaluated Gavi's 2021–2025 Private Sector Engagement (PSE) Strategy. The evaluation sought to assess the relevance, performance and sustainability of the Strategy and develop actionable lessons and recommendations to inform the design of the next PSE Strategy.

Evaluation conclusion: Gavi's Private Sector Engagement (PSE) Strategy 2021–2025 was conceptually relevant and has become more significant as the global health financing environment grows constrained. The Strategy delivered important results, including increased and more diversified fundraising, enhanced advocacy and visibility, and greater mobilisation of private sector expertise, innovation and capabilities. However, its overall impact was limited by uneven operationalisation, insufficient integration across the organisation, and difficulties translating partnerships into scalable initiatives. Despite these challenges, private sector partners consistently identified Gavi's credibility, trusted reputation and convening power as distinctive strengths, providing a strong foundation on which to build Gavi 6.0.

What worked →	What impeded results →	What Gavi 6.0 needs →
Gavi PSE mobilised funding, credibility, advocacy value and private sector capabilities for immunisation priorities.	PSE-related processes, incentives, and monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) systems were not well integrated within Gavi and not appropriately adapted to private sector engagement.	A clearer value proposition for PSE, a sharper portfolio approach, operating models that match supply to country demand, and stronger cross-Secretariat ownership.

Gavi PSE strategy background and context

Gavi's PSE Strategy positioned private sector engagement as a core enabler of Gavi 5.0, mobilising financing and advocacy, expertise, and innovation through partnerships with corporates, innovators, philanthropies and other private sector actors to support Gavi's immunisation mission. The strategy was implemented during a period of significant change, spanning the COVID-19 response, Gavi's sixth replenishment and an increasingly constrained global health financing environment. As Gavi implements the Gavi Leap and Gavi 6.0, the organisation is adopting a leaner operating model, strengthening country leadership and seeking greater organisational efficiency and impact.

Evaluation methods in brief. The evaluation encompassed the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. An adapted theory-based approach with contribution analysis alongside mixed evaluation methods was used, and evaluation findings were assessed according to the strength of the supporting evidence. The evaluation reviewed a subset of the PSE portfolio through six case studies, examined emerging trends in private sector financing and partnerships, benchmarked peer approaches, and assessed operating models most relevant to Gavi.



Document and data review
- Gavi strategy documents, Board and policy papers, other public documents
- Data on private sector financial contributions to Gavi, select metrics on PSE projects

KIIs, FGD and workshops
- 116 stakeholders interviewed, including 87 at global and 29 at country/ regional levels, using recognised and ethical interview techniques and practices
- AI-assisted analysis with human validation
- Workshop with Gavi to validate findings and co-create recommendations

Project case studies
- 6 Gavi private sector projects, based on remote and in-person consultations, and review of relevant documents and data

Comparator analysis and operating-model deep dives
- 9 comparator and peer organisations
- Deep dive on 4 operating models and approaches relevant to Gavi PSE
- Megatrends analysis of private sector financing

Summary of key findings

	Area	Summary findings	Evidence strength
Relevance	**Relevance and coherence with Gavi and countries**	Gavi's PSE Strategy was conceptually well aligned with the broader Gavi 5.0/5.1 Strategies and Gavi's identity as a public-private partnership. However, there was limited shared understanding of the Strategy's strategic positioning and the different modalities for private sector engagement, alongside challenges in aligning private sector opportunities with country demand and priorities.	High
	Appropriateness of PSE Strategy for private sector	Private sector partners valued Gavi's credibility, government relationships and convening power. However, engagement processes were often perceived as overly burdensome, with transaction costs disproportionate to the scale of partnerships. *"there needs to be an acknowledgement that the ways of working, the processes, needs to have a different approach… otherwise, you're going to lose the participation of the private sector."*	Medium
Performance	**Efficiency in coordination within Gavi and partnership delivery**	Systemic organisational barriers limited implementation, including weak organisation-wide ownership of PSE, the loss of key champions through staff turnover, competing priorities and capacity constraints among country-facing teams, and structural differences between the operating models for private sector partnerships and Gavi's core country funding model. PSE process guidelines were also not deemed to be adequately comprehensive or socialised within Gavi. The portfolio grew opportunistically to a sizeable number of PSE projects, creating management demands that outpaced team capacity. The absence of clear portfolio prioritisation limited the Secretariat's ability to focus resources on the most strategic opportunities and maximise overall impact and efficiency.	Medium
	Results for PSE work under 5.0	MEL for PSE remained underdeveloped during Gavi 5.0, constraining Gavi's ability to demonstrate and assess the full value of private sector engagement. PSE mobilised US$576 million during Gavi 5.0, with 58% supporting COVAX and US$243 million for Gavi's core immunisation priorities, while also broadening Gavi's private sector donor base. Direct private sector commitments increased by 111%, demonstrating sustained growth beyond the incentives provided by the Matching Fund. PSE also strengthened Gavi's replenishment narrative and broader engagement with sovereign donors. Gavi successfully mobilised a diverse range of private sector expertise, capabilities and innovations. The performance and impact of these partnerships varied considerably depending on the extent to which they responded to country demand and were adopted and scaled within country programmes.	Medium
	Sustainability and scalability of PSE partnerships	Several partnerships generated useful learning and promising proof-of-concept results, but few had clear pathways to institutionalisation, scale, replication or exit.	Medium

Insights and implications on scale and sustainability

Insights from benchmarking Gavi peers on innovation sustainability and scale

Comparator organisations differed in mandate and financing models, but shared four characteristics that consistently supported the transition from innovation to scale:

1. **Define the route to scale before funding innovation.** The strongest organisations have realised they need to identify a plausible 'buyer' who will adopt, finance or sustain an innovation before committing resources, rather than assuming demand will emerge after successful pilots. For many, this begins by integrating innovations into their own delivery platforms—a pathway that Gavi is well placed to leverage through its country programmes and procurement architecture.

> *"Supply is almost never the problem; demand almost always is."*

2. **Treat innovation as a managed pipeline, not a collection of pilots.** Successful organisations actively prioritise, test, adapt and discontinue innovations, with explicit pathways from experimentation to operational deployment.
3. **Provide support beyond grant funding.** Technical assistance, operational testing, partnership brokering and structured governance were as important as funding in enabling innovations to scale.
4. **Reduce transaction costs.** Peer organisations increasingly use platform approaches, framework agreements and standardised partnership mechanisms to accelerate collaboration with the private sector.

Key insight for Gavi: Gavi is well positioned to strengthen innovation-to-scale because, unlike many peers, it already has a predictable procurement and country financing architecture. This creates a natural route to adoption that could be leveraged more systematically through Gavi 6.0.

Drawing from the case studies and consultations, five factors consistently distinguish Gavi PSE partnerships with genuine scale and sustainability potential from those that remain grant-dependent pilots. A caveat is that to date, scale and sustainability within the portfolio are the exception rather than the rule, and the evaluation reviewed only a subset of Gavi PSE partnerships.

Enabler for scale and sustainability	Implications for Gavi
1. Active government demand and willingness to pay	Help partners, particularly smaller innovators, navigate country financing, procurement and Ministry budget processes which are vital to sustainability
2. Cost-effectiveness and a credible commercial or financing model	Identify the 'buyer' early and embed "commercialisation" thinking — not profit, but a model where value is designed in from day one, not added on at closeout
3. Integration into existing government systems and workflows	Begin with national systems as the frame of reference rather than adding a new 'layer' or requirement
4. Country-specific contextual fit, not universal applicability	Scale and replication are context-dependent (e.g. geography, political and partner environment), not automatic; Where a solution worked, key conditions for success should be identified and factored into scale/replication planning
5. Upfront strategic planning how Gavi will serve as catalyst vs. long-term funder	Sustainable PS projects are those where Gavi's role was catalytic and transitional

Characteristics associated with higher strategic return private sector projects

Across the evaluation, partnerships that generated stronger strategic returns shared several common characteristics. These provide a practical framework for considering the likely value, implementation feasibility and longer-term sustainability of future private sector partnerships under Gavi 6.0.

High-return partnership characteristic	Illustrative considerations	Illustrative Gavi case study example
1. Clear value proposition	• Tackles key Gavi bottleneck • Aligned to partner comparative advantage and business model • High financial or other relevant leverage	**UPS STEP** leveraged specialist logistics expertise; **Unilever** combined funding with behaviour change and commercial capabilities; **Simprints** is developing the world's first biometrics use case for immunisation
2. Country alignment and implementation readiness	• Strong contextual fit • Active government engagement and champions • Integration with existing systems	**Zipline** in Nigeria and Rwanda demonstrated strong government demand; **Unilever** re-design in Indonesia strengthened its local relevance showing success in India was not replicable by default
3. Gavi catalytic role and leverage	• Clear Gavi convening or catalytic role • Secretariat effort is proportionate to expected strategic value	**VaxSocial** drew on Gavi's country convening platform *[without Gavi as a partner], "no one's going to listen to us or leverage the learnings that we uncover through our work.";* **UPS STEP** and **VaxSocial** had partner-financed project management support
4. Credible pathway to sustainability and scale/replication	• Pathway to cost-effectiveness/ affordability (where relevant) • Credible financing, commercial or institutional model • Evidence of sustained demand	In Rwanda, **Zipline** established a pathway to government financing, catalysed by Gavi PSE pilot funding and Innovation Top Up financing. **La Caixa's** near-term sustainability is assured. Replicating the financing partnership has market-dependent structural conditions

Conclusions and lessons learned

The main lessons from the 2021–2025 period relate less to the continued relevance of private sector engagement and more to the institutional conditions required for it to deliver results consistently.

Lesson 1. The Gavi PSE 5.0 strategy was conceptually sound, but there was a gap in shared understanding and operationalisation by the Secretariat. The experience of 2021–2025 demonstrates that strategic relevance alone is insufficient: successful private sector engagement depends on visible senior sponsorship, shared purpose, clear accountability and effective collaboration across PSI, programme and country teams.

Lesson 2. Country demand was the strongest determinant of partnership performance and sustainability. Gavi needs a structured way to bring supply and demand together. The evaluation also showed that successful partnerships balanced proactive private sector opportunity with country demand rather than relying exclusively on either a supply- or demand-led approach.

Lesson 3. Institutional incentives and organisational processes influenced how partnerships were prioritised and managed across the Secretariat. Key challenges of the 5.0 period were missing cross-team co-ownership, valuing expertise and innovation alongside funds raised, and structured channels through which any team can surface an opportunity or a country need. These are preconditions for effective PSE, not refinements.

Lesson 4: Gavi's internal processes were sub-optimal and streamlining them is a precondition for the partnership ambitions of 6.0. The lesson is not that Gavi should abandon rigour; the 5.0 risk was less an absence of governance than diligence applied without proportionality.

Lesson 5: The 5.0 period lacked an explicit portfolio-based approach, different strategies for different partner types, and the management burden became too high relative to team size. The lesson is to establish clear criteria what to take on, scale and decline, with different strategies for different partner types; and to define what Gavi manages directly and what it runs through platforms, particularly with a leaner Secretariat.

Lesson 6: A consistent framework for sustainability, scale and risk was never defined. Expectations for scale and sustainability varied across partnerships; risk appetite was not explicit; projects often lacked entry, continuation, and exit criteria; transition pathways to government financing or market shaping were rarely defined from the outset. The Innovation Scale-Up Facility provides an opportunity to introduce this discipline under Gavi 6.0.

Lesson 7: Advocacy was a stated 5.0 modality that delivered real value for sovereign fundraising but was underrecognized. The lesson is that while the PSE Strategy recognised this modality, it didn't measure it or make it visible enough or build its capture into the measurement architecture.

Lesson 8: PSE MEL was not meaningfully developed, so PSE could not demonstrate its outputs, its outcomes for beneficiaries, or the value of its non-cash contributions. 5.0 lacked a shared key performance indicators (KPI) architecture, co-owned across private sector and programme teams, which captured financial, advocacy, expertise and innovation value and outcomes for beneficiaries. It is the precondition for every other lesson here.

Recommendations

Six recommendations are organised into four areas (i) strategic positioning and prioritisation; (ii) operationalisation and shared accountability; (iii) innovation and scale-up approach; and (iv) performance measurement and MEL. The full report provides details for each recommendation, alongside a signposting of the rationale and suggested timing and business unit responsibility.

Strategic positioning and prioritisation

Recommendation 1. The Gavi 6.0 PSE Strategy should clearly define the purpose and comparative advantage of private sector engagement for Gavi and focus resources on the areas where the private sector brings the greatest additional value in a changing development and financing landscape.

(i) **Identify a strong statement of purpose** on what and how the private sector can contribute to Gavi.

(ii) **Retain a multi-modal approach** – within this **recognise advocacy** as a strategic outcome of PSE and **include in-kind partnerships and contributions in a targeted and selected manner** – see also box below.

(iii) **Focus PSE efforts** on artificial intelligence (AI) partnerships, the new generation of AI technology philanthropy, relationship-intensive segments (major philanthropies, ultra-high net worth individuals, family offices, and especially technology companies), and domestic and regional private sector actors.

The AI and digital infrastructure sector offer huge potential to Gavi, on two distinct tracks:

(i) The companies themselves offer more expertise than cash: capabilities, embedded talent and co-built solutions, with success dependent on Gavi's technical absorptive capacity and data readiness.

(ii) Separately, the AI boom is creating a new pool of personal wealth. Reported estimates put this at US$37 billion to US$100 billion a year in future giving (press-reported, not independently verified). This capital seeks impact rather than AI adoption. It is expected to be substantially earmarked and thematically selective and will be routed largely through cost-effectiveness intermediaries that assess evidence before relationships.

The two tracks call for Gavi to implement two distinct engagement strategies.

Looking ahead to Gavi 6.0, financing trends suggest that accessing emerging philanthropic wealth—particularly from the technology sector—will require both streamlined internal processes and a different model of engagement. Funders increasingly expect co-creation, robust evidence on cost-effectiveness and impact, and confidence that organisations can deploy capital quickly and effectively.

These expectations also apply to many of Gavi's existing private sector partners. Gavi's peers are already adapting to this environment, embedding stronger evidence generation and more agile partnership models.

Recommendation 2. Manage PSE as a strategic portfolio, focusing on fewer partnerships with greater and longer-term impact.

(i) **Adopt a deliberate approach to PSE** – prioritise scale, emphasise depth.

For example, a strategic and deliberate approach to portfolio management would entail adopting a "tiered" approach" with a small number of committed strategic bets, each backed by a defined Gavi strategy that partners

can join, a bounded window for opportunistic partnerships accepted against the same entry criteria, and a defined risk appetite for the portfolio as a whole, including the share of resources allocated to experimental engagements.

(ii) **Adopt bespoke strategies for different private sector actors** – e.g. recognise high level of effort (LOE) required for relationship building with new and philanthropic partners, actively engage country teams for local private sector opportunities, use platforms where robust and efficient structures exist/ can be created.

Platform-based models allow organisations to do more with less headcount, but the coordination costs need to be funded. The model may facilitate scale but may not always deliver on planned strategy (as control is reduced) and requires matching of partners' risk appetites. The evidence is direct on what decides outcomes: a funded, staffed coordination backbone is what separates working vehicles from ones that stall – not the platform's design or its members. Gavi already holds two reference points on platforms, AHO/VaxSocial and the Scale-Up Facility, and the decision is not whether to pursue platform-based approaches but where each objective sits, from co-funded project to full multi-stakeholder vehicle. Gavi needs to decide its position, fund the backbone before recruiting members, and set governance, metrics and a sunset clause at the design stage.

(iii) **Use explicit criteria to determine which partnerships to initiate, adapt, scale or exit** – entry criteria should consider sustainability and transition plan and return on investment (ROI).

Recommendation 3. Develop a dedicated offer for the new generation of technology philanthropy, built around a simple multi-funder mechanism and the evidence base required to be credible to evidence-driven funders.

(i) **Design a simple, flexible multi-funder mechanism** – that is legible, co-created and initiated fast.

(ii) **Build the organisational readiness this capital demands**: capacity to produce cost-effectiveness analysis and impact data to the standard these funders expect, responsiveness to information requests, and openness about uncertainty – with concomitant resource requirements.

Operationalisation and shared accountability

Recommendation 4. Gavi should enhance and streamline PSE governance, foster a country-oriented approach by embedding PSE through a formal business partnering model, with shared accountability across the Secretariat for delivery.

(i) **Governance**: (i) Identify a named executive sponsor at senior leadership level; (ii) Define roles, responsibilities and standard operating procedures; (iii) Simplify governance and fiduciary processes through proportionate risk management.

(ii) **Country-oriented approach with needed business partnering**: (i) Plan PSE opportunities jointly with technical and country teams from origination; (ii) Gavi should also develop a pipeline of unfunded country priorities from the holistic country application process, which PSE can take to prospective partners.

Given its cross-cutting technical role and visibility across country programmes, **the Health Systems and Immunisation Strengthening (HSIS) team should be considered the primary business partner for the Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation (PSI) team** in shaping partnerships aligned with Gavi health systems strengthening (HSS) priorities and with the Country Delivery Department (CDD) engaged to ensure country relevance, ownership and successful implementation. The **Strategy team should be engaged, and lead where appropriate, when a partnership carries organisation-wide strategic implications**, given its reach across the Secretariat.

Innovation and scale-up approach

Recommendation 5. The PSE strategy should define its approach to innovation which distinguishes between experimentation, scale and long-term ownership, and which identifies the 'buyer' in the pathway to adoption and scale.

(i) **Differentiate between innovations** early in the value chain intended to generate evidence, and more mature innovations intended to be scaled, recognising that these require different governance, risk tolerance and exit logic. **Define what scale means** for Gavi and for each innovation portfolio at the outset and apply explicit entry, continuation and exit criteria accordingly.

(ii) **Link the Innovation for Uptake, Scale and Equity in Immunisation (INFUSE) platform explicitly** to the Innovation Scale-Up Facility, Gavi Market Shaping, HSIS and country funding opportunities, and Gavi's innovation strategy, and **identify a single named owner accountable for a solution's progression from INFUSE evidence generation through to scale-up**.

Blended finance models may be considered, keeping in mind issues regarding fund scope, generating a credible pipeline, requirements of catalytic grant funding alongside commercial capital, need for supporting technical assistance (TA) to facilitate successful investments, specialist skills set requirements, balance between private sector and development finance institution (DFI) capital and interest, amongst others.

Performance measurement and MEL

Recommendation 6. Develop a strategy level MEL framework that measures Secretariat performance, PSE outcomes and supports strategic decision-making, continuous improvement and resource mobilisation.

(i) **Develop a comprehensive and yet right-sized MEL framework** fully aligned with the strategic positioning and prioritisation outlined in Recommendation 1.

- Use portfolio learning and regular portfolio reporting to inform partnership selection, portfolio management, strategy adaptation and governance oversight, so that MEL evidence is actively used in decision-making rather than only measured and reported.
- Build the evidence capability needed to engage evidence-driven funders, including robust impact and cost-effectiveness data.
- Ensure adequate resource capacity to deliver effectively on MEL.

Ensure **shared KPIs** across Gavi functions/ teams to support shared accountability and measurement.

1. INTRODUCTION

This report presents the evaluation of Gavi's Private Sector Engagement (PSE) Strategy 2021-2025. This first section covers the evaluation background and context (Section 1.1), objectives and governance (Section 1.2), framework and methodology (Section 1.3) and report structure (Section 1.4).

1.1. EVALUATION BACKGROUND

Gavi's Private Sector Engagement Strategy 2021 – 2025

Gavi's PSE Strategy 2021-2025 was designed to mobilise financial and non-financial resources, expertise and innovation from corporations, philanthropies, foundations, civil society and high net worth individuals (HNWI) in support of Gavi's immunisation objectives. The Strategy built on Gavi's earlier PSE work, which was launched in 2016, and positioned private sector engagement as a **core enabler of the Gavi 5.0 Strategy**. The Strategy aimed to: (i) mobilise flexible and sustainable resources to support Gavi's core mission and respond to emerging needs; (ii) leverage private sector expertise, tools and networks to address programmatic bottlenecks and strengthen country led delivery; (iii) foster innovation and technology adoption that can generate scalable and sustainable solutions to immunisation challenges; and (iv) enhance advocacy and visibility for immunisation through private sector influence, networks and communications platforms. The Strategy was implemented through three main engagement modalities:

- **Funding and advocacy partnerships** focused on mobilising financing and advocacy support for Gavi. Key initiatives include the Matching Fund, which used 1-1 matching to attract private sector contributions.
- **Expertise-based partnerships** aimed to channel private sector capabilities to address immunisation bottlenecks, based on matching private sector supply with country and programme demand.
- **Innovation partnerships** focused on new products, practices and services that could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of immunisation delivery. This includes Gavi's Innovation for Uptake, Scale and Equity in Immunisation (INFUSE) platform, designed to identify and support innovations of relevance to country immunisation challenges.

Gavi PSE Strategy context

The PSE Strategy was implemented during a period of significant change for Gavi and the wider global health financing environment. The early years of the strategy period were shaped by the **COVID-19 pandemic**, including Gavi's role in mobilising funding for the global response and administering the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access Facility Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC). The latter part of the strategy period coincided with Gavi's sixth replenishment in 2025 and a markedly more **constrained financing environment**. This has increased pressure on global health institutions to protect immunisation gains while demonstrating efficiency, value and diversified approaches to financing. Although Gavi's sixth replenishment pledging summit secured more than US$9.4 billion – an important achievement in this context – it fell short of the US$11.9 billion target.[1] **Gavi 6.0** and the **Gavi Leap** respond to these challenges through a new country operating model and broader institutional reforms aimed at strengthening efficiency, partnerships and country leadership. The new strategic period also begins with a significantly **leaner Secretariat**, following an approximately 30% reduction in overall staffing.

Against this backdrop, Gavi is developing its 2026–2030 Private Sector and Innovation Strategy. This evaluation therefore provides a timely assessment of how the 2021–2025 PSE Strategy contributed to Gavi's objectives and the

[1] Gavi (2025). Gavi pledging table. https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/investing/gavi-pledging-table-2026-2030.pdf.

lessons that should inform the future role, design and positioning of private sector engagement under Gavi 6.0, cognizant of the ongoing dynamic environment for Gavi as a while and Gavi PSE in particular.

1.2. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND GOVERNANCE

1.2.1. Evaluation objective, purpose and scope

The **evaluation purpose and objectives** are to (1) assess the relevance, performance and sustainability of the PSE 2021-2025 Strategy and (2) develop actionable lessons and recommendations to inform the design of the next PSE Strategy. Whilst the evaluation is retrospective, there is a significant forward-looking component with findings informing the new PSE Strategy to be delivered under Gavi Leap. The **evaluation scope** includes the full cycle of the 2021-2025 Strategy (including design, implementation and results) and is global with a selection of partnerships analysed through in-depth case studies. The scope does not cover private sector engagements with the Market Shaping and Supply Chain functions.

To **enhance the forward-looking component of the evaluation** in order to maximise utility, the evaluation scope was extended to include an assessment of emerging trends in private sector funding, deep-dive analysis of peer organisation approaches to private sector engagement, and a review of various operational models of private sector engagement.

The evaluation has an explicit **use case** to inform the new PSE Strategy for Gavi 6.0, intended to be shared with the Gavi Board in December 2026. The **audience** for the evaluation is the Gavi Secretariat, Board and Programme and Policy Committee. It also intended for Alliance partners, implementing countries, and sovereign, corporate and philanthropic partners to support alignment of private sector engagement with national priorities.

1.2.2. Evaluation governance

The evaluation was commissioned and managed by the Evaluation Unit of Gavi's Measurement, Evaluation and Learning department, with an Evaluation Manager serving as the core focal point. An **Evaluation Advisory Committee (EAC)** undertook quality assurance (QA) on the draft inception and draft evaluation reports, applying Gavi's structured QA tool. An **Evaluation Steering Committee (SteerCo)** brings additional expertise in the subject matter and evaluation expertise and was engaged with the evaluation at these same milestones. The **Private Sector and Innovation (PSI) team and Strategy team** at the Gavi Secretariat have been engaged as a key evaluation user throughout, with key touchpoints for fact-finding and evaluative evidence.

1.3. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

Evaluation framework and questions

The evaluation framework is structured around **three evaluation pillars** of **relevance, performance and lessons for Gavi 6.0** (Figure 1.1 over page). The framework covers **eleven evaluation questions (EQs)**, mapped to **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) criteria of relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability**. The framework also reflects the evaluation's **learning focus** to inform Gavi PSE 6.0. The evaluation used an **adapted theory-based approach with contribution analysis.** This reflects the limitations of the PSE Strategy Theory of Change (TOC)[2] – included in Appendix A, whereby the evaluation used the TOC as a reference point to structure the enquiry rather than treating the TOC as a fixed results pathway.

[2] The TOC does not capture the full range of PSE benefits, reflect key aspects of how PSE operates in practice and within Gavi's evolving context, or provide a clear measurement framework.

Figure 1.1: Evaluation framework and methodology

Evaluation pillar	OECD DAC evaluation criteria and Evaluation Questions	Approach and methods
Relevance	1. **Relevance and coherence:** To what extent were the private sector objectives and modalities aligned with Gavi's 5.0/5.1 strategic priorities, given the evolution of the Strategy over this period? 2. **Relevance and coherence:** To what extent are the existing private sector modalities and processes appropriate for effective engagement with the private sector?	❖ **OECD DAC evaluation criteria** ❖ **'Adapted' theory-based approach using existing TOC as a frame and contribution analysis approach, also recognising evolving context and range of outcomes** ❖ **Mixed methods** ❖ **Data triangulation and robustness assessment** ❖ **Consideration of gender, equity and inclusion aspects, including ethical considerations**
Performance	***Implementation efficiency*** 3. **Efficiency:** To what extent were PSE modalities effectively coordinated across the Gavi Secretariat? Which governance, management, and coordination processes within the PSE strategy were perceived to enable or limit achievement of results? 4. **Efficiency:** To what extent was implementation of the PSE Strategy, including different PSE modalities, done in a timely, cost-effective manner? Were there opportunities for efficiency gains, if any? 5. **Efficiency:** To what extent were recommendations from the previous PSE evaluation (2016-2020) implemented, and to what extent they may have influenced results under 5.0/5.1? ***Results, enablers and inhibitors*** 6. **Effectiveness:** To what extent were the PSE Strategy outputs and outcomes achieved? Specifically, how effective were the PSE modalities and activities in contributing to results at Secretariat, partner, and country levels, including: (a) funding, (b) advocacy, (c) innovation and technology, (d) expertise? 7. **Effectiveness and sustainability:** To what extent did the PSE Strategy facilitate sustainable partnerships, including mechanisms for replication, institutionalization, or scale-up? Which partnerships have the most potential to be scaled or be replicated across countries and what are the enabling and contextual factors to consider when doing this? 8. **Effectiveness:** Which partnerships under the PSE Strategy were perceived to be most effective for delivering against Gavi's objectives and what were the enabling/limiting factors contributing to their success? What are implications for assessing which partnerships will achieve good RoI?	
Lessons for 6.0	**9. Overall conclusions and lessons from 5.0 PSE Strategy, implementation and results:** What key lessons from the 2021-2025 period could best inform the next Private Sector and Innovation Strategy? **10. Strategic considerations going forward:** What risks, opportunity costs, trade-offs and strategic considerations should guide the design of PSE Strategy in Gavi 6.0? **11. PSE and overall Gavi 6.0 alignment:** How should the PSE approach evolve to remain impactful, scalable, and aligned with Gavi 6.0 priorities?	

Mixed methods evaluation

The evaluation applied a mixed methods approach as detailed in Figure 1.2.

Figure 1.2: Evaluation mixed methods



Document and data review
- Gavi strategy documents, Board and policy papers, other public documents
- Data on private sector financial contributions to Gavi, select metrics on PSE projects

KIIs, FGD and workshops
- 116 stakeholders interviewed, including 87 at global and 29 at country/ regional levels, using recognised and ethical interview techniques and practices
- AI-assisted analysis with human validation
- Workshop with Gavi to validate findings and co-create recommendations

Project case studies
- 6 Gavi private sector projects, based on remote and in-person consultations, and review of relevant documents and data

Comparator analysis and operating-model deep dives
- 9 comparator and peer organisations
- Deep dive on 4 operating models and approaches relevant to Gavi PSE
- Megatrends analysis of private sector financing

Triangulation and robustness rating: Evidence was triangulated across methods to identify convergence and divergence. Each key finding was assigned a relative strength of evidence rating, based on the quantity, quality, reliability and specificity of supporting evidence across sources, stakeholder groups, methods and case studies

Supporting materials detailing the evaluation methods are provided in the appendices (bibliography in Appendix B, key informant interview (KII) list and interview guides in Appendix C). Project case studies and comparators are summarised in Table 1.1 below.

Table 1.1: List of project case studies and comparators

List of case studies
1. **La Caixa Foundation – US$120.7 million (2008 – 2025):** Long-running funding and advocacy partnership mobilising CaixaBank corporate and private banking clients for matched immunisation financing
2. **Zipline and United Parcel Service (UPS) Foundation – US$16.33 million (2016 – present):** Innovation and operational partnership using autonomous drone delivery to strengthen last-mile vaccine and health commodity supply chains (Rwanda, Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya)
3. **Simprints – US$9.9 million (2020 – 2027)**: Innovation partnership using biometric identification to link children to vaccination records and improve tracking in frontline immunisation systems (Bangladesh & Ghana)
4. **Unilever / Keluarga SIGAP – US$6.5 million (2022 – 2025)**: Expertise-based partnership applying private-sector behaviour change and consumer engagement approaches to immunisation, nutrition and handwashing behaviours (Indonesia)
5. **VaxSocial (Advancing Health Online (AHO)) – US$13 million (2023 – 2026):** Digital demand-generation partnership testing whether online and social media engagement can increase vaccine confidence and offline uptake (Nigeria, India, Indonesia)
6. **Mastercard Wellness Pass – US$5.75 million (2022 – 2025), one initiative within Mastercard's broader US$77.2 million support to Gavi 2020:** Expertise-based digital health partnership adapting Mastercard's Community Pass platform to support individual vaccination records and data use (Ethiopia)
List of comparators
Core evaluation focus: Global Fund, Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA)
Additional under amendment: World Food Programme (WFP) and **WFP Innovation Accelerator,** Save the Children, International Rescue Committee (IRC), **World Health Organization (WHO) Foundation, Unitaid**

Evaluation method limitations and mitigation measures

The following were key limitations and mitigations for the evaluation: (1) **Varying stakeholder familiarity with Gavi's PSE Strategy, projects and achievements**, particularly for long-running projects. To support robustness, findings were triangulated across stakeholder groups and evidence sources. (2) **Inconsistent and incomplete project-level data across sources**, including for some efficiency and effectiveness metrics. The evaluation team worked with Gavi

to clarify data where possible, cross-checked evidence across internal trackers, project documentation, consultations and public materials, and qualified findings where gaps remained. The efficiency and effectiveness assessments were adapted accordingly as explained below in the respective EQ sections. (3) **Interviewee bias** (e.g. private sector (PS) project implementers more supportive of its success). The evaluation has conducted a well-rounded set of interviews, ensuring all perspectives across issues which have then been triangulated across. (4) **Generalisation of findings from case studies and comparator organisation reviews.** Case study reviews have been complemented by wider portfolio reviews supported through document review and KIIs. Where aspects are specific to a case study these have been flagged. Caution has been employed in interpretation and considering relevance for Gavi during the comparator review.

Triangulation and robustness rating

Evidence was triangulated across methods to identify convergence and divergence. Each key finding was assigned a relative strength of evidence rating, based on the quantity, quality, reliability and specificity of supporting evidence across sources, stakeholder groups, methods and case studies (Table 1.2).

Table 1.2: Strength of evidence rating for findings

Rating	Assessment
High (4) 🟩🟩🟩🟩	The finding is supported by multiple sources of generally good quality, allowing robust triangulation across documents, data, stakeholder consultations, case studies and, where relevant, comparator or workshop evidence.
Medium (3) 🟨🟨🟨	The finding is supported by several sources of generally good or mixed quality. Triangulation is possible, but evidence coverage is not complete, or is stronger for some sources, stakeholder groups or case studies than others.
Low (2) 🟧🟧	The finding is supported by limited evidence, or by multiple sources of weaker quality. Triangulation is limited and the finding should be interpreted with caution.
Insufficient (1) 🟥	The finding is supported by incomplete, unreliable or contradictory evidence. Findings with insufficient evidence were not included as evaluation findings.

1.4. Report structure

The remainder of the report presents findings on relevance (Section 2), performance, including efficiency, results, sustainability and scale (Section 3), conclusions and lessons for Gavi 6.0 (Section 4), and recommendations for the future Private Sector and Innovation Strategy (Section 5).

The report is supported by the following appendices: Appendix A presents the PSE Strategy 2021 to 2025 theory of change; Appendix B provides the bibliography; Appendix C provides the interview list and guide; Appendix D provides the evidence mapping by EQ; Appendix E provides the PSE process mapping; Appendix F provides the efficiency analysis across case studies; Appendix G assesses progress against the recommendations from the 2016–2020 PSE evaluation; and Appendix H provides the analysis of INFUSE results.

Three separate annex documents were developed and are not published: (1) Project case study reports; (2) Comparator analysis; and (3) Tasks under the expanded scope through the evaluation extension.

2. EVALUATION PILLAR 1: RELEVANCE

2.1. PSE Strategy alignment with Gavi 5.0/5.1 Strategy

EQ1. *Relevance and coherence*: To what extent were the private sector objectives and modalities aligned with Gavi's 5.0/5.1 strategic priorities, given the evolution of the Strategy over this period?

Our assessment of the alignment of the PSE Strategy to Gavi's overall strategy considers the evolving context over the strategy period described in Section 1.1.

Finding 1. Gavi's PSE strategy objectives and modalities were conceptually relevant to Gavi's strategy and mandate as a public-private partnership (PPP), offering a broad framework for harnessing private sector comparative advantage in service of immunisation objectives.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
High	Evidenced by document review, analysis of PSE project alignment to Gavi priorities, and stakeholder interviews. Although detailed knowledge of the PSE Strategy varied across the Secretariat, the finding was consistently supported across evidence sources.

PSE Strategy objectives were aligned with Gavi's overall objectives and priorities: Private sector engagement was positioned as an enabler within the Gavi 5.0 Strategy and reflects Gavi's identity as a PPP.[3] The PSE Strategy aligned with Gavi 5.0/5.1 objectives in that it "aims at mobilising private sector contributions in support of Gavi's efforts to reach zero-dose and under-immunised children"[4] and aids efforts at alleviating health systems bottlenecks in areas such as (i) immunisation supply chains; (ii) data systems; and (iii) demand promotion.[5] Key Gavi thematic strategies, specifically (i) the Digital Health Information (DHI) and Immunisation Supply Chain (iSC) strategies describe the private sector as an enabler[6]; and (ii) Gavi's Innovation strategy describes the private sector as a Gavi 'funding lever' to help countries test or scale innovations, including through INFUSE, Gavi's innovation incubator.

PSE partnership modalities were relevant: Through three partnership modalities – funding and advocacy, expertise-based partnerships, and innovation – the strategy provides multiple entry points for mobilising private-sector financial and non-financial resources in support of Gavi priorities. The three modalities are conceptually grounded in a logic of comparative advantage: mobilising additional private sector financing, deploying corporate operational know-how to solve immunisation delivery bottlenecks, and introducing innovations capable of unlocking hard-to-reach populations. Across consultations, stakeholders broadly affirmed this framework as appropriate in principle. The Matching Fund was frequently cited as a particularly well-designed instrument, enabling risk-tolerant experimentation with integrated and cross-sectoral approaches, such as "End Child Wasting" nutrition-immunisation programming in Ethiopia, that would not be permissible under Gavi's standard financing modalities. Expertise-based partnerships with organisations such as UPS and Unilever were seen as appropriately leveraging market-leading capabilities in supply chain, behaviour change and last-mile delivery. Innovation-oriented partnerships through INFUSE were described as an important pipeline mechanism for identifying and testing frontier solutions such as drone delivery (Zipline), biometric identification (Simprints) and digital health tools.

PSE enhances Gavi's value proposition: The strategy's relevance also stems from its contribution to Gavi's broader value proposition by enhancing its reputation as an innovative, multi-stakeholder organisation. In an increasingly resource-constrained global health financing environment, the strategic rationale for PSE has also strengthened.

[3] Gavi (30 November – 2 December 2021) Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy.

[4] Ibid

[5] In October 2021, the Programme and Policy Committee (PPC) recommended for Board approval the principles of Gavi's 5.0 private sector engagement (PSE) strategy, namely that it is country driven, aligned to Gavi's zero-dose agenda, vaccine delivery, and immunisation system strengthening.

[6] The DHI strategy acknowledges the rapid transition to digital interventions during COVID and Gavi's comparative advantage to set priorities and convene private sector, civil society and other stakeholders to coordinate country DHI support. The iSC strategy describes engaging the private sector to find creative solutions for local challenges and recognises opportunities to outsource functions to the private sector where existing capacities can be leveraged.

Several stakeholders noted that Gavi's ability to demonstrate private sector engagement and innovative partnerships has become more important for its value proposition to sovereign donors, particularly during replenishment cycles.

Finding 2. While the PSE Strategy was conceptually relevant, shared understanding of its strategic positioning and operationalisation across Gavi was limited. This compromised the strategy's relevance and coherence.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
High	Strongly evidenced by document review, stakeholder interviews and through case studies. There were different points of emphasis across consultations, however overall messaging pointed to the aspects highlighted below.

Despite strong conceptual relevance of the Gavi PSE 5.0 Strategy, there were a number of challenges related its implementation. These are summarised in Figure 2.1 and explained in more detail below. Some of these challenges can be traced to changes in identity and senior individuals within Gavi: as leadership changed, the story shifted with it, leaving the proposition of PSE within Gavi carried by individuals rather than the institution.

Figure 2.1: Key challenges compromising PSE Strategy relevance and coherence



Varied understanding of the PSE Strategy and modalities. Some interviewees viewed the strategy as well aligned with Gavi's health systems strengthening (HSS) priorities and particularly relevant for addressing persistent challenges that are difficult to solve through core grant funding. Others described it as a "black box", with limited visibility of its objectives and relationship to Gavi's core business. Consultations also reveal the boundaries between different PSE modalities (financing and advocacy, innovation, expertise) were inconsistently understood. This ambiguity is not merely definitional. It has practical consequences: it makes it difficult for country teams to anticipate what PSE can offer and for the Secretariat to take a coherent portfolio view across modalities (Box 2.1 illustrates the blurring of modalities in practice).

Box 2.1. Varied understanding and application of PSE modalities

Secretariat stakeholders tended to associate PSE with innovation regardless of the formal modality. Several PSE projects also were considered having dual modalities: for example, the Zipline partnership was described as both an expertise and innovation partnership. Many expertise-based partnerships also provide both financing and in-kind support (e.g. Mastercard Wellness Pass; UPS, which provided funding for Zipline and in-kind support for the Strategic Training Executive Programme (STEP) supply chain coaching initiative). Expertise-based partnerships in particular were the least systematically developed modality with no consistent framework for defining what "expertise" meant or how its deployment was assessed. Most partnerships were also seen as contributing advocacy value to Gavi, even if not described as such.

Lack of clarity on balance between resource mobilisation and programmatic impact objectives: A deeper question of strategic positioning concerns the extent to which PSE is fundamentally oriented around resource mobilisation versus programmatic impact. While these objectives are complementary and mutually reinforcing in

effective private sector engagement, several stakeholders perceived that fundraising considerations had greater influence over the design and selection of partnerships (discussed further in EQ3).

Challenges in aligning private sector partnership opportunities with country needs and priorities. Unlike core Gavi investments, private sector partnerships often originate from partner interests, capabilities and funding cycles rather than from country requests. As a result, aligning partner opportunities with country priorities requires balancing supply-side opportunities with country demand. Evidence from case studies and consultations suggests the principle of matching PS supply to country-driven demand[7] was applied inconsistently, contributing to perceptions that some PS partnerships operate alongside, rather than being integrated into core country programmes, with one country team interviewee described some projects as "forced upon" country teams and governments.

Case studies also illustrate how alignment can evolve over time in response to changing circumstances. Zipline and VaxSocial demonstrated strong country ownership, whereas political changes in Bangladesh disrupted Simprints' traction with the government. Similarly, the Mastercard Wellness Pass partnership was initially conceived with the Ethiopian Ministry of Health to support the country's COVID-19 response but lost much of its original rationale as the pandemic subsided and COVID-19 vaccination campaigns came to an end.

At the same time, several interviewees questioned whether a strict demand-driven model is always appropriate, noting that innovative ideas and capabilities often originate outside countries which means some degree of supply-side proactivity is legitimate and necessary. The challenge is not to eliminate supply-side initiative but to ensure that it is always paired with genuine country alignment before commitments are made. There is strong consensus that country alignment is central to whether PS investment will be impactful and sustainable and ultimately embedded within country programmes (discussed further in effectiveness EQs).

Advocacy role of PSE not well developed in the strategy and under-recognised within Gavi. Consultations identified that the strategy under-recognised advocacy, influence, and relationship-building as important pathways through which PSE creates value. While these contributions featured prominently in stakeholder accounts, they are not well articulated in the strategy's theory of change or measurement framework (discussed in EQ5 and 6). The Zipline partnership illustrates this: its high-level, leadership-driven origins generated substantial attention, media profile and advocacy value for Gavi, yet this remains among the least systematically captured dimensions of PSE's contribution in the strategy's theory of change. This finding does not suggest that PSE should be driven by advocacy objectives. Rather, it highlights the need to recognise and measure the full range of value PSE creates beyond financial and programmatic outcomes.

PSE partnership work on innovation and expertise-based partnerships risk diminishing their value unless they can achieve scale. A recurring theme across consultations was that many partnerships had generated promising pilots, learning, or proof-of-concept demonstrations, while comparatively few progressed to broader adoption and scale during the 2021–2025 Strategy period. The value proposition to Gavi of these partnerships diminishes if promising pilots do not translate to demonstrable success stories over the medium to longer-term. This issue is further examined in innovation results (EQ6) and sustainability (EQ7), with analysis how comparator organisations are pursuing innovations and issues in their sustainability and scale (Box 3.9 and 3.10). The significant decline in the global health financing context was cited by Gavi and other stakeholders as further strengthening the imperative for scalable private sector solutions – being representative of funds well used. A separate issue for Gavi is the absence of a unifying framework of how PSE and other Gavi supported innovation comes together at the country level. This contributes to potential duplication and fragmentation: a 2024 analysis to support operationalisation of Gavi's

[7] The supply-demand framework for PSE expertise-based partnerships envisages a structured life cycle in which country teams lead the definition of needs and priorities, PSE leads the landscaping and assessment of potential partners and business models, and the two tracks converge through an iterative feedback loop before design and implementation.

Innovation strategy similarly identified the need for more coordinated, informed and streamlined operational approach to innovation within the organisation.[8]

2.2. Appropriateness of Gavi modalities for engagement with private sector

EQ2. *Relevance and coherence:* To what extent are the existing private sector modalities and processes appropriate for effective engagement with the private sector?

Finding 3. Private sector partners value Gavi's credibility, government relationships and convening power above all else — but consistently report friction in the partnership experience. This may affect future engagement if not addressed.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
Medium	Evidenced by document review, stakeholder interviews, particularly with Gavi's private sector partners and other external partners, and through case studies. Medium robustness reflects that a sub-set of Gavi's private sector partners were interviewed and may therefore not be fully representative of all private sector perspectives however consistency across private sector stakeholders is high.

Across case studies and private sector partner consultations, the value of working with Gavi is clearly and repeatedly articulated and goes well beyond a transactional funding relationship. Partners consistently highlight the following areas of added value that are difficult to replicate through other channels.

- **Gavi's credibility and legitimacy as a global health actor.** The VaxSocial partnership with MSD and others was built on the explicit recognition that, without Gavi as a partner, "no one's going to listen to us or leverage the learnings that we uncover through our work." Gavi's legitimacy and government relationships were described as "very compelling" for private sector partners, including its ability to create the necessary distance between pharmaceutical companies and grant-making decisions.
- **Gavi's access to and relationships with governments.** One private sector actor indicated that Gavi "helped us get a seat at the table with government partners because Gavi had the respect of government." This enabled them to have conversations that would not otherwise have been possible. For the VaxSocial project, country selection depended critically on Gavi's ability to validate country fit and secure in-country government acceptance. In the Unilever Keluarga SIGAP project, WPP Media and Power of Nutrition likewise identified Gavi's immunisation mandate and government convening power as the partnership's decisive added value in Indonesia.
- **Gavi's ability to translate between private sector and public health logics.** This "ability to marry the two worlds" was described as a distinctive and valued capability. The Matching Fund was also highlighted as a key mechanism for catalysing co-investment, with the match structure creating internal selling points that help partners justify continued investment to their own leadership.

Against this appreciation for what Gavi brings, partner accounts reveal a consistent concern: that the transaction costs of working with Gavi are disproportionate to the scale of many engagements and are poorly calibrated to private sector ways of working. There are reports that relevant entry points for engaging Gavi have been unclear, along with internal process burdens, unclear decision rights, and slow timelines which undermine the partnership experience and put future engagement at risk. The concern is not about whether Gavi creates value, but **whether the process of accessing that value is sustainable for partners**. This is consistent with feedback collected by Gavi from INFUSE Pacesetters that the pace and complexity of Gavi's processes was poorly compatible with private-sector and

[8] Gavi (2024). Operationalising Gavi's Innovation Strategy

entrepreneurial realities.[9] These issues are recognised more widely, and several are described in detail in EQ3 where internal process efficiency and root-cause analysis is considered further. They include:

- **Lack of clarity on relevant entry points to Gavi.** Prospective and existing partners report difficulty identifying how to engage with Gavi, with similar challenges also reported by one current sovereign donor and one foundation donor. While the Matching Fund was described as the most accessible modality, moving into country co-funds and the fragility window required engaging a multiplying set of internal stakeholders, a difficulty attributed to Gavi's internal matrix structure rather than to any single team. The definitional ambiguity between modalities described under EQ1 compounds the problem, as partners cannot easily anticipate which route fits their offer.

- **Contracting and approval timelines were the most frequently cited pain point.** Simprints contracting deals were reported to have taken anywhere from nine months to two and a half years. The Mastercard Wellness Pass project in Ethiopia took approximately 10-11 months for procurement and contracting of the local implementing partner — described by one interviewee as "a record delay" — meaning the COVID vaccination campaign use case had largely passed by the time the contract was signed. One partner reports, "***there needs to be an acknowledgement that the ways of working, the processes, needs to have a different approach… otherwise, you're going to lose the participation of the private sector."***

- **Decision-making authority and escalation were also persistently problematic.** Private sector partners highlighted the challenge of multiple signoffs across Gavi teams and governments, with no neutral convening entity to broker resolutions. Some of the feedback received described the governance burden as "*daunting*" and stated that "*it's very bureaucratic … and sometimes in the private sector, that wears us down*." In the VaxSocial project, the process of hiring a dedicated Gavi full-time equivalent (FTE) to manage the partnership took more than six months, and by one account up to two years, meaning the person arrived after grantees had already been selected and projects had started. Another private sector partner noted that corporate impact teams operate with limited internal bandwidth and value concise reporting a corporate leader can grasp in a single step ("*if there is more than one step in explaining, it's too many. Gavi's current reporting and engagement style does not consistently provide this*").

Box 2.2. What future private sector partners will expect from Gavi

Looking ahead to the Gavi 6.0 period, the megatrends analysis consistently indicates that accessing emerging philanthropic wealth, particularly from the technology sector, will entail streamlined internal processes and shifts in external engagement, including:

- More 'co-creation' and engagement, not only funding;
- The capacity to produce cost-effectiveness analysis and impact data to the standard these funders expect and to engage in this area; and
- Demonstrating Gavi decision-making pace and absorptive capacity to credibly deploy substantially more capital.

These requirements are also pertinent for several of Gavi's existing private sector partners.

Some peer organisations are already effectuating one of more of these elements: IRC embedded cost-effectiveness analysis through a dedicated 'Best Use of Resources' team, and this underpins a funding relationship with GiveWell worth around US$10 million annually across interventions including malnutrition, immunisation and chlorination.

For Gavi, streamlining internal processes to engage these PS partners will be important enablers of the partnership ambitions set out in Gavi 6.0.

[9] Unlock Aid (2024). Unlocking Downstream Innovation to Improve Health Outcomes: Recommendations for Gavi and the Global Fund.

3. EVALUATION PILLAR 2: PERFORMANCE

This section presents findings on PSE Strategy implementation and results.

The Strategy mobilised significant resources, strengthened Gavi's private sector relationships and demonstrated value across financing, advocacy, expertise and innovation. The findings highlight both areas of strong performance and opportunities to strengthen private sector engagement under Gavi 6.0, including organisational arrangements, portfolio management and other factors that influenced implementation and results.

3.1. IMPLEMENTATION EFFICIENCY

3.1.1. Governance and coordination

EQ3. *Efficiency*: To what extent were PSE modalities effectively coordinated across the Gavi Secretariat? Which governance, management, and coordination processes within the PSE Strategy were perceived to enable or limit achievement of results?

Finding 4. Several governance and management related challenges within Gavi have constrained the efficiency of PSE implementation.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
Medium	Evidenced by document review, stakeholder interviews across Gavi Secretariat teams and evidenced across case studies. Is rated as medium robustness due to differences across PSE projects.

A number of the governance and management related challenges were systemic rather than project-specific and influenced how partnerships were designed, approved and implemented, and contributed to inconsistent collaboration across key Secretariat teams – the Private Sector and Innovation (PSI), Health Systems and Immunisation Strengthening (HSIS), and Country teams – and an overall high coordination effort. Figure 3.1 presents these "visible" implementation challenges and inefficiencies experienced and the underlying contributing organisational factors. The remainder of this section discusses each of these underlying factors in turn.

Figure 3.1: Governance and management challenges constraining PSE implementation efficiency



Few organisation-wide incentives to encourage ownership of PSE, while competing priorities and capacity constraints constrain engagement. Partnerships and projects typically originate within PSI[10] and the extent of involvement of HSIS and Country teams – both upfront and on an ongoing basis – has varied across the project lifecycle (see Box 3.1). This reflects both the current allocation of responsibilities for PSE and the practical realities of Gavi's operating model. Country teams manage large portfolios of core investments and have limited capacity to engage beyond their primary responsibilities, a constraint likely to become more pronounced under Gavi 6.0 with a leaner Secretariat. The relatively smaller value of most PSE initiatives compared with Gavi's core investments also influences how country teams prioritise their time.

Several country team interviewees indicated that they had identified multiple PS opportunities to bring to Gavi but had not pursued them as doing so was not considered as part of their formal responsibilities. Secretariat consultations also acknowledged differing levels of experience and inclination across the Secretariat for working in the private sector. At PSE partnership/ project level, this same tension and incentives were described directly: the PSI team had incentives to champion and scale an innovative partnership, while country-facing teams saw their responsibility as protecting the integrity of national health systems and implementation quality — priorities that did not always point in the same direction.[11] Where incentives did align (e.g. Zipline Nigeria), PS partnerships worked more seamlessly.

It is interesting to note that there is considerable concentration of PSE partnerships in 4-5 key countries (Ethiopia, Nigeria, India and Côte d'Ivoire), the first three of which are Gavi High Impact Countries, which are a priority for the PSE Strategy. Nonetheless, consultations suggest Senior Country Managers (SCMs) play a key factor in this, with some more receptive to PSE and more familiar with its potential contribution, while others were less inclined to pursue PSE due to time pressures, reservations about Gavi working with the PS, or other reasons.

Box 3.1. Case studies exemplify a range of governance, management, and coordination processes across Gavi Secretariat for PS projects

Working arrangements across the Secretariat varied considerably, spanning more limited SCM involvement during design and implementation (e.g. Simprints in Bangladesh), to SCM and/or HSIS participation in project steering groups (e.g. Mastercard Wellness Pass in Ethiopia), to an SCM reviewing and approving the contract content (e.g. Zipline in Nigeria). Zipline also offers a strong example where close relationship between Gavi's PSI team and Zipline Africa team means they are constantly triaging active projects and pipeline opportunities on regular basis. Country teams are not actively involved, but the close arrangement works well to ensure alignment with country needs.

In some cases, the above working arrangements were considered appropriate by implicated Gavi teams. For example, the Simprints proof-of-concept in Bangladesh represented a small investment (approximately US$3 million) relative to Gavi's broader country portfolio (approximately US$1.3 billion over 2021–2026), and the SCM considered their limited engagement was proportionate. The key factor here was the Simprints investment was focused on advancing biometrics technology along with a proof-of-concept study, which did not materially interact with immunisation campaigns.

However, where partnerships were more visible, or more closely linked to country implementation, limited SCM ownership created tensions. The VaxSocial pilots in Nigeria, were perceived by some stakeholders as operating outside the country programme, with weaker accountability to the SCM or government despite budgets of approximately US$1–1.5 million per pilot and desire to have stronger alignment with campaigns.

More recent partnerships offer examples of cross-Secretariat 'co-creation' following initial PSI-led conceptualisation, such as the End Child Wasting project funded by CIFF in Ethiopia. Overall, stakeholders

[10] Appendix E presents a mapping of key processes for PSE within Gavi in terms of partnership/ project origination, design, review, approval and implementation and monitoring. Under the operating model, the unit leading private sector engagement (PSI) sits within the Resource Mobilisation (RM) department of the Gavi Secretariat and the Managing Director for RM approves and oversees implementation of PSE projects.

[11] In addition, the lack of clear collaborative framework with Gavi's vaccine programmes/market shaping team was noted, despite their strong private sector experience. This did not necessarily constrain engagement, such as in the case of some INFUSE partners for which there was an intentional transition to the market shaping team by PSI (e.g. NexLeaf, discussed in EQ6).

consistently highlighted the importance of close engagement with country teams to support implementation efficiency, country ownership, and sustainability, whilst recognising practical constraints.

Stakeholders also expressed differing views on whether RM remains the most appropriate institutional home for PSE. The current arrangement directly links to the resource mobilisation objective as well as other related objectives on advocacy, however, also creates a degree of (perceived) distance from country programmatic needs and priorities. There were some suggestions to consider re-placement within the Secretariat, although majority emphasised the need to have integrated and collaborative mechanism for joint working rather than focus on institutional placement, especially given the direct link to fundraising.

In addition, the PSI team is a small team within Gavi (approximately 4 FTE over 5.0) and is viewed as having been spread too thin in relation its large portfolio of projects and internal coordination requirements, whilst also navigating Secretariat-wide staffing reductions, and senior leadership departures. Senior leadership departures in particular have led to a loss of PSE champions within Gavi, and at the same time have also been noted to have fostered a culture of more siloed working on PSE. PSE was described by one Secretariat interviewee as "very siloed, very disjointed from the Gavi business", a characterisation echoed in other consultations.

Together, these factors have resulted in uneven engagement across the Secretariat and limited organisation-wide ownership of PSE.

Comparator experiences are useful to note here – in particular, the Global Fund has emphasised the importance of internal engagement (Box 3.2).

Box 3.2. Internal alignment is a prerequisite for effective private sector engagement: evidence from the Global Fund

Historically, the Global Fund's private sector model involved bringing donor money for priorities that country grant management teams had neither defined nor endorsed, creating friction and low institutional commitment. The Global Fund describes a six-year process to shift internal culture related to private sector engagement, creating a model where private sector fundraising is more closely aligned with priorities already identified by internal teams.

The Global Fund estimated that 60–70% of private sector team time is now devoted to internal processes and socialisation: aligning with disease teams, grant management, senior management, and country-facing functions, rather than to external relationship management. While Gavi's PSI team estimates a higher effort on internal processes, interviewees more often described this effort as addressing internal misalignment, unclear decision-making and process inefficiencies rather than building organisational ownership (see also EQ2). By contrast, the Global Fund views this investment in internal engagement as a deliberate enabler of effective collaboration and implementation.

This model does not preclude the Global Fund Secretariat from initiating innovative private sector partnership concepts. **Instead, it places greater emphasis on internal socialisation before and alongside external engagement.** The climate-health nexus was cited as the clearest illustration of this. When the Secretariat began developing the concept internally, there were questions on fit with the Global Fund's mandate and priorities. One year into implementing the US$42 million raised, the biggest impact was not direct programme outputs but the mainstreaming of climate and health into country grant applications, a system-level shift attributed to the sustained internal engagement that accompanied the fundraising.

These organisational incentives are reinforced by structural differences in the operating models of private sector partnerships and Gavi core country planning and funding. Unlike Gavi core country programmes, developed through a structured multi-year planning process, private sector opportunities emerge continuously, often require sustained relationship building, and interact with private sector partners' own strategic priorities and funding cycles. This makes early alignment with country planning more challenging and contributes to perceptions that some partnerships are developed in a "top-down" manner. As discussed under EQ1, the evaluation found that country demand was not consistently reflected across the PSE portfolio.

A related issue is separate procurement and funding arrangements commonly used for PSE partnerships, which some stakeholders felt reduced visibility by country teams. In practice, these arrangements often reflect the nature

of private sector engagement: Many partners seek to support catalytic investments rather than contribute to Gavi's core funding, while partnerships frequently provide capabilities beyond routine immunisation support, operate on different implementation timelines, and require bespoke monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) approaches. However, as Gavi's country funding becomes more constrained under 6.0, tensions from these separate arrangements could become more pronounced, particularly where the value of a PSE project exceeds available Gavi HSS resources or contributes indirectly to immunisation outcomes.[12] Rwanda's use of Gavi HSS Innovation Top Up (ITU) funds to scale Zipline is an example where a PSE-supported pilot can transition to mainstream HSS financing, illustrating the strong complementarity possible between PSE and country funding mechanisms.

PSE operational guidance was limited during 2021-25 and poorly socialised. Gavi PSE guidelines are high level, not comprehensive on the full process flow (especially implementation and engagement from cross Secretariat teams), have not been updated since 2017 and are not well socialised within the Secretariat (for the 6.0 period, updated PSE operational guidelines are under review as part of broader 6.0 operationalisation planning). The implication for the 2021-25 period is that roles and responsibilities for PSE were not well defined and communicated. In general, multiple senior Secretariat staff indicated that their team's engagement in PSE projects had been limited and ad hoc, with one stating. "*decision making rights are not clear… the private sector team signs up for stuff… it's just completely disjointed*". The guidelines and collaborative working are also not encouraged extensively within the organisation and for example some interview feedback indicated that often New Business Committee (NBC) meetings are not prioritised by other departments. Where coordination worked well (e.g. Zipline in Rwanda and Nigeria), it tended to be more individual driven.

Gavi internal processes are not well aligned with the requirements of PSE. Gavi's organisational culture and internal processes have also been described as being shaped around sovereign donor funding and associated diligence processes, with limited appreciation of the value-add and practical differences for PSE which restricts the ambition of PSE. The PSI team has described the considerable bureaucracy and related transaction costs of internal engagement and alignment which reduced organisational agility and made it more difficult to develop and manage private sector partnerships efficiently. As discussed in EQ2, this view is shared by private sector partners, with contracting and approval timelines being one of the key challenges raised.

3.1.2. Timeliness and cost efficiency

EQ4. *Efficiency*: To what extent was implementation of the PSE Strategy, including different PSE modalities, done in a timely, cost-effective manner? Were there opportunities for efficiency gains, if any?

The analysis assesses efficiency at two interconnected levels. First, it examines whether the overall composition and management of the partnership portfolio supported efficient use of Secretariat resources. Second, it assesses efficiency across the partnership lifecycle, distinguishing between transaction costs inherent to private sector engagement and those arising from Gavi's governance and operating model. The assessment draws on portfolio-level data and stakeholder consultations, and the six case study partnerships which provide the strongest evidence on implementation processes. Analysis is constrained by the absence of consolidated data on implementation timelines and costs across the PSE portfolio, and inconsistent project documentation, particularly on (i) internal review and approval timelines, and (ii) Secretariat effort and transaction costs by partnership or modality. To address these gaps, available documentation is triangulated with stakeholder consultations and qualitative self-assessments of Secretariat effort. Findings should be interpreted as indicative of overall patterns and opportunities for improvement rather than precise measures of cost-effectiveness.

Finding 5. The PSE portfolio evolved through a combination of strategic priorities and emerging partnership opportunities. As the portfolio grew, there was

[12] The more recent US$30 million nutrition integration partnership in Ethiopia (2024-26) required careful consideration of its scale relative to Gavi's HSS investment and risks of distortion and parallel delivery. The selection of UNICEF, a Gavi strategic partner, as the implementing partner was reported to have alleviated some concerns on this issue.

increasing need for more systematic portfolio-level prioritisation to optimise Secretariat effort and strategic impact.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
Medium	Evidenced by stakeholder interviews (predominantly with the Secretariat), triangulated with analysis of individual PSE projects, some case studies and comparator analysis. Medium rating based on the variable visibility of detailed performance across the full PSE portfolio. Management burden based on PSI team self-reported level of effort across the portfolio which has not been independently verified.

Strongly opportunistic orientation: Across the 2021–2025 portfolio, Gavi managed 38[13] active projects linked to its three partnership modalities[14], of which approximately 20 originated during 5.0 (excluding COVAX-related partnerships). This is nearly double the 20 private sector partnerships implemented as of early 2020, however data limitations make it challenging to have a direct comparison of the projects managed over successive strategy periods.[15] While opportunistic approaches are appropriate for PSE and for innovation to some extent, this significant growth in portfolio size also reduced opportunities for portfolio-level prioritisation, standardisation and economies of scale. This also reflects an incentive structure oriented towards fundraising (as discussed in EQ1).

Limited portfolio approach around priority HSS challenges, coupled with limited cross-Gavi learning. With some exceptions, there is limited evidence of a strategy to identify and progressively scale a small number of high-potential PS solutions aligned with Gavi's HSS priorities. This scaling challenge applies chiefly to innovation and expertise partnerships, where the aim is to grow a proven solution, and is distinct from financing and advocacy partnerships (such as La Caixa), whose value lies in resource mobilisation rather than being scaled as a delivery model. Partnerships such as Zipline (last-mile delivery) are rare examples where Gavi has concentrated investment behind a compelling solution and entered repeatable partnership platforms. Most initiatives have remained discrete projects. While this partly reflects the portfolio's emphasis on innovation and key role of PSE to test/introduce new approaches, it has also limited opportunities to consolidate learning and build repeatable models. Secretariat staff also acknowledge the limited learning across Gavi core, HSIS and PS projects tackling similar HSS challenges over 5.0, reducing opportunities to strengthen institutional learning and improve portfolio-level efficiency. The Scale-Up Facility planned for 6.0 is intended to address this scaling gap for innovations.

Limited evidence the portfolio was actively balanced across partnership modalities, maturity, country coverage, or expected pathways to scale. In general, there does not appear to be direction on an optimal portfolio mix across these different parameters, notwithstanding the ambition for more financing and advocacy partnerships such as La Caixa. For example, over 2021-25, 74% of projects were single country engagements. Only seven PSE partnerships (including Simprints, VaxSocial, Unilever, Zipline) operated across multiple countries. This reflects two characteristics of the current portfolio (i) weight towards pilots/proof-of-concepts, with only Zipline transitioning during 2021-25 to a more scaled model in 5 countries (though each administered through separate projects); and (ii) the 'built-in' transaction cost of tailoring country approaches to local context, sourcing and working with local implementing partners (where relevant), plus engaging different country governments. Gavi's collaboration with Girl Effect to drive increased uptake of the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine, where Girl Effect is an investor and implementer, with Gavi Matching Funding across five countries, appear to offer greater potential to realise internal efficiencies.

The resulting portfolio created a high cumulative management burden. Based on PSI self-assessment, 17 partnerships (44%) were classified as requiring a low level of management effort, 14 (36%) as moderate, and eight (21%) as high, reflecting the level of coordination, technical input and relationship management required. On average

[13] Total project count over the period is 39, but 38 when excluding the single COVAX project.

[14] Five of the projects originating during Gavi 5.0/5.1 were for Zipline, spanning four different countries.

[15] Mott Macdonald (2021). Evaluation of Gavi's Private Sector Engagement Approach 2016-2020.

each PSI team member manages approximately seven 'live' projects, according to the team. Higher-level effort is expected in PSE and some track to strategically important relationships (e.g. La Caixa, UPS), or large initiatives with new partners (CIFF-supported nutrition integration partnership in Ethiopia), or a re-conceptualisation of an existing partnership (e.g. Mastercard Wellness Pass). However, the cumulative effect of project numbers means even many low-effort partnerships create significant cumulative workload and resources devoted to developing one partnership are unavailable for others. This is particularly relevant in the context of a leaner Secretariat under Gavi 6.0.

Box 3.3 highlights the Global Fund's approach to enhancing portfolio-level efficiency through prioritising larger, earmarked cash-based initiatives with the private sector.

Box 3.3. The Global Fund's strategic portfolio approach: fewer, larger and co-created private sector partnerships

The Global Fund has deliberately shifted towards a more selective private sector portfolio, prioritising larger value financing partnerships that address strategic priorities at scale rather than a broad range of individual opportunities. Non-financial and in-kind support are significantly "dialled down" as a partnership priority, following experience that corporate contributions, typically capped by shareholder constraints at US$5–10 million, could not be deployed at scale through the Global Fund's architecture and were unlikely to be embedded into grants after the pilot period. Transaction costs were high and scalability was limited.

Between 2022 and 2025, The Global Fund secured approximately US$200 million in earmarked private-sector commitments. **A central lesson has been partnerships should begin with a clearly defined problem rather than a funding opportunity**. Long-term partnerships, such as those with CIFF and Takeda are examples of relationships that expanded over time through continuous co-development around shared health priorities rather than a series of stand-alone projects.

Finding 6. Across the project life cycle, several opportunities have been identified to reduce avoidable administrative burden within Gavi's internal processes.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
Medium	Strong evidence on high transaction costs of Secretariat processes and key pain points to target for efficiency gains, evidenced by stakeholder interviews, triangulated with case studies. Medium robustness concerning overall portfolio management effort due to self-reported data.

Stakeholders more familiar with private sector engagement framed developing private sector partnerships as a time-intensive undertaking, as it involves considerable relationship development, identification of comparative strengths and value-add to Gavi's mission. Post partnership acquisition, three key inefficiencies linked to the PSE cycle surfaced routinely in the case studies and consultations. The significance of administrative transaction costs becomes greater in view of the large number of PSE projects managed by Gavi. These include:

High transaction costs of Secretariat processes and unclear ownership. As described earlier (see EQ2, EQ3), key pain points for both private sector partners and the Secretariat are several Gavi processes, particularly contracting and approval timelines along with delayed decision-making authority and need for escalation, and unclear ownership between RM/PSI, HSIS and country teams. These inefficiencies were a recurring constraint on completing the PSE supply-demand framework's feedback loop, independent of the underlying technical merit of the partnership. Inefficiencies risk being cascaded, such as for the Wellness Pass project in Ethiopia, where the COVID-19 pandemic need had waned by the time the implementing partner was contracted. The Zipline health post scale-up in Rwanda involved a contract led by the Country Delivery Department (CDD) team through the Innovation Top-Up Fund (not a PSE-managed contract); the approximately two-month delay arose because Zipline established a new legal entity (Zipline Rwanda) rather than contracting via the existing Zipline International, triggering full procurement onboarding (Know your client (KYC) and due diligence). Some administrative delays may be linked, in part, to unclear PSE process flow and accountabilities, including absence of shared incentives within the Secretariat for PSE.

Bespoke implementation arrangements: Several stakeholders observed that partnership processes remain highly bespoke, with governance, contracting and implementation arrangements often redesigned for each partnership.

While this flexibility is appropriate for novel or high-risk partnerships, greater standardisation of repeat partnership models, contractual arrangements and implementation approaches could reduce administrative burden without reducing appropriate governance.

High administrative burden of project management. Management effort also varies across the partnership lifecycle. For Zipline, operational burden was described as light once deployments were running, with monthly country-team touchpoints and approximately one hour per week of PSI time to cover five countries — reflecting the lower ongoing management demands of a mature, scaled deployment. PSI team reports spending significant time on management costs, which increase with project complexity (e.g. # grantees or implementing partners, # countries) and associated strategic, operational and fiduciary management.

The UPS STEP and VaxSocial programs are unique in being managed by secretariats serving as platforms outside Gavi. One Senior Manager runs each with a small part of their time, and approval processes exist outside of Gavi, though facilitated by the PSI senior manager. This allows Gavi to "show up and ... play the part that Gavi plays" including public facing external engagement and strategic engagement (refer to Box 3.4 for details on the VaxSocial management model).

Box 3.4. VaxSocial fiscal sponsor for programmatic and fiduciary management model

VaxSocial uniquely has a partially outsourced project management model, financially sponsored by AHO, an initiative of MSD and other funders. The AHO Secretariat is operated by Rabin Martin who also serves as the Secretariat for the VaxSocial project. The Secretariat leads on project management responsibilities, including organising funder meetings, preparing materials and surfacing implementation issues to Gavi and AHO. Rabin Martin's fees are paid by AHO, separate to its contribution to VaxSocial. Global Impact serves as the VaxSocial fiscal sponsor, holding contributions from AHO and Gavi Matching Fund to undertake grantee contracting, disbursement and financial reporting.

This partially 'outsourced' project and financial management structure is **considered by Gavi as critical for alleviating the VaxSocial administrative burden on the Gavi Secretariat**, which spans 3 countries and 6 grantees. Gavi provides strategic direction and public-health oversight rather than directly administering each grantee relationship. AHO additionally finances a dedicated Gavi FTE to coordinate Gavi inputs and support to VaxSocial in Nigeria, India and Indonesia. The FTE sits within HSIS to support efficiency in execution.

Wider review of platform-based models highlights both its advantages and disadvantages. Platform-based models allow organisations to do more with less headcount, but the coordination costs need to be funded. The model may facilitate scale but may not always deliver on planned strategy (as control is reduced) and requires matching of partners' risk appetites.

3.1.3. Implementation of previous evaluation recommendations

EQ5. *Efficiency*: To what extent were recommendations from the previous PSE evaluation (2016–2020) implemented, and to what extent have they influenced results under 5.0/5.1?

The evaluation of the Gavi PSE Strategy 2016–2020 concluded that Gavi had made important progress in establishing its private sector engagement approach. It set out five priority recommendations for Gavi 5.0 covering aspects relating to: (i) strategic alignment; (ii) Secretariat roles, responsibilities and incentives; (iii) integrated MEL; (iv) cost and value for money (VFM) assessment; and (v) structured learning. This section assesses progress against these recommendation areas under 5.0, drawing on document review, consultations, case study evidence and portfolio analysis. Appendix G provides a detailed tracker presenting the PSI team's feedback on progress made alongside this evaluation's assessment.

Finding 7. The recommendations made under the PSE Strategy evaluation for 2016-20 remain relevant. Progress was limited overall, also reflecting the challenging internal and external circumstances for Gavi PSE.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
High	Evidenced by stakeholder interviews (predominantly with the Secretariat), triangulated with case studies and document review.

With regards to the recommendation areas made by the previous evaluation, Gavi made the clearest progress in aligning the PSE Strategy to Gavi 5.0 (recommendation 1), but less progress in putting in place the roles and responsibilities (2), MEL (3), cost capture (4) and learning systems (5). As such, the recommendations influenced the architecture of the 2021–2025 PSE Strategy more than its operationalisation.

The limited progress made needs to be interpreted against a disrupted implementation period. The COVID-19 pandemic redirected PSI capacity towards urgent fundraising and response activities. INFUSE provides one example of this disruption, with consultations noting that the platform's activities were halted during the emergency period. The period also included a chief executive officer (CEO) transition in 2023–24, an interim CEO phase, changes in Resource Mobilisation leadership, and changes in PSI leadership. Consultations suggest that leadership changes, restructuring and shifting priorities affected continuity and strategic focus.

A summary of progress is as follows:

- As noted, progress was strongest on strategic alignment of the PSE Strategy with the overall Gavi strategy. The previous evaluation recommended aligning the PSE approach with Gavi 5.0, including its delivery, HSS, data, evidence and evaluation priorities. As described under EQ1, private sector engagement was positioned as a core enabler of Gavi 5.0 and aligned with reducing the number of zero-dose children, increasing vaccine delivery and immunisation system strengthening. However, the findings under EQ1 show that alignment was stronger in design than in operational delivery.

- Progress on reviewing and clarifying roles, responsibilities and incentives across the Secretariat was partial. The previous evaluation recommended reviewing Secretariat roles, responsibilities, incentives and capacities for delivering PSE across Gavi. As described in EQ3, formal review mechanisms such as the NBC exist, however, these mechanisms did not fully resolve ownership of PSE-relevant decision making across the Secretariat. PSE collaboration often depended more on relationships rather than clearly embedded roles and incentives.

- Progress on integrated MEL was minimal. The previous evaluation recommended an integrated MEL system covering both individual PSE projects and the PSE approach as a whole. This remains unresolved. While multiple partnerships/ projects had dedicated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) or research components, and these supported project design and course correction in some cases, there has been no coherent portfolio-level framework for comparing partnerships, measuring innovation results, valuing in-kind expertise, or assessing return on investment (ROI). This limitation is discussed further in EQ6, which considers how Gavi can assess PSE results and value.

- Progress on cost capture and VFM was also minimal. The previous evaluation called for better cost data, VFM assessment and potential total cost of ownership studies. These gaps remained visible during 2021–2025, as described above in EQ4. As noted above, case study evidence and consultations point to high transaction costs linked to due diligence, contracting, approval processes, partner management and internal coordination. A key challenge is the opportunity cost of managing multiple bespoke partnerships through a small Secretariat team. Without standardised cost capture mechanisms, Gavi cannot compare partnership models or assess where PSE offers the strongest return for Secretariat effort.

- Progress on structured learning and scale-up was limited. The previous evaluation called for stronger learning across partnership types, project themes and approaches to scale-up. Multiple partnerships implemented in the

evaluation period generated useful learning and show promising pilots or proof-of-concept results. However, learning was not consistently translated into portfolio-level decisions on replication, scale, adaptation or exit. Consultations also point to unresolved questions about what scale means across different PSE modalities and when Gavi should continue, transition or stop support. These issues are discussed further under EQ7 and the lessons for Gavi 6.0.

Overall, the 2016–2020 recommendations continue to be relevant for 5.0. Addressing these issues under Gavi 6.0 will require moving from strategy-level alignment to operational requirements, including clear decision rights, portfolio metrics, cost tracking and defined pathways from pilot to scale, adaptation or exit.

3.2. RESULTS, ENABLERS, AND INHIBITORS

3.2.1. PSE results

EQ6. *Effectiveness*: To what extent were the PSE Strategy outputs and outcomes achieved? Specifically, how effective were the PSE modalities and activities in contributing to results at Secretariat, partner, and country levels, including: (a) funding, (b) advocacy, (c) innovation and technology, (d) expertise.

This section begins with a review of the MEL arrangements for the Gavi PSE Strategy, followed by an assessment of results in (i) funding; (ii) advocacy and (iii) innovation and expertise-based partnerships. Contribution analysis has supported the assessment of the TOC-defined results, although our analysis extends further give the noted limitations of the TOC.

PSE Strategy MEL approach

Finding 8. MEL for PSE remained underdeveloped during Gavi 5.0, constraining Gavi's ability to demonstrate and assess the full value of private sector engagement.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
High	Based on document review of PSE Strategy, confirmed by Secretariat consultations and case studies.

The Gavi PSE Strategy 5.0 was not supported with a clear MEL framework, including relevant PSE Strategy level key performance indicators (KPIs) and how PSE feeds into the overall Gavi strategy KPIs. There were individual and team level KPIs for the PSI team, but these were activity focused and not results oriented. The Gavi 2024 Annual Progress Report presents PSE results within overall Gavi resource mobilisation reinforcing a narrow view of PSE performance centred on funding. PSE contributions to other Gavi objectives such as innovation, supply chain and demand generation were not specifically measured and not co-owned by PSI/ RM alongside the programmes teams. There were no agreed metrics to capture the results across expertise and innovation-based projects at a portfolio level, although select projects tracked relevant results indicators (Box 3.5). PSE financial and project databases were incomplete and fragmented creating a challenge to link from donor pledge to partnership value, to project budget and expenditure, to country-level implementation and results. As noted under EQ5, the evaluation of the PSE Strategy 4.0 had also identified the gap with regards to MEL and recommended development of an integrated MEL approach. As a result, the broader value of PSE was not always easy to define or evidence, including its contribution to Gavi's donor-facing narrative and relationship building with sovereign donors, and the value of in-kind expertise secured through partnerships. Box 3.6 provides select comparator MEL approaches.

Box 3.5. Project-level MEL across case studies

Multiple case studies have included evaluations: VaxSocial had a strong learning emphasis of how social media can influence actual vaccine uptake, with a US$1 million independent evaluation financed by the Gates Foundation. Unilever Keluarga SIGAP in Indonesia and Mastercard Wellness Pass in Ethiopia similarly had externally led

evaluations. Several Zipline impact studies were externally funded, independently conducted and peer-reviewed (e.g., an ID Insight study in Ghana funded by the Gates Foundation). Simprints is conducting a randomised controlled trial (RCT) to assess impact of infant biometrics on vaccine coverage. Among the case studies, Zipline has generated the most extensive evidence base including reported reductions in missed opportunities to vaccinate, zero-dose prevalence and maternal mortality.

Some evaluations faced methodological challenges, which should be taken into account when interpreting their findings: The Unilever Keluarga SIGAP evaluation in Indonesia experienced issues with control-group contamination. While the final VaxSocial evaluation results have not been published at the time of this evaluation, learning outputs from the project point to significant measurement risks around self-reported vaccination outcomes and the importance of triangulating self-reported survey data with vaccine records from health centres. Such challenges reflect the complexity of measuring the effect of media (e.g. digital campaigns, social media) on immunisation uptake and other health-related behaviours but remain strategically important areas for Gavi.

Box 3.6. Comparator experiences with PSE MEL

Comparators face the same measurement challenge with mixed success: UNICEF appraises private sector partnerships on their "total potential value for children" rather than immediate financial contribution, though how this is operationalised in measurable terms remains unclear, while CEPI and BARDA, whose product-development mandates lend themselves to clearer technical milestones, tie partnership monitoring to stage-gated funding with the ability to halt or redirect projects.

Financing results

Finding 9. *Financing results*: PSE fundraising in 5.0 demonstrated a substantial increase over previous strategy periods, spurred by COVAX fundraising. Two of the largest new funders are for integrated nutrition and immunisation and demand promotion through social media, highlighting areas where PSE adds particular value to Gavi.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
High	Analysis of Gavi's PSE funding and the Gavi PSE project database. Limitations in financing and project databases are noted as an overall evaluation limitation.

PSE mobilises resources through its financing, innovation and expertise-based modalities. It is widely recognised that PSE accounts for a small share of total Gavi resources, accounting for 1.9% during 4.0, rising to 2.6% during 5.0.[16] This growth during 5.0 was strongly shaped by the exceptional circumstances of COVID-19 and COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX). Table 3.1 provides an overview, with values reflecting donor pledges recorded in Gavi's PSE donor tracker.[17] Key points are as follows:

Total PSE-relevant pledges in 5.0 were US$576.4 million, with 58% for COVAX: Gavi mobilised US$332.9 million from 45 private sector partners or partner groupings (43 of which are identified by name) for COVAX, reflecting the

[16] This total covers all funding pledges for Gavi 5.0 across the organisation and includes both US$9.7 billion pledged for Gavi and the additional US$12.6 billion pledged toward the Gavi COVAX Advance Market Commitment (AMC) in response to the pandemic.

[17] Financing results are based on pledge values provided by Gavi for all private-sector related funding. Data limitations are described in Evaluation methods section 1.3.

significant agility and potential of PSE.[18] A further US$243.4 million was raised towards Gavi 5.0 immunisation prioritises, including Matching Fund pledges from the Gates Foundation, United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (UK FCDO), the Netherlands and Sweden which are intended to help to incentivise other private sector pledges and for INFUSE 2.0. Within this total, direct (non-matched) PS commitments also increased by 111% (from US$13.3 million to US$28 million), demonstrating growth beyond the incentives of the Matching Fund.

Gavi 5.0 also saw a substantial expansion in the PSE-related partner base, with 58 new PSE-related funding sources during the period, including 57 private sector donors and one new sovereign Matching Fund contributor, Sweden (Figure 3.2). Together, these new funding sources accounted for 36% of total 5.0 PSE-relevant pledges. Most of the new funders (n=32) supported COVAX only, but a significant amount was also raised from 16 new partners (US$42.1 million) to support Gavi's core immunisation agenda. Another ten new partners supported both COVAX-related and non-COVAX activities, contributing US$44.1 million, suggesting the pandemic provided an entry point to engage new partners on Gavi's core agenda, similar to PS engagement following emergency appeals by other peer organisations (as for example indicated by the World Food Programme). Overall, this suggests an emphasis on new relationship building and that a meaningful subset of new funders also engaged with Gavi beyond the exceptional pandemic response.

Several new or expanded private sector funders supported strategic priorities beyond COVAX during Gavi 5.0. Advancing Health Online (AHO), a new Gavi partner, pledged US$6.0 million to support VaxSocial, while CIFF significantly increased its contribution from US$30,600 in Gavi 4.0 to US$16.8 million in Gavi 5.0, supporting nutrition integration in Ethiopia. Other large non-COVAX contributors included the Rockefeller Foundation (US$5.1 million), TikTok (US$5.0 million), Arm Limited (US$5.0 million) and the Steele Family Foundation (US$4.6 million). Together, these six organisations pledged US$42.4 million, of which approximately US$37 million was matched through the Private Sector Matching Fund.

La Caixa remains Gavi's most significant financing partnership. During the Gavi 5.0 strategic period (2021-2025), it contributed US$23.5 million to Gavi, which was matched by the Gates Foundation through the Gavi Matching Fund, bringing the total value of the partnership during this period to US$47 million. These funds support vaccine procurement (see Box 3.7), while also generating the broader advocacy value discussed below.

[18] The two aggregate categories in Gavi pledge reporting are "Other Donors", which includes organisations that did not wish to be named, and "Portuguese Private Sector", which may comprise contributions from multiple donors. The total of 45 features 43 unique and named organisations, and two aggregate categorisations.

Table 3.1: PSE-relevant pledges in Gavi 4.0 and 5.0 by funding channel, US$ million

Funding channel	Gavi 4.0	Gavi 5.0
COVAX AMC*	0.0	179.5
COVAX AMC (Matching Fund)	0.0	153.4
Sub-total PSE COVAX	**0.0**	**332.9**
Direct PS pledges (un-matched) *	13.3	28.0
PS pledges (matched)	77.0	104.4
Matching Fund (Gates Foundation, UK FCDO, Netherlands, Sweden (5.0 only))	81.5	111.1
Sub-total PSE	**171.8**	**243.4**
Pneumococcal AMC	0.1	0.0
Total PSE	**172.0**	**576.4**
Total Gavi (includes COVAX AMC in 5.0)	**9,041.6**	**22,448.0**

*Gates Foundation pledges to Gavi core and COVAX AMC are included in the Gavi Total, and not PSE, given the Gates Foundation's unique role as a core Gavi founding partner.

Figure 3.2: Gavi 5.0 PSE-relevant pledges from new and existing funders (US$ million)



Box 3.7. La Caixa partnership

The La Caixa Vaccines4Children partnership (formerly known as the Business Alliance for Child Vaccination) is a long-running, cash-based private sector engagement between La Caixa Foundation, CaixaBank, Gavi, the Gates Foundation (through Gavi's Matching Fund), and ISGlobal (Barcelona Institute for Global Health). Established in 2008, making La Caixa Foundation Gavi's first private sector partner, the partnership has operated continuously for nearly two decades and is consistently cited within the Gavi Secretariat as the flagship example of how a private sector financing model can be scaled, leveraged and sustained.

The model mobilises donations from CaixaBank's corporate banking and private banking (wealth management) client network in Spain. La Caixa Foundation matches client donations, and the Gates Foundation then matches the combined total through the Gavi Matching Fund, creating a '1=4' value proposition: every euro donated generates four euros of immunisation impact. This multiplication of impact is central to the partnership's fundraising proposition and public communications.

During Gavi 5.0 (2021-2025), La Caixa Foundation contributed US$23.5 million to Gavi, which was matched by the Gates Foundation through the Gavi Matching Fund, bringing the total value of the partnership during this period to US$47 million. Notably, La Caixa's annual contribution nearly doubled over these five years, increasing from US$3.7 million in 2021 to US$7 million in 2025, reflecting its growing commitment to Gavi's mission. The scale of this support is particularly significant, as the partnership's total value exceeds that of several sovereign donors over the same period, underscoring its importance not only within Gavi's private sector portfolio but also in absolute financial terms.

Funding has been concentrated on pneumococcal vaccines (PCV) in Mozambique since 2014, with 100% of Gavi's PCV expenditure in Mozambique reported to be financed through La Caixa contributions.

Advocacy results

Finding 10. *Advocacy results:* PSE strengthened Gavi's donor-facing narrative during Gavi 5.0, facilitating sovereign donor engagement. These advocacy effects were indirect and not systematically captured or quantified.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
Medium	Evidenced by some stakeholder interviews (within Gavi and some external partners). Medium evidence given the confidential nature of fundraising and that some examples are based on few stakeholders. Limitations are described in the findings below.

Consultation evidence from stakeholders both within and outside Gavi highlighted the advocacy value of Gavi's engagement with the private sector, strengthening its donor-facing narrative as an innovative organisation. This contribution is not systematically captured or measured through formal metrics and is difficult to attribute directly to sovereign pledges. As a result, the finding relies primarily on triangulated stakeholder perceptions across interviews.

Several stakeholders described PSE as helping Gavi tell a stronger story to donors, that Gavi is not only a traditional global health organisation, but an organisation able to bring private sector capital, expertise and innovation into immunisation. This was seen as particularly relevant in the current constrained donor financing environment, where Gavi's ability to demonstrate partnership, innovation and value for money is increasingly important. Stakeholders repeatedly cited examples such as Zipline, UPS, Simprints, and Arm[19] as supporting this narrative. **These examples have had advocacy value beyond their direct programmatic contribution, by reinforcing Gavi's image as an innovative and future-facing organisation.** It is also worth noting that Gavi's innovation story was concentrated around a small number of repeatedly cited projects. This is not necessarily a weakness, given that innovation is risky and not all partnerships become high-profile successes. However, it demonstrates that translation of individual PSE projects into a wider innovation narrative is not guaranteed.

Private sector partnerships have also created useful entry points for sovereign donor engagement. Stakeholders described private sector partnerships as helping make Gavi's work more visible and politically salient to donor governments, particularly where partnerships connect Gavi's global immunisation mandate to domestic private sector capabilities, innovation, or tangible stories that resonate with donor-country audiences. Stakeholders did not claim that private sector engagement could be directly attributed to specific sovereign pledges, but rather that it contributed in ways such as donor confidence, access, visibility and narrative strength. La Caixa, Gavi's first private sector partnership, was cited as a positive example in Spain where its visibility on vaccination helped raise Gavi's profile and has contributed to a broader enabling environment for sovereign support. In the UK, the Matching Fund and Arm partnership offered a link between Gavi's work, UK private sector expertise and innovation, with Arm also reportedly supporting Gavi-facing advocacy to the UK government. In Nigeria, the Zipline partnership was similarly associated with sovereign donor engagement: Sweden's funding for Zipline operations followed a private sector workshop featuring Zipline and UPS, and the UK's support for a malaria-linked Nigeria project was partially enabled because Zipline delivered malaria products. As with other cases, attribution is indirect — but the example is notable because Nigeria's engagement with Zipline was government-requested rather than externally driven, with the country SCM team and PSI working collaboratively to advance the partnership. In the Netherlands, the Tony's Chocolonely partnership helped translate Gavi's health mission into a more tangible domestic narrative around companies, workers, consumers and development impact. The Unilever Keluarga SIGAP programme also generated advocacy and visibility value with Match Fund donors, including the Dutch government and UK FCDO, with Indonesia subsequently becoming a Gavi sovereign donor (though attribution is not established). Further, many of Gavi's PS

[19] Arm is a British semi-conductor and software design company which has contributed to Gavi and is providing technology support to advance biometrics for immunisation through Simprints.

partners also directly conducted behind-the-scenes advocacy on behalf of Gavi, though this results pathway is also more weakly evidenced given its relationship-based, informal and often confidential nature.

Innovation and expertise-based partnership results

Across Gavi 5.0, there were a total of 39[20] projects covering innovation and expertise-based partnerships. This includes the INFUSE 2.0 2024 Pacesetters Atlas AI, Causal Foundry and Signalytic.

The mapped portfolio is also weighted towards partners from high income countries, with 27 projects linked to high income partner origins and 6 projects linked to low or lower middle income partner origins. By partner type, the portfolio is split between 12 established private sector partners, 12 innovation or early-stage private sector partners, and 9 non-profit or foundation partners. This suggests that Gavi's PSE portfolio is not limited to traditional corporate partnerships, but also includes technology innovators, specialist delivery organisations and philanthropic or non-profit actors.

As noted in EQ1, the difference between the two types of partnerships/ modalities has not been clear, and across the case studies for this evaluation, the classification by modality has been incongruous across different stakeholders and documents. Our review of the case study projects indicates that several projects incorporate elements of both, and hence the distinction is more arbitrary in practice. INFUSE is the key source for innovation partnerships however there are also a number of innovations outside of the INFUSE pipeline (Zipline being a key example).

In our assessment of the results of these innovation and expertise-based partnerships, we have considered the value proposition as outlined in the PSE Strategy and TOC, namely:

- **Expertise-based partnerships** are proven approaches and tools from the private sector to address key barriers to immunisation and enhance efficiency in vaccine delivery; and
- **Innovation partnerships** reflect proven sustainable approaches adapted at scale in Gavi-supported countries.

below summarises the six evaluation case studies along these parameters – reflecting the expertise and innovation aspects within each project and their respective contribution – both conceptually in terms of their strategic value add and key results reported to date.

[20] The overall count of 39 total projects is based on the PSI Project Tracker (2026), which includes 1 COVAX project, and 2 projects that were designed in 5.0 but had not yet started. Analysis of partner country origin and partner type is based on the smaller subset of 33 projects captured in the ELT Sub-Group: Resource Mobilisation material (2026). The two sources are not fully aligned. They do not include the same projects in all cases, and there are discrepancies on project terminations. The resulting sub-counts should therefore be interpreted as descriptive analysis of the relevant mapped subset, rather than as figures that reconcile arithmetically to the wider portfolio count.

Table 3.2 below summarises the six evaluation case studies along these parameters – reflecting the expertise and innovation aspects within each project and their respective contribution – both conceptually in terms of their strategic value add and key results reported to date.

Table 3.2: Summary of case study value proposition and results

Project, budget, years, partners	Expertise / innovation elements	Strategic value add to immunisation bottleneck	Key results reported to date
La Caixa, US$120.7 million (2008–2025) La Caixa Foundation, CaixaBank, Gates Foundation, ISGlobal	Long term funding and advocacy partnership mobilising CaixaBank corporate and private banking clients for matched immunisation financing.	Diversifying Gavi financing for sustainability	• Contributed US$23.5 million to Gavi during 5.0, which was matched by the Gates Foundation through the Gavi Matching Fund, bringing the total value of the partnership during this period to US$47 million. • 7,000+ companies and 17,000 private banking clients reached, reported by La Caixa
Zipline and UPS Foundation, US$13.7 million (2016–present) Zipline, UPS Foundation	Drone enabled delivery of vaccines and health commodities to hard-to-reach facilities and communities.	Last mile delivery, supply chain strengthening	• 17m+ vaccine doses delivered across Gavi supported countries • Rwanda: 600+ health posts served, 99.6% order fill rate, 10-to-30-minute delivery time
Simprints, US$9.9 million (Bangladesh & Ghana, 2020–2027) Simprints, Nippon Electric Company, Arm, Botnar Foundation	Biometric identification technology for linking children to vaccination and health records.	Data and digitisation	• Reliable fingerprint capture moved from around 18 months to 9 months, then 6 months • Technology used in around 558 clinics in Ghana, approximately 8% of clinics nationally • Current artificial intelligence (AI) Infant Biometrics work is collecting images from around 10,000 children in Ghana and Bangladesh
Unilever Keluarga SIGAP US$6.5 million (2022–2025) Unilever / Lifebuoy, The Power of Nutrition, Google, Cisco	Behaviour change, community engagement and mass media applied to immunisation, handwashing and nutrition. Unilever contributed consumer insight, brand communication and mass-media expertise through its Lifebuoy brand.	Demand promotion - Brought behavioural science, community networks, and mass media reach into immunisation communication	• Trained 6,239 Kader SIGAP community volunteers, reaching 100% of the target. • Reached 83,298 mothers and 84,628 children under two through home visits under the Keluarga SIGAP programme. • Reached 64,963 mothers through 4,737 SIGAP sessions at Posyandu community health posts, exceeding the session target.
VaxSocial, US$13 million (2023–2026), AHO (sponsors: MSD and others), with Gates Foundation support for external evaluation	Social media, behavioural insights, chatbots and offline referral models for vaccine demand generation.	Demand promotion - Expand vaccine demand promotion to social media and other channels beyond the public sector, with evidence generated.	• In Nigeria, tested three models across ten states and the Federal Capital Territory, linking digital engagement to chatbots, provider referrals, community health volunteers and pharmacists • Nivi reported 179,436 users reached the askNivi chatbot, 112,268 completed onboarding and 72,699 became targeted engaged users by September 2025 • Evidence of additional verified vaccinations remains limited.
Mastercard Wellness Pass in Ethiopia, US$5.75 million (2022–2025) Implemented through the Mastercard Inc. Growth Segments business. Part of Mastercard's broader US$77.2 million Gavi support since 2020.	Digital identity and eCard solution linked to District Health Information Software 2 (DHIS2) Tracker for individual immunisation records. Mastercard brought Community Pass expertise in digital identity, secure credentials, smart-card systems and platform integration.	Data and digitisation	• Expanded to 687 facilities in 197 woredas by Jan 2025, and later 722 facilities in 9 regions • 636,871 clients registered in DHIS2 Tracker by Jan 2025 • 1.52m+ eCards distributed and 303,001 cards issued to clients • 2,520 health providers trained on use of the Wellness Pass for digital vaccine records; broader capability-building to strengthen the foundations for continued digitalisation of the health system

Finding 11. *Expertise-based partnership results:* Gavi successfully mobilised a diverse range of expertise-based PS partnerships to tackle key immunisation bottlenecks. Results varied according to how well partnerships have (i) built on the partner's comparative advantage and long-term business model; and (ii) matched private-sector supply to a clearly articulated country demand.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
Medium	Evidenced by interviews (within Gavi and external stakeholders), case studies and documentation. Strong evidence on importance of aligning to partner comparative advantage and matching to country demand. Overall medium robustness rating as predominantly reflects the case studies and may not the full PSE portfolio.

As presented above in Table 3.2 on the case studies, PSE projects have brought in a range of PS expertise to support key immunisation bottlenecks across supply chains and logistics, data management and demand generation – all recognised as key bottlenecks to Gavi's zero dose agenda. More generally, the wider PSE portfolio reflects a broad range of immunisation bottlenecks, with projects covering demand generation, integrated immunisation and nutrition approaches, supply chain, digital health, data, cold chain and cash mobilisation. Demand generation is the most common focus area, with 9 projects, followed by integrated approaches with 8 projects, supply with 7 projects, data and digital health with 6 projects each, cold chain with 4 projects, and cash mobilisation with 1 project.[21] Many of these projects have brought both financial and non-financial (i.e. in-kind contributions) to the table. Box 3.8 at the end of this section describes some examples of in-kind partnerships and their value as well as experiences with peer organisations.

Integration of PS expertise to support immunisation has generally been more successful with UPS and Unilever Keluarga SIGAP, and it is too early to assess the overall value of VaxSocial. From the wider portfolio, stakeholder feedback indicates newer projects, such as integrating nutrition and immunisation (End Child Wasting through CIFF financing), as adding value, while the introduction of the Dimagi project in Nigeria was perceived as contradicting Gavi's efforts to strengthen governance around digital solutions. Case study evidence supported by the KIIs reveals that key factors driving success relate to the extent to which the projects build on partner comparative advantage and business model as well as matching of partner supply with country demand. In particular:

Leveraging of private sector partners' comparative advantage and business model:

- This was done particularly well in the UPS STEP, which drew on UPS' market-leader expertise in logistics. It also held promise through VaxSocial where MSD was engaged via its AHO funding – though implementation faced challenges.
- It was mixed in Unilever Keluarga SIGAP in Indonesia, where Unilever's behaviour-change and media capability, Gavi's government engagement, Power of Nutrition's nutrition positioning was the main source of value, though informants were explicit that tying the project to Unilever's Lifebuoy hand soap brand affected delivery, and later sustainability. The Wellness Pass pilot in Ethiopia provides an example where the partnership focused on a specific health-sector application, rather than more fully leveraging Mastercard Inc. Growth Segments business's wider Community Pass infrastructure, rural networks and broader social value proposition.

Matching of private sector supply to country demand:

- Zipline represents the strongest example of country demand across multiple countries: the Rwandan government has been described as the model's clearest champion, with whole-of-government commitment enabling a level

[21] These categories are not mutually exclusive: 6 projects are mapped to more than one focus area, reflecting the fact that several PSE partnerships combine demand, delivery, data and system strengthening objectives.

of integration that was characterised as a "full system transformation" rather than a discrete project. Zipline subsequently expanded to Ghana and Nigeria, where state-level government procurement preceded donor support in some cases, and to Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire.

- Performance in the Unilever Keluarga SIGAP project in Indonesia strengthened once the model was adapted to the Ministry of Health's family-health and stunting agenda. This followed significant design work as the project began as supply-led, based on a priority Lifebuoy market rather than through a country-articulated need. The Wellness Pass digital vaccine record solution in Ethiopia is an example where initial Ministry of Health demand was not necessarily an indicator of success, as broader policy, financing and institutional reforms required for embedding the Mastercard Wellness Pass eCard were not sufficiently developed over the pilot period. Coordination and government ownership were also among the challenges reported to affect implementation. Ethiopia's continued progress in health information system digitalisation suggests the project's timing and solution design were ambitious relative to the pace and complexity of wider health information system development and to the financing context.

Box 3.8. Analysis of expertise and in-kind partnerships

Gavi's PSE expertise-based modality remains aligned with broader trends in corporate private sector engagement. A large proportion of Gavi's expertise-based partnerships combine financial contributions with in-kind support (e.g. Mastercard and Unilever). More broadly, our analysis indicates corporate private sector engagement is increasingly shifting from financing to expertise. Gavi's UPS STEP project is an example of an expertise-based partnership where the principal contribution is the deployment of UPS's logistics expertise and capacity strengthening (noting UPS Foundation also provides funding through Gavi for Zipline). Partners increasingly expect co-creation rather than solicitation and expect Gavi to know their strategy and capabilities before approaching them. The implication is that Gavi's ask should be built partner by partner around each company's business logic and non-financial assets.

This trend is pronounced in the AI and digital infrastructure sector. AI actors in particular offer more in expertise than in financial resources, and our analysis indicates the sector holds substantial potential for Gavi, provided Gavi builds the technical absorptive capacity and a streamlined entry point required to receive it. One Gavi private sector partner similarly observed that Gavi has yet to fully leverage corporate expertise in areas where companies hold strong comparative advantages, particularly in technology. Sector analysis suggests Gavi's priority should be to engage the companies as capability partners, invest early in data readiness and a technical counterpart team, and establish a single organisation-wide AI vision with a named owner, since partners are already looking for one.

The value created by expertise partnerships is often operational rather than financial, making it less visible through conventional resource mobilisation metrics. For example, WFP's in-kind technology partnership with Palantir, through the Optimus supply chain optimisation project, is reported to have generated significant cost savings (in the tens of millions) across WFP's global operations, benefits that do not appear in fundraising figures but represent substantial organisational value.

Save the Children UK provides an example of an expertise partnerships structured around a long-term, mutual value proposition rather than funding alone. Its partnership with GSK, established in 2013, is now in its third five-year phase and currently includes a £15 million commitment focused on reducing the number of zero-dose children in Ethiopia and Nigeria. The partnership spans the full range of Save's private sector engagement: funding, advocacy, technical expertise, employee engagement and supply-chain support. Employee engagement is an important part of the value proposition for GSK. Its Pulse volunteering scheme has evolved from longer-term secondments towards shorter pro bono placements, while continuing to support employee engagement, recruitment and retention. This mutual value proposition has helped to sustain one of Save UK's longest-standing corporate partnerships. Reflecting this, Save the Children assess assesses the value of the partnership as a whole, rather than seeking to evaluate each individual in-kind contribution in isolation.

By contrast, the Global Fund has deliberately reduced its emphasis on in-kind partnerships, concluding that, in many cases, the transaction costs outweighed the strategic value and potential for scale. It has however retained an emphasis on large-scale digital partnerships (such as Digital Health Impact Accelerator which was launched in

2022 as a US$50 million catalytic fund to accelerate digital health transformation in sub-Saharan Africa), potentially in line with the emerging trend of growth and opportunity in this sector.

Taken together, these examples illustrate that organisations are adopting different approaches to expertise and in-kind partnerships, reflecting their strategic priorities and operating models. Efficiency analysis (EQ3) also indicates Gavi should make decisions on which expertise and in-kind partnerships to prioritise. This decision point is taken up in Recommendations 1 and 2.

Finding 12. *Innovation-based partnership results:* Gavi's PSE work on innovations has piloted some impressive solutions to key immunisation bottlenecks. The case studies illustrate different innovation trajectories, reflecting varying levels of country traction, market-shaping considerations and wider adoption and scale-up.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
Medium	Evidenced by interviews (within Gavi and external stakeholders), case studies and documentation. Overall medium robustness rating as predominantly reflects the case studies and may not the full PSE portfolio.

As noted previously, some of the innovations supported through the Gavi PSE work, including Zipline and Simprints have been widely recognised and quoted and presented Gavi as a strong innovation partnership. Both these innovations also have use-cases beyond immunisation, strengthening their value-proposition to countries and other partners and funders.

In terms of health impact results, these innovations have followed different trajectories over Gavi 5.0, reflecting differences in the 'maturity' of the innovation technical and solution design and country traction. During Gavi 5.0, Zipline expanded across Rwanda, Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya, with more than 25 million vaccine doses delivered across Gavi-supported countries (partner reported). Key Simprints achievements during 5.0 were bringing down the age where fingerprints are reliable biometrics from 18 months to six months. Ongoing work is to expand field-proven technologies, such as facial biometrics for children over six months, and to validate biometrics for infants under six months. An RCT is also underway to evaluate the effectiveness of biometrics in immunisation coverage tracking and its cost-effectiveness as a tracking solution. The experience of INFUSE reinforces conclusions drawn from the case studies: stakeholders consistently viewed INFUSE as an effective mechanism for identifying promising innovations.

The innovation-based partnerships have had varied results with regards to the following:

Alignment with country demand/ securing traction in country: Simprints' early work in Bangladesh built on its existing local presence and was introduced as a research and development (R&D) project, piloted alongside the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) e-Tracker. Although the Ministry of Health was actively engaged throughout implementation and biometrics were integrated directly into the e-Tracker, a pathway to domestic financing was not confirmed and political changes were key constraints. In Ghana, Simprints reports having greater success in the regions where it was first involved in the RTS,S malaria vaccine trial. Lessons from Bangladesh have also been applied to Simprints' engagement with Ministries around transition and building cost-effectiveness evidence to assist with domestic budget planning. Zipline presents a very different case, where country introduction has been explicitly demand-driven (expanded in EQ7).

Market shaping-related questions: Both Zipline and Simprints illustrate different market-shaping considerations for Gavi, highlighting that supporting the adoption of promising innovations does not necessarily equate to shaping a sustainable market.

- Zipline and other last-mile innovations illustrate a potential tension between accelerating access in the short-term through donor-funded parallel supply chains and longer-term viability through incentivising governments to pay

for the service themselves. Zipline also raises broader market-shaping considerations: stakeholders highlighted potential innovation 'lock in' given high upfront costs and subsequent deep integration into supply chains. These reflect deliberate technology adoption and procurement choices by governments, which rightly determine how their public health supply chains are organised. At the same time, Gavi's market shaping mandate gives it an interest in healthy and sustainable markets for the technologies it supports. Finally, the temporary disruption to Zipline's government of Ghana contract due to political change also illustrates the vulnerability of government pay models to political cycles, while recognising this represents an external/systemic sustainability risk largely outside Gavi's control.

- Simprints illustrates a different set of market-shaping questions. It is the only INFUSE Pacesetter focused on biometrics that remains active in the immunisation and health sector.[22] Gavi has provided repeated grant funding (often alongside other private funders) and supported technology partnerships to advance the use case for biometrics for immunisation. Views differ on whether Gavi could have taken an explicit market shaping strategy for biometrics, as characterised in Gavi's more successful approach to remote cold chain monitoring through Nexleaf, a 2016 INFUSE Pacesetter (deliberate multi-supplier, price-reduction pathway). One stakeholder suggested that sustained and high-profile support for a single provider may have reduced incentives for alternative biometric solutions to emerge and for stronger competitive pressure on cost and performance. This evaluation does not draw conclusions on the specific Simprints market-shaping question; rather Simprints is illustrative of the wider strategic distinction between supporting an individual innovation and intentionally shaping a sustainable market around that innovation or category.

Limited progress of innovations beyond country pilots: This is a key aspect highlighting the success or not of an innovation and is discussed in detail in the next EQ7.

Taken together, these cases offer a structural lesson for INFUSE-type innovation investments that future innovation partnerships may benefit from a clearer distinction between supporting individual innovations and intentionally shaping markets, and in balancing supply-side opportunities with country demand (discussed in EQ2). The Gavi Innovation Scale Up Facility (SUF), developed in response to innovation scaling challenges, is intended to provide such a pathway for INFUSE and other innovations for scale through both risk-tolerant and private investment (note that the SUF is however not in scope for this review).[23]

Comparator analysis highlights how Gavi peers are approaching innovation and scale pathways (Box 3.9 and see EQ7).

Box 3.9. Comparator experience highlights transferable lessons for strengthening Gavi's innovation model

Most comparator organisations have established dedicated innovation functions, although their mandates and operating models differ. Despite these differences, several lessons emerge that are relevant to Gavi.

- **Innovation functions provide more than grant funding.** Peers increasingly combine financing with technical assistance, partnership brokering, operational testing and active portfolio management. WFP Innovation Accelerator, IRC Airbel Impact Lab, Save the Children UK, CEPI and BARDA all provide structured support to innovators beyond funding alone, helping innovations progress from proof of concept towards adoption and scale.
- **Demand, rather than innovation supply, is the principal bottleneck.** Several stakeholders described a common lesson across the sector: identifying promising innovations is rarely the constraint; securing country demand, financing and institutional adoption is considerably more challenging. This applies to both product and

[22] Simprints was one of four Pacesetters selected in the 2018 INFUSE cycle focused on biometrics and digital health cards to help solve the global identity crisis (two of which offered a biometrics solution).

[23] Gavi (2026). Gavi announces new partnerships to accelerate innovation and expand access to immunisation. Available at: https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/gavi-announces-new-partnerships-accelerate-innovation-and-expand-access (Accessed 27 July 2026).

programmatic or operational innovations. New products particularly require a 'buyer' and Unitaid for instance focuses on strengthening the market conditions, including affordability, demand, and supply needed for governments and partners to adopt innovations at scale. This has been more challenging where innovations lack a natural scale funder, and government fiscal and policy conditions constrain adoption. As a large-scale country programmes funder, Gavi and the Global Fund are recognised as having a comparative advantage in scaling innovations and innovative approaches through their core funding models.

- **Organisations create explicit pathways from innovation to scale.** Comparator organisations increasingly use dedicated financing mechanisms to support pathways to sustainability and scale. The Global Fund uses time-limited Match Funding to encourage countries to embed new tools within routine grant implementation, while the WFP Innovation Accelerator, Save the Children Global Ventures and BARDA Ventures have established innovative financing mechanisms, including venture philanthropy, blended finance and investment funds, to support promising innovations beyond the pilot stage.
- **Country delivery platforms are strongly leveraged for adoption.** Organisations with substantial country operations, including WFP, IRC and Save the Children, use their delivery platforms to identify operational needs, test innovations and support scale-up. Their experience highlights the importance of integrating innovation into existing delivery systems rather than treating pilots as stand-alone activities and is directly relevant to Gavi-supported immunisation programs.

Overall, comparator experience suggests that successful innovation functions focus less on generating new ideas than on creating structured pathways to adoption and scale through demand generation, technical support, appropriate financing mechanisms and active portfolio management.

3.2.2. Sustainability, replication and scale-up

EQ7*. Effectiveness and sustainability*: To what extent did the PSE Strategy facilitate sustainable partnerships, including mechanisms for replication, institutionalization, or scale-up? Which partnerships have the most potential to be scaled or be replicated across countries and what are the enabling and contextual factors to consider when doing this?

Sustainability, replication and scale-up are among the most critical tests of whether Gavi's PSE investment delivers lasting value. This section assesses how far the strategy facilitated sustainable partnerships, what the case studies reveal about the conditions under which scale and replication become possible, and what the evidence suggests about which modalities and models carry the strongest forward potential. A key challenge under PSE 5.0 was that these terms were not adequately defined. As one interviewee observed, "it was never defined what scale meant", and this definitional gap has contributed to inconsistent ambition-setting and measurement across the portfolio.

Finding 13. Gavi demonstrated strength in identifying and piloting innovative private sector solutions to immunisation bottlenecks. The greater challenge was translating pilots into institutionalised and scalable models, and financing and scale were not systematically embedded in partnership design.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
Medium	Evidenced through the case studies and wider portfolio review, including interview feedback from Secretariat and partners across the portfolio. Medium overall robustness as weighed to case study evidence which reflects only a share of the full PSE portfolio.

The evidence suggests that Gavi's comparative strength during Gavi 5.0 lay in sourcing, validating and testing innovative private sector solutions, evidenced by growth in the PS portfolio and results discussed above (EQ6).

Stakeholders observed that partnerships frequently focused on demonstrating technical feasibility without establishing credible pathways to government adoption, commercial viability or long-term financing. They report sustainability planning was typically inserted into concept notes as a required section rather than designed as a core partnership logic. One Secretariat stakeholder was explicit, "*the sustainability component is almost always like government will take this on, but there's … no pathway to that.*" Some interviewees also noted that Gavi's broader

market shaping machinery has not been consistently leveraged to create enabling conditions for PSE innovations to become adopted at scale.

A review of sustainability or scalability of PSE projects is provided below (focusing on the case studies), followed by a review of the key drivers and enablers.

PSE projects review

The experience across the case studies has varied:

(i) The Zipline Rwanda case is the clearest evidence of key conditions for institutionalisation and sustainability being met: government procurement contracts, full supply chain integration, and a public funding commitment.

In Rwanda, the partnership has evolved from a technology pilot into an integral component of the national supply chain: the blood system and vaccine delivery were fundamentally reorganised around centralised on-demand drone delivery. The Rwandan government has been described as the model's clearest champion, with whole-of-government commitment enabling a level of integration that was characterised as a "full system transformation" rather than a discrete project. The Government of Rwanda has signed public procurement contracts and taken on operational ownership.

Gavi Secretariat stakeholders described Gavi's engagement as the catalyst, and the country is now buying the service directly. Gavi also helped position drone-based vaccine delivery as a credible national health-system intervention, rather than a donor-funded pilot, supporting its inclusion in national workplans and budgets. In Rwanda, Gavi's Innovation Top-Up grant financed expansion to health posts, while the country team channel helped secure Ministry of Health buy-in and a commitment to sustain the service after Gavi funding.

Zipline also demonstrates the clearest trajectory to scale and replication, however scale-up conditions are demanding: strong executive-level government demand, public procurement, local entity formation, regulatory airspace approval, and integration into existing supply chain workflows are all required. This may constrain expansion which to date now includes Ghana and Nigeria, where state-level government procurement preceded donor support in some cases, and to Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire. In September 2026, Côte d'Ivoire approved an eight-year public-private partnership to expand to ten distribution hubs, with the US Department of State providing upfront infrastructure funding and the government committing to fund ongoing operations - an early signal of government ownership.

(ii) Sustainability for the la Caixa partnership is not in question in the near term, but replication potential is constrained by structural and fiscal dependencies.

Replication of the Vaccines4Children fundraising model is actively being explored in one country. The key replication lesson for Gavi 6.0 concerns the structural conditions the financing partnership relies on — a banking partner with a client-facing social mission, a domestic advocacy intermediary, a fiscal framework that rewards philanthropic giving, and a matching mechanism that multiplies visible impact. These conditions need to be identified and assembled market by market before the model can be considered replicable.

(iii) Expertise-based partnerships demonstrate varied programmatic sustainability and a degree of dependency on the corporate partner.

The **Unilever Keluarga SIGAP** behaviour-change partnership in Indonesia saw the Indonesian Ministry of Health reportedly incorporating some elements into policy. However, Unilever's reduced engagement following changes in its Lifebuoy business strategy removed a key driver of the partnership's continuation. The independent scale-up evaluation also concluded no clear government funding or institutional home had emerged and that and "without clearer institutional anchoring and budget lines, the intensity of Keluarga SIGAP programme activities is unlikely to be maintained at scale". Issues with robustness of the digital evaluation also limits the evidence base for future replication decisions.

The **UPS / STEP** programme demonstrates **programmatic sustainability** through human capital rather than technology adoption through capacity strengthening of supply chain officials. This collaboration continues and is anchored in UPS' core expertise.

The **Wellness Pass** in Ethiopia, implemented through the Mastercard Inc. Growth Segments business was not sustained, with an external evaluation identifying financial and human-resource constraints, high equipment and training costs, infrastructure limitations and continued reliance on donor funding for the eCard as key barriers. The project however was considered to have contributed to Ethiopia's broader transition towards digitalisation of immunisation information through capacity strengthening and technology transfer.

(iv) INFUSE innovations have followed different sustainability and scale pathways

The **Simprints** biometrics partnership demonstrates both the potential and the challenges of transferring innovative technologies into government adoption. Multiple rounds of Gavi support in Bangladesh and Ghana, plus technical partnerships with Japan-based Nippon Electric Company (NEC) and Arm have enabled significant technical progress for an immunisation use case, but the pathway to sustainability remained underdeveloped, illustrating the "valley of death" challenge for innovations. In Bangladesh, the partnership advanced as a research and proof-of-concept initiative alongside the national EPI e-Tracker but political changes disrupted momentum. Ghana presents a more promising trajectory, including efforts led by Simprints to establish a government budget line for biometrics, following an organisational learning curve on navigating public financing procurement and contracting processes. Expectations around Simprints' sustainability and scale should also be interpreted in the context of the technology's ongoing development, including current research to validate biometrics from birth.

The strongest example of mobilising follow-on investment and partnerships was transitioning Nexleaf (remote cold-chain analytics) to Gavi's market shaping team.[24] However, overall, consultations and portfolio evidence suggest INFUSE has been more successful as an innovation pipeline than as a mechanism for systematically transitioning innovations into country-owned implementation at scale.

Taken together, stakeholders have highlighted that in the current constrained global health financing environment, a large portfolio of smaller pilot projects in Gavi cannot be justified and that fewer, focused projects with credible scale potential is a sensible approach. Consistent with this shift, the Gates Foundation is focusing its Gavi 6.0 Matching Fund to private sector cash contributions, rather than matching innovation or expertise-based partnerships.

Sustainability, scale and replication enablers

Drawing across the case studies and KII evidence, five factors consistently distinguish partnerships with genuine sustainability, scale and replication potential from those that remain grant-dependent pilots (summarised in Figure 3.3 and detailed below). Two caveats apply: (i) adequate Secretariat person-time may be required to replicate certain types of partnerships (e.g. La Caixa), requiring explicit decisions about resource allocation and trade-offs; and (ii) to date, sustainability, scale and replication within the portfolio are the exception rather than the rule.

Figure 3.3: Enablers for sustainability and scale



[24] There are also examples where Gavi HSS funding has been the scale partner, such as with NexLeaf in India pre-2018, driven by clear country demand. CGD (2024). A Bigger Role for Gavi in Scaling Innovations for Immunization and Health Systems.

1. Active government demand and willingness to pay

The single most important factor across all case studies is whether the government has demonstrated demand through action — signing procurement contracts, designating budget lines, or actively integrating the partnership into national systems — rather than through formal endorsement or passive cooperation alone. Mastercard Wellness Pass in Ethiopia illustrates the fragility of partnerships where government engagement remained largely formal or did not translate into sustained operational or financial ownership (*"If the government's not bought in, then it's just already… there's no way they're going to be convinced to sustain the costs of something."* - Secretariat member). Simprints in Bangladesh illustrates a related challenge where the partnership was subsequently affected by political change, highlighting the importance of embedding ownership sufficiently deeply to withstand changes in political leadership, while recognising that such changes and their implications can sit beyond a partner's control.

Rwanda's whole-of-government mandate for Zipline and the Nigerian states that signed contracts before donor funding arrived are the clearest positive illustrations. This is also where Gavi can bring value to PS partnerships, by helping its partners, particularly smaller innovators, navigate country financing, procurement and Ministry budget processes which are vital to sustainability.

2. Cost-effectiveness and a credible commercial or financing model

Partnerships where the total cost of ownership is not planned for from the outset consistently fail to transition. The Wellness Pass Ethiopia experience showed that costs without a financing model for eCards, readers, hardware and maintenance created a transition cliff. Zipline's viability depends on government readiness to treat drone delivery as infrastructure spending rather than project cost, which is only feasible where delivery volumes and geography justify the investment. Simprints' repeated grant rounds suggest the technology has not yet reached a price point or cost-effectiveness threshold that enables government adoption. One Gavi corporate partner argued that Gavi needs to embed "commercialisation" thinking — not profit, but a model where value is designed in from day one, not added on at closeout.

3. Integration into existing government systems and workflows

Partnerships that are designed as plug-ins into existing national infrastructure are significantly more likely to sustain than those that build parallel systems. Zipline Rwanda succeeded partly because it reorganised existing logistics infrastructure rather than adding a new layer. The network was first established for blood delivery in 2016 before expanding into routine immunisation, so vaccine delivery could build on infrastructure, operational capacity and relationships already in place. UPS / STEP succeeded partly because delivering training and capacity strengthening does not require ongoing technology investment or procurement. A recurring observation from some Secretariat experts engaged in PSE projects is that those designed around a technology or corporate asset often do not begin from government systems as their frame of reference, which weakens their pathway to sustainability and scale.

4. Country-specific contextual fit, not universal applicability

Scale and replication are context-dependent, not automatic. Zipline's strongest settings are geographically specific as Rwanda's hilly terrain, island geographies, insecure or flood-prone regions present the strongest use cases. Success for Unilever Keluarga SIGAP in Indonesia depended on a "harmonious" partner ecosystem that Gavi HSIS explicitly cautioned was "exceptional" and not always replicable beyond the country. The earlier experience of Simprints in Bangladesh illustrates the effects of changes in political and administrative context.

5. Upfront strategic planning how Gavi will act as catalyst and connector vs. long-term funder

The strongest sustainability cases share a common pattern: Gavi's role is catalytic and transitional rather than sustained. In Rwanda, Gavi's initial PSE support de-risked the first vaccine delivery pilots before the government assumed procurement. In the Unilever India case, Gavi's initial funding catalysed government uptake of materials and advocacy generated lasting value beyond the grant period. By contrast, partnerships where Gavi has remained the principal funder through multiple cycles — Simprints being the clearest example — show fewer indicators of transition readiness. One Gavi Secretariat stakeholder described the original intent of the Innovation Scale-Up Facility in these

terms: using private capital and investment vehicles to bridge the "valley of death" so that innovations can reach a cost and evidence threshold where governments can procure directly, without perpetual Gavi grant support. A Gavi Secretariat stakeholder described it as "the best idea as far as scaling, replication, sustainability" they had seen.

Comparator organisations offer transferable lessons on managing the transition from innovation to scale and are summarised in Box 3.10.

Box 3.10. Learning from comparators on sustainability and scale

Comparator organisations offer transferable lessons on managing the transition from innovation to scale, though structural differences limit direct comparison.

UNICEF: Demand first, not supply push. UNICEF's Office of Innovation has shifted away from broad product innovation toward a sharper "risk-impact" lens, prioritising projects where a demand pathway for adoption exists. "Supply is almost never the problem; demand almost always is" — is directly applicable to some of Gavi's experience in private sector partnerships. UNICEF argued that Gavi's predictable buy-side financing through its country programming actually makes some innovation and market-shaping decisions "cleaner"— an advantage Gavi has not fully leveraged.

CEPI: Framework agreements enabling agility at scale. CEPI is moving toward umbrella or framework agreements that pre-authorise governance arrangements, enabling individual partnerships to be activated quickly without repeating full approval processes. This approach reduces transaction costs for repeat engagements with the same partner or partner type and allows speed-to-implementation that more closely matches private sector timelines — a model with potential relevance for Gavi's multi-country innovation deployments.

Global Fund: Private funding as organisational risk capital, not scale vehicle. The Global Fund has explicitly repositioned private sector funding as "organisational risk capital" — enabling strategic shifts, testing models and moving into new areas that core funding would not support. It has also "dialled down" non-financial and innovation support given high transaction costs relative to scalability, and the Global Fund's role as a scaler of innovative solutions versus testing innovations. This represents a deliberate portfolio choice that Gavi has not made explicitly: what is private sector engagement for, and which activities are worth the administrative burden? Gavi PSE focused on integration of nutrition-immunisation draws parallels to the Global Fund's approach, first with Unilever in India and later with CIFF in Ethiopia, implemented by UNICEF.

Key transferable principle: The comparators differ in mandate and instruments, but those that have navigated the innovation-to-scale transition most effectively share a single discipline: they have made an explicit choice about what their private sector engagement is *for*, and matched the financing instrument to a defined route to scale — fixing who will buy, adopt or sustain an innovation before capital is committed, not after. What none of them does is run a broad, opportunistic innovation portfolio and assume demand will follow. Gavi's current model does not consistently apply any of these mechanisms — yet Gavi is better placed than any comparator to do so, because its predictable procurement architecture means the buyer is already structurally present, the very condition other GHIs identified as missing.

3.2.3. Enablers, barriers and assessing ROI

EQ8. *Effectiveness*: Which partnerships under the PSE Strategy were perceived to be most effective for delivering against Gavi's objectives and what were the enabling/limiting factors contributing to their success? What are implications for assessing which partnerships will achieve good RoI?

Finding 14. Partnerships generated the greatest strategic return where multiple forms of value accumulated. Return also increased as partnerships matured and progressed towards sustainability and scale.

Strength of evidence	Rationale
Medium	Evidenced through the case studies and wider portfolio review, including interview feedback from Secretariat and partners across the portfolio. Medium overall robustness as weighed to case study evidence which reflects only a share of the full PSE portfolio.

The strongest-performing partnerships combined several forms of value rather than delivering against a single objective.

Zipline provides the clearest example. The partnership generated operational improvements in vaccine delivery, demonstrated successful innovation, achieved institutional adoption through government procurement, strengthened Gavi's innovation narrative and created a scalable model for future expansion. Although initially resource intensive, the partnership progressively generated greater returns as implementation matured and government ownership increased. Gavi also played an important role in Zipline credibility as a health system intervention, leveraging Gavi's reputation and convening.

The **La Caixa partnership** occupies a structurally different position from the other case studies. It has generated sustained financial contributions, contributing directly to vaccination coverage, while also strengthening Gavi's advocacy and visibility in Spain. A Gavi Secretariat stakeholder described the partnership as generating substantial annual funding, including support through the Gavi Matching Fund, with a medium administrative burden comparable to that of smaller sovereign donors. This was seen as an exceptional return relative to Secretariat effort. Another stakeholder cited it as a benchmark for the kind of cash-based, low-complexity partnership the PSI team should seek to replicate.

UPS likewise generated substantial operational value by applying its logistics expertise to immunisation supply chains through the STEP programme. The partnership addressed a clearly defined operational bottleneck while requiring comparatively modest ongoing management by the Secretariat.

Other partnerships generated important but narrower forms of value, illustrating challenges of assessing relative performance, particularly in the absence of a portfolio approach within the PSE Strategy:

- **VaxSocial** represents a substantial investment (approximately US$12 million, including Matching Fund contributions, plus a US$1 million independent evaluation) in understanding how social media and digital platforms can influence vaccine confidence and uptake across three priority markets. Given the growing influence of digital platforms on health behaviours, Gavi's strategic emphasis on demand promotion, and limited expertise in digital behaviour change among Gavi's core partners, such a partnership could be regarded as having potential to generate high long-term value for Gavi. However, one stakeholder was sceptical of VaxSocial's potential to influence Gavi digital demand guidance and decision-making, citing that internal awareness of the partnership was too low for its findings to shape future practice. The platform-based management of VaxSocial financed by AHO reduced Secretariat transaction costs, significantly improving the ratio of outcome to level of effort.
- **Simprints** has generated valuable advances in biometric technology for immunisation, contributed to Gavi's innovation narrative, and underpins Gavi partnerships with key technology partners in sovereign funding states: Japan-based NEC and later with UK-based Arm. Its long-term value to Gavi now depends on a strategy to transition from grant-funded innovation to sustainable adoption. Establishing this pathway, potentially through the Innovation Scale-Up Facility developed under 5.0, will be an important priority for Simprints and other Gavi fostered innovations under Gavi 6.0.
- **Unilever Keluarga SIGAP** developed a potentially sustainable community-based model to encourage healthy household behaviours including vaccine uptake, and generated advocacy and visibility value with Match Fund

donors, and plausible pathway to Indonesia becoming a Gavi sovereign donor (though attribution is not established).

Across the case studies, four factors consistently distinguished partnerships with stronger results, sustainability and replication potential – taken together as characteristics signalling **'high-return'** partnerships. Based on these findings, the evaluation developed an ex-post framework for assessing future partnership opportunities. The framework combines Gavi-controlled factors, country context and the partnership's underlying value proposition. Table 3.3 lists these factors: **(i) a clear value proposition; (ii) country alignment and implementation readiness; (iii) Gavi catalytic role and leverage; and (iv) a credible pathway to sustainability and scale/replication,** with analysis of which conditions were present across the case studies.

Table 3.3: Characteristics of high-return partnerships based on PS case studies

Partnership and primary strategic return		High-return partnership characteristic				Overall strategic return (realised to date)
		1. Clear value proposition • Tackles key Gavi bottleneck • Aligned to partner comparative advantage and business model • High financial or other key leverage	**2. Country alignment and implementation readiness** • Strong contextual 'fit' • Active government engagement and champions • Integration with existing systems	**3. Gavi catalytic role and leverage** • Clear Gavi convening or catalytic role • Secretariat effort proportionate to expected strategic value	**4. Credible pathway to sustainability and scale/replication** • Pathway to cost-effectiveness/ affordability (where relevant) • Credible financing, commercial or institutional model • Evidence of sustained demand	
La Caixa	Long-term financing, advocacy and donor mobilisation	Present	Present	Present	Partially present	High
Zipline	Innovation successfully translated into government adoption and scale; advocacy	Present	Present	Present	Partially present	High
Simprints	Biometric technology development and future innovation potential; advocacy	Present	Partially present	Partially present	Partially present	Moderate – High
UPS STEP	Logistics and supply chain operational expertise, workforce capacity	Present	Present	Present	Present	High
Unilever Keluarga SIGAP (Indonesia)	Behaviour-change innovation, replication and government engagement; advocacy	Present	Partially present	Partially present	Not present	Low - Moderate
VaxSocial	Strategic learning on digital demand generation and social media	Present	Partially present	Present	Partially present	Moderate: too early and requires socialisation within Gavi
Mastercard Wellness Pass (Ethiopia)	Mutual learning on aligning Mastercard Inc. Growth Segments business comparative advantage with Gavi's needs	Not present	Partially present	Partially present	Not present	Low for Wellness Pass (important lessons for broader Gavi-Mastercard partnership)

Present Partially present Not present

4. EVALUATION PILLAR 3: LESSONS FOR 6.0

This section draws together evidence from EQ1 to EQ8. EQ9 (Section 4.1) sets out key lessons for the next strategy. EQ10 (Section 4.2) turns them into strategic choices, and EQ11 (Section 4.3) tests them against the Gavi Leap.

4.1. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

EQ9. *Overall conclusions and lessons from 5.0 PSE Strategy, implementation and results:* What key lessons from the 2021–2025 period could best inform the next Private Sector and Innovation Strategy?

The evaluation evidence points towards the following eight key lessons to inform the next Gavi PSE Strategy.

Taken together, the period leaves Gavi with more to build on than the challenges alone suggest: demonstrated relevance; a COVAX mobilisation executed at speed and scale; partners ready to deepen engagement; an advocacy modality that delivers real value for sovereign fundraising; a funding model that provides an avenue for scale; and platform models that extend a small team's reach. Where the period underperformed, the causes were structural: a sound strategy without shared comprehension, differences in the operating models of private sector partnerships and Gavi core country funding, supply-led design, heavy internal processes, an unmanaged portfolio, sustainability and risk appetite by assumption, different incentives across the Secretariat, and absent measurement. These are lessons about design, and each corresponds to a decision available to Gavi in shaping the next strategy.

Lesson 1: The Gavi PSE 5.0 strategy was conceptually sound, but there was a gap in shared understanding and operationalisation by the Secretariat. The Gavi PSE 5.0 Strategy sets out a clear intent to mobilise private sector financing, advocacy, expertise and innovation. It names its modalities and carries a theory of change. Stakeholders agreed on PSE's relevance (EQ1), and the modalities were appropriate in design (EQ1 and 2). The issue however sits in its operationalisation (EQ1, 3 and 4). Different teams held different views of what the strategy was for; a point that also came across clearly during an emerging findings workshop for this evaluation. The boundary between innovation and expertise-based private sector engagement was contested inside the PSI team itself and the classification of modalities was applied inconsistently (EQ1, EQ6). The theory of change was never turned into a measurement framework (EQ6). Some of these challenges can be traced to changes in identity and senior individuals within Gavi: as leadership changed, the story shifted with it, leaving the proposition carried by individuals rather than the institution. The lesson is on the importance of consistent operational understanding, shared ownership and an agreed interpretation of the strategy, carried by an institutional sponsor.

Lesson 2: Country demand was the strongest determinant of partnership performance and sustainability. The most consistent success factor across the evidence is whether a partnership responded to real country demand (EQ6, EQ7, EQ8). Zipline Rwanda is the strongest case in point, while supply led partnerships have struggled (e.g. Wellness Pass in Ethiopia, Keluarga SIGAP demand generation in Indonesia). A Gavi country manager described limited visibility over private sector grants in their own portfolio and managed outside the country structure. The frustration is two-sided with PSI leadership describing a partner with clear country demand, stalled because engagement was not on a country manager's priority list (EQ3). The evidence equally cautions against swinging to pure demand-pull as countries do not always know which solutions exist. The lesson is that Gavi needs a structured way to bring supply and demand together. Successful partnerships require structured business partnering to balance country priorities with proactive identification of private sector solutions, rather than relying on either a purely demand- or supply-led approaches.

Lesson 3: Institutional incentives and organisational processes influenced how partnerships were prioritised and managed across the Secretariat. Incentives differed across teams needed for effective PS project delivery and at times came up against each other. Where incentives aligned, partnerships worked more seamlessly (EQ3). Capacity constraints and competing demands further influenced the extent of engagement and country-facing teams responsible for delivery were frequently engaged late or not at all – with exceptions noted across the evaluation

findings and case studies. Opportunities were more likely to move through personal relationships rather than structured channels between teams. The imbalance has a second dimension the Secretariat named itself: what was rewarded during 5.0 was funding. This matters particularly as sovereign resources decline: Gavi needs resources, but it equally needs the efficiency and impact gains that expertise and innovation deliver. There have also been no incentives and processes for PSE leads to be raised outside of the PSI team. The lesson is that no strategy wording outweighs organisational incentives. Key challenges of the 5.0 period were missing cross-team co-ownership from design onward, valuing expertise and innovation alongside funds raised, and structured channels through which any team can surface an opportunity or a country need. These are preconditions for effective PSE, not refinements.

Lesson 4: Gavi's internal processes were sub-optimal and streamlining them is a precondition for the partnership ambitions of 6.0. Secretariat and partner accounts converge on the same pain points across the partnership lifecycle: unclear entry points into Gavi, lengthy contracting and approval timelines, multiple signoffs with no clear decision rights or escalation route, and bespoke governance and contracting arrangements redesigned for each partnership (EQ2, 3 and 4). Partners described the governance burden as "daunting" and warned that "*the ways of working, the processes, needs to have a different approach… otherwise, you're going to lose the participation of the private sector."* Transaction costs were frequently disproportionate to the scale of the engagement and poorly calibrated to private sector ways of working, and delays cascade into results: the Wellness Pass COVID use case had largely passed by the time the contract was signed. These are long-standing issues — the 2016–20 evaluation also flagged roles, responsibilities and cost capture, and progress was limited under 5.0 (EQ5). The lesson is not that Gavi should abandon rigour; the 5.0 risk was less an absence of governance than diligence applied without proportionality. Key obstacles to effective and efficient partnerships during 5.0 were the lack of standardised partnership models and contractual templates for repeat engagement types, unclear decision rights with a defined escalation route, and due diligence out of proportion to partnership size and risk. Peers, such as CEPI are mitigating this risk by developing framework agreements that pre-authorise governance for repeat partners.

Lesson 5: The 5.0 period lacked explicit portfolio criteria, different strategies for different partner types, and the management burden was too high relative to team size. The project tracker records 38 non-COVAX projects were managed over 2021-25. During this period, seven high-effort projects account for roughly 40% of the total budget under management, and the Matching Fund appears in 25 of the 38 projects. The consultations record partnerships accepted under pressure, without discipline in the acceptance decision; and that private sector projects did not necessarily consider costs or scale when starting contracts. The portfolio also demonstrated solutions to capacity constraints by working through platforms. Consultations identified the AHO platform for VaxSocial as the portfolio's best model: structured outside Gavi, with a fiscal sponsor absorbing the management load, and research feeding back into national strategies and Gavi's spending guidance. Alongside, the private sector and philanthropic ecosystem is becoming more sophisticated and more intentional. Foundation and philanthropic partners now arrive with a full range of financing tools, co-funding conditions that shape institutional arrangements, and shared implementing infrastructures: engagement far beyond cheque-writing. Corporate partners bring brand, capability and advocacy value, with commercial logic attached. The lesson is that 5.0 lacked an explicit portfolio logic: criteria for what to take on, scale and decline; different strategies for different partner types, since a corporation, a foundation, a high net worth individual and an early-stage innovator each want different things from Gavi. It also needed a deliberate split between what Gavi manages directly and what it runs through platforms, particularly with a leaner Secretariat.

Lesson 6: Sustainability, scale and risk appetite were never defined nor actively considered during project design. The 5.0 portfolio produced more pilots than sustained or institutionalised outcomes (EQ7). Scale was never defined and risk appetite was never made explicit. The balance between early-stage innovation and scale discipline was named as a question on which the organisation holds different views, concluding that failure tolerance must be intentional, not accidental. Stakeholders asked for limits to be hard coded into the next strategy. Gavi has begun building the answer: the Innovation Scale-Up Facility. The lesson is to provide the discipline 5.0 lacked: scale and sustainability were not defined at the start of each partnership, nor differentiated by context; risk appetite was not

explicit; projects generally lacked entry, continuation and exit criteria with permission to use them, and graduation routes, to government financing or market shaping, were mostly undefined at project outset.

Lesson 7: Advocacy was a stated 5.0 modality and it delivered real value for sovereign fundraising, but was underrecognized. The 5.0 strategy explicitly paired financing with advocacy, and this is one of the places it worked as intended (EQ6). Multiple examples have been provided on PSE supporting sovereign engagement (Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, Sweden, Indonesia). The Matching Fund carries this value naturally when it connects a donor country to its own companies (UK companies; Orange in France; Tony's Chocolonely in the Netherlands). This matters more as the political economy of development financing evolves, aid budgets shrink and donors look to demonstrate they are diversifying development financing, or spending is linked to their national private sectors. PSI leadership has described these relationships as securing access at the highest levels of government during political change: hard to document, but a key part of how the team operates, with payoffs arriving years later, and a story that is risky to tell externally. The lesson is that while the PSE Strategy recognised this modality, it didn't measure it or make it visible enough or build its capture into the measurement architecture (Lesson 8).

Lesson 8: PSE MEL was not meaningfully developed, so PSE could not demonstrate its outputs, its outcomes for beneficiaries, or the value of its non-cash contributions. The 5.0 strategy was not supported by a monitoring, evaluation and learning framework. Team indicators tracked activity rather than results, and public reporting folded PSE into aggregate resource mobilisation (EQ6). Outputs were tracked unevenly, with portfolio data inconsistent across sources and project counts that do not reconcile. Where project-level evaluations existed, several externally led, they carried material limits, including partner-generated evidence and a contaminated control group. The lesson: 5.0 lacked a shared KPI architecture, co-owned across private sector and programme teams, which captured financial, advocacy, expertise and innovation value and outcomes for beneficiaries. It is the precondition for every other lesson here.

4.2. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS GOING FORWARD

EQ10. *Strategic considerations going forward:* What risks, opportunity costs, trade-offs and strategic considerations should guide the design of PSE Strategy in Gavi 6.0?

The primary risk for 6.0 is non-implementation of the confirmed lessons, not the absence of options. Several of the lessons under EQ9 are not strategic choices but preconditions and essentials: clear operationalisation of the strategy (Lesson 1), demand-driven design (Lesson 2), sustainability planned from inception (Lesson 6), recognition of the advocacy modality (Lesson 7), a functioning MEL architecture (Lesson 8) and process improvements (Lesson 4). These must be implemented in 6.0 regardless of the strategic direction chosen. The risk of not doing so is concrete: PSE would lose credibility both internally, where different teams already hold different views of its purpose, and externally, where partners have warned that process burdens threaten their continued participation, and it would become a burden on countries rather than a contribution to them. This review, the development of the new Private Sector and Innovation Strategy, and the Gavi Leap priorities align in time, creating a window to move the needle on PSE within Gavi that did not exist during 5.0. The considerations below therefore address the genuine trade-offs — the decisions on which reasonable positions differ and where Gavi must weigh opportunity costs. For each, we set out the options, their pros and cons, and this evaluation's position, which also feed into the determination of the recommendations set out in Section 5.

Consideration 1: Strategic positioning. The strategic positioning of PSE faces a number of key choices, including:

- On objective – whether fundraising is the primary purpose or PSE within Gavi is a genuinely multi-modal function in which expertise, innovation and advocacy carry equal institutional weight.
- On focus – broad-based engagement mirroring Gavi's own breadth, or a catalytic function such as the Global Fund model, where private capital is positioned as organisational risk capital that tests models and moves into areas core funding cannot, rather than as a general funding stream.

A fundraising-led positioning has the virtue of honesty about where incentives currently sit and preserves the funder relationships the RM-led model built; its cost is that it perpetuates the cash-only lens that undervalued expertise, innovation and advocacy throughout 5.0.

A multi-modal, catalytic positioning matches where the evidence says PSE added most value; its cost is a lower and less legible fundraising number at precisely the moment resource pressure is highest, which requires Gavi to accept the recalibrated proposition explicitly rather than by default. Such positioning also aligns with analysis that the expertise-based modality remains relevant with broader trends in corporate private sector engagement, strongly pronounced in the AI and digital infrastructure sector.

This evaluation's position: PSE 6.0 should consider the opportunity trade-offs between these objectives and focus areas and create clear boundaries for their pursuit given team resource constraints. There is a strong case for retaining Gavi's multi-modal function with a catalytic orientation to some degree, particularly where corporate partnerships and trust building could later give access to new forms of technology wealth. MEL must follow from this positioning decision and count the fundraising expectation, along with advocacy, expertise and innovation.

Consideration 2: Breadth versus depth in the portfolio. The 5.0 portfolio was concentrated by accident: a few high-effort projects carried a disproportionate share of budget, while a long tail of small projects drew on the same fixed pool of relationship effort that partners experience as the real currency of the relationship.

- Breadth preserves the option value of early-stage bets and the funder diversity 5.0 materially built (EQ6); its cost is a stretched team, diluted stewardship, and partnerships accepted under pressure without discipline in the acceptance decision.
- Depth improves focus, manageability and the return on a stretched team, and allows each retained partnership to be resourced with the relationship effort that converts goodwill into larger commitments; its cost is foregone optionality, and it must be executed as deliberate prioritisation, not as a contraction of the relationships breadth produced.

The comparator evidence is instructive: the Global Fund has explicitly chosen depth, dialling down non-financial engagements whose transaction costs outweighed strategic value and concentrating on partnerships capable of delivering strategic priorities at scale.

This evaluation's position: Gavi should choose depth, defined as fewer partnerships, resourced properly for stewardship and co-creation, judged on more than the funds raised — with early-stage optionality held through INFUSE and platform structures rather than through direct management of a long tail.

Consideration 3: Resolving organisational/ systemic constraints to PSE implementation. A key finding was the need for 6.0 to feature more integrated and collaborative structures, systems and mechanisms for joint Secretariat working on private sector partnerships. For the 6.0 period, updated PSE operational guidelines are under review as part of broader 6.0 operationalisation planning, however this is just one building block: lessons from UNICEF highlights that who was at the table when innovation decisions were made was the bigger determinant of success, not necessarily pre-defined processes. The full comparator analysis also points overwhelmingly towards an internal organisational conclusion: PSE effectiveness is fundamentally an organisational alignment and strategic prioritisation issue. Success for 6.0 will depend on how, and to what extent, structural links are made across the Secretariat with programmes, health systems and country teams.

This evaluation's position: Regardless of Gavi's choices in implementing Leap and 6.0, the evaluation is unequivocal of need for an integrated and collaborative mechanism for joint working. Addressing this is a perquisite for the 6.0 period. Shared KPIs, mainstreamed review and co-ownership from partnership design onward are non-negotiable design features.

Consideration 4: Handling innovation — selection, role boundaries, and the routes into Gavi's funding model. 5.0's innovation record shows strong sourcing and validation but weak pathways beyond the pilot.

Three trade-offs need explicit consideration in 6.0.

- First, role boundaries: where PSE's responsibility for scaling begins and ends relative to market shaping, HSIS, country teams and external partners.
- Second, the routes into Gavi's model: how innovations feed into core funding, HSIS funding and the Innovation Top-Up, the Scale-Up Facility, and — a question Gavi should answer in strategy design — the intended relationship with the Solutions Fund.
- Third, selection: which innovations PSE supports, and how this fits within the Gavi-wide innovation strategy and the work of other teams.

The options range from PSE as innovation tester (tolerating failure, running long timescales, holding innovations until proven) to PSE as sourcing-and-connecting function (with testing, scaling and financing owned by the receiving mechanisms). The former keeps momentum and ownership in one team but reproduces the pilot problem; the latter matches a leaner Secretariat and the SUF's external-housing logic but depends on receiving functions being resourced and willing.

This evaluation's position: PSI's comparative advantage, demonstrated across 5.0, is sourcing, validating and connecting — not long-cycle testing. 6.0 should define PSI's innovation role as the front end of a pipeline with named graduation routes (ITU, market shaping, SUF), entry and exit criteria, and explicit hand-off points agreed with each receiving function.

Consideration 5: Positioning Gavi for an evolving private sector landscape. The evaluation concludes that the design of Gavi's 6.0 PSE Strategy should respond not only to the lessons from implementation during 5.0, but also to significant changes in how private sector and philanthropic organisations engage. Across the forward-looking analysis and comparator review, private sector actors increasingly emphasise long-term strategic partnerships, co-creation, technical capability and systems change rather than traditional grant funding alone. Philanthropic organisations similarly show greater preference for larger-scale, collaborative funding approaches, while new sources of wealth, particularly in technology, are emerging with different expectations around engagement and partnership.

The strategic implication is that Gavi 6.0 should not simply refine the 5.0 Strategy, but position Gavi to respond to a changing partnership environment in which the sources of private value, funding and collaboration continue to evolve. This also requires Gavi to define a clearer value proposition for different partner segments, recognising that private sector actors increasingly seek strategic collaboration and shared value alongside financial contributions. The changing landscape also presents opportunities to engage domestic and regional private sector actors in support of Gavi Leap's localisation ambitions.

This evaluation's position: Gavi's comparative strengths remain strong, but realising future opportunities will require adapting its partnership approaches and value proposition to reflect different partner segments, changing sources of private capital, corporate engagement and philanthropic giving.

4.3. Alignment with Gavi 6.0

EQ11. *PSE and overall Gavi 6.0 alignment:* How should the PSE approach evolve to remain impactful, scalable, and aligned with Gavi 6.0 priorities?

The following approaches apply to PSE in relation to the five priorities of the Gavi Leap (Putting Countries First, Tuning the Engine, Powering Partnerships, Embracing the Intelligent Age, and Harnessing the Future of Immunisation). All findings take account of the reduced financing environment the Leap itself responds to.

Approach 1: Putting Countries First is the Leap priority the evidence endorses most strongly, and PSE can only meet it by hard-wiring country demand into partnership design. Leap places country ownership at the

centre of the operating model, giving countries more agency over how resources are deployed. The evaluation evidence strongly affirms the same. Country demand was the single most consistent explanatory factor in partnership outcomes. The following design implications imply:

- Demand should be surfaced through country planning cycles rather than asserted by partnerships, while keeping supply-side shaping to harness key opportunities, since countries do not always know which solutions exist. 6.0's aligning grant cycles open a design window in which PSI can map partner options against country bottlenecks. Proven projects can then be shown to countries as options when budgets are set, as external capital on top of health system allocations. PSE should become intrinsic to Gavi's country support, rather than depending on individual champions among country managers. Senior programme leadership recommended mainstreaming private sector projects into Gavi's standard review process, with innovation expertise on the review committee.
- There needs to be an understanding of which contexts are most suitable for which type of projects. For instance, fragile countries with weak digital infrastructure are not where an AI partnership would be successful. There needs to be an overall approach, where thematic priorities align to country readiness, so mistakes of the past are not repeated. Sustainability expectations should also differ by country context, because a credible transition in a fragile setting is not the same as in a transitioning one.

Approach 2: Tuning the Engine implies that the portfolio, capacity and measurement lessons of 5.0 are essentials rather than options for PSE. Leap commits to a leaner Secretariat, a structural transformation of monitoring and evaluation, and strengthened risk management. A smaller PSI team makes strategic portfolio choices, bespoke partner-type strategies and deliberate use of platforms essential adaptations rather than improvements. The direction of travel the evidence supports is fewer and bigger bets. The Leap's measurement transformation is the best vehicle for closing one of the key gaps in PSE 5.0. The shared KPI architecture that Lesson 8 identifies should be built inside that reform, not as a parallel PSE exercise, and should capture financial, advocacy, expertise and innovation value and outcomes for beneficiaries. The Leap's risk management strengthening is the natural home for the explicit risk appetite and the entry, continuation and exit criteria the portfolio never had.

Approach 3: Powering Partnerships does not name the private sector, yet the evidence shows private partners already operating in all three of its dimensions; writing PSE into the partnership architecture is the clearest alignment opportunity the Leap leaves open. Leap's partnership priority declares there is *"no room for duplication, fragmentation and competitive behaviours"*. It sets three dimensions: closer collaboration with global health partners including the Global Fund, extending to a *"merger at the last mile"*; a new approach to fragile and humanitarian partnerships; and emergency-centric partnerships. The private sector appears in none of them by name but presents opportunities across. A Gavi and Global Fund collaboration that leaves out the private dimension would carry the same gap into both organisations' plans. In fragile and humanitarian settings, the consultation evidence runs from digital demand-generation platforms operating in insecure contexts to a philanthropy interviewee describing the integration agenda as *"so timely"*, with shared implementing partners as ready co-delivery infrastructure. Country-facing consultations in Ethiopia made the same point from the demand side: last mile delivery matters precisely because of subnational fragility, conflict-affected areas and the burden on health workers who collect vaccines instead of delivering services. The alignment implication is structural, not rhetorical: as Gavi formalises its partnership models, PSE should be designed into them, so the fiscal logic driving the priority, doing more with less, captures the private capacity already in use.

Approach 4: Embracing the Intelligent Age gives PSE a natural role that 5.0's own innovation lesson qualifies: pathways to institutionalisation must be designed in, or AI partnerships will reproduce the pilot problem. Leap commits Gavi to AI at three levels: Secretariat mainstreaming, programmatic and in-country applications under an AI@Gavi strategy, and an explicit method of small pilots followed by scale-up. Secretariat described the emerging AI framework for 6.0 as very strong, citing potential investment at the scale of US$100 million as a use case. They proposed practical country-facing tools, simple appraisal aids for countries to assess innovations themselves, and pointed to domestic innovators as an underused partnership pool, which would also rebalance a portfolio the evidence shows skewed toward high income partner origins. PSE is the natural sourcing channel: the PSI forward vision

recorded in consultations already names AI partnerships alongside portfolio discipline and platforms, and the portfolio holds a live case of AI in country programmes through infant biometrics research. This evaluation emphasises Leap's emphasis on pilots followed by scale. Analysis indicates that the AI and digital infrastructure sector offers huge potential to Gavi, but success is dependent on the technical absorptive capacity of Gavi and that Gavi should engage AI partners at portfolio level, under one owner and one vision, building on data readiness and capability as the shared foundation.

Approach 5: Harnessing the Future of Immunisation names private sector engagement and innovative finance as Gavi heritage; the architecture principles it proposes are the same discipline the PSE lessons demand. Leap's future-facing priority explicitly claims Gavi's "heritage of engaging with the private sector" and its innovative finance record as guides for what comes next, and it keeps innovative finance among the focused mandates. This is the Leap's own answer to whether PSE belongs in 6.0: it is framed as identity, not accessory.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations below were informed by the evaluation findings, complemented by additional landscape and comparator analysis on emerging trends and opportunities in private sector engagement. They are intended to inform the development of the Gavi 6.0 2026–30 PSE Strategy, support implementation of the PSE Strategy, and respond to the evolving private financing and partnership landscape. They were developed through a co-creation workshop with the evaluation team and the Gavi Secretariat from the PSI, HSIS and Strategy teams and refined through one round of review of draft recommendations.

Six recommendations are organised into four areas (i) strategic positioning and prioritisation; (ii) operationalisation and shared accountability; (iii) innovation and scale-up approach; and (iv) performance measurement and MEL. Each recommendation includes details in the form of sub-recommendations, alongside a signposting of the rationale and suggested timing and business unit responsibility.

Strategic positioning and prioritisation

Recommendation 1. The Gavi 6.0 PSE Strategy should clearly define the purpose and comparative advantage of private sector engagement for Gavi and focus resources on the areas where the private sector brings the greatest additional value in a changing development and financing landscape.

(i) **Clearly articulate the added value of private sector engagement** in delivering Gavi's objectives – identifying a strong statement of purpose that brings out what and how the private sector can contribute (differently from other actors) and emphasises how PSE provides impetus to meeting Gavi's objectives in an accelerated and/ or enhanced way. This value should also provide the combined benefit of creating resonance amongst private sector to engage with Gavi.

(ii) **Retain the multi-modal approach** of Gavi PSE including fundraising, advocacy benefit and accessing the capabilities, expertise and innovation of the private sector. Notably, while fundraising is key, the 6.0 PSE Strategy should **recognise advocacy as a strategic outcome of PSE** by explicitly reflecting its contribution to sovereign donor mobilisation, growing importance during replenishments and overall attraction of Gavi as a dynamic and multi-stakeholder entity. Within each of these modalities, **include in-kind partnerships and contributions – but in a targeted and selected manner** that leverages current PS trends in an optimal manner – see next point.

(iii) **Explicitly focus PSE efforts** on where the biggest bang for buck lies in the coming years including: (a) AI capability partnerships applying AI to immunisation and health system priorities, designed at substantially greater scale than the current innovation and expertise modalities and potentially with a strong in-kind component; (b) the new generation of AI technology philanthropy, engaged early and through a dedicated multi-funder offer; (c) relationship-intensive segments (major philanthropies, ultra-high net worth individuals, family offices, and especially technology companies), with higher transaction costs but substantially greater long-term potential; (d) domestic and regional private sector actors, in line with Gavi Leap's localisation priority.

Rationale	Findings 1 and 5, PS megatrends analysis, operating model analysis of in-kind partnerships Lessons 1, 5, and 7
Timing	To be included as part of the PSE 6.0 Strategy development in 2026-27
Responsibility	PSI/ RM, with support from Strategy, HSIS and CDD

Recommendation 2. Manage PSE as a strategic portfolio, focusing on fewer partnerships with greater and longer-term impact.

(i) **Adopt a deliberate and strategic approach to the PSE portfolio** – prioritise partnerships capable of delivering scale; emphasise depth over breadth; consider a tiered approach with a small number of committed strategic bets, each backed by a defined Gavi strategy that partners can join, a bounded window for opportunistic partnerships accepted against the same entry criteria, and a defined risk appetite for the portfolio as a whole, including the share of resources allocated to experimental engagements.

(ii) **Adopt bespoke strategies for different private sector actors** – e.g. recognise high level of effort (LOE) required for relationship building with new and philanthropic partners, actively engage country teams for local private sector opportunities, ensure unified Gavi positioning and adequate tech-leadership in engagements with technology companies, use **platforms** where robust and efficient structures exist/ can be created.

(iii) **Use explicit criteria to determine which partnerships to initiate, adapt, scale or exit**, reviewing the portfolio regularly to rebalance effort against impact, particularly in view of a leaner Secretariat. **Entry criteria should include a credible sustainability and transition plan at design and the intended return for both Gavi and the partner.**

Rationale	Finding 5, PS megatrends analysis, comparator analysis (Global Fund, CEPI), operating models analysis of platform-based models Lessons 5 and 6
Timing	To be developed in parallel to the PSE 6.0 Strategy development in 2026-27 as a means of operationalising the strategy
Responsibility	PSI/ RM

Recommendation 3. Develop a dedicated offer for the new generation of technology philanthropy, built around a simple multi-funder mechanism and the evidence base required to be credible to evidence-driven funders.

This recommendation operationalises Recommendation 1 (iii, b) on focused engagement with the new generation of AI technology philanthropy, recognising its priority given the estimated US$37-US$100 billion a year in future giving (press-reported, not independently verified. Planning assumptions for Gavi rest on the conservative end (US$37 billion a year), with the upper end of US$100 billion a year carried as a stated sensitivity.

(i) **Design a simple, flexible multi-funder mechanism** through which this capital can enter Gavi, with matching and de-risking structures built in, rather than a growing portfolio of bespoke bilateral grant relationships. There are three key elements: (i) the mechanism must be *legible* to evidence-driven funders and the intermediaries that route them; (ii) it must offer genuine *co-creation* and engagement, not only donation; and (iii) it must be *open early*, while this generation's giving habits are forming.

(ii) **Sequence the engagement deliberately**: first the intermediaries with whom Gavi is already in dialogue, then corporate AI foundations, then individual funders as initial public offering (IPO) wealth becomes liquid. For each segment, define what "legible" requires of Gavi's evidence base and relationship model.

(iii) **Build the organisational readiness this capital demands**: capacity to produce cost-effectiveness analysis and impact data to the standard these funders expect, responsiveness to information requests, and transparency

about progress, challenges and uncertainty. This capability requires dedicated resourcing and additional to that of the PSE team's current capacity of approximately 4 FTE over 5.0. Resourcing may be met in part by reprioritising and strategizing efforts as outlined in Recommendations 1 and 2.

(iv) **Be explicit about the trade-offs**: this capital is expected to be substantially earmarked, thematically selective and demanding of data.

Rationale	PS megatrends analysis, comparator analysis (Global Fund, UNICEF) Lessons 5 and 8
Timing	Mechanism design in 2026 alongside PSE Strategy development, so the offer is open early in the 6.0 period.
Responsibility	PSI/ RM; evidence and MEL requirements jointly with the MEL function

Operationalisation and shared accountability

Recommendation 4. Gavi should enhance and streamline PSE governance, foster a country oriented approach by embedding PSE through a formal business partnering model, with shared accountability across the Secretariat for delivery.

The model should be designed to minimize the internal friction in PSE processes identified in this evaluation, incentivise cross-team working, and be pragmatic to operate in support of Gavi Leap and a leaner Secretariat. It should detail how Gavi teams systematically collaborate across the private sector partnership lifecycle. It should recognise both formal and informal ways of working; however, the purpose of formalisation is to codify and protect the relationship-based ways of working that the evaluation found drive successful partnerships, so they survive staff turnover and leadership change, not to replace relationships with rules.

(i) **Governance**: (i) Identify a named executive sponsor at senior leadership level to lead strategy implementation and socialisation, with a defined cadence of visibility, for example a standing review of PSE portfolio performance at leadership level; (ii) Define roles, responsibilities and decision-making authorities and standard operating procedures, including key Secretariat teams and personnel to engage; (iii) Simplify governance and fiduciary processes through proportionate risk management and standardised partnership approaches, for example tiering fiduciary and risk review by partnership value and risk profile, and using framework agreements that pre-authorise governance for repeat partners (an approach CEPI is already developing).

(ii) **Country-oriented approach with needed business partnering**: (i) Plan PSE opportunities jointly with technical and country teams from origination, so partnership discussions are credible and implementable in country before commitments are made to partners. This should distinguish responding to expressed country demand from building country buy-in for solutions countries cannot yet see, with the entry point for unproven partnerships running through the relevant technical teams. (ii) Gavi should also develop a pipeline of unfunded country priorities from the holistic country application process, which PSE can take to prospective partners.

(iii) **Ways of working**: (i) Establish structured spaces for cross-team engagement through the partnership lifecycle; (ii) Define a single entry point through which country-facing teams access all PSE mechanisms (INFUSE, the Matching Fund, the Innovation Scale-Up Facility and other instruments); (iii) establish common KPIs for PSE among Secretariat teams (e.g. PSI, HSIS, CDD).

Given its cross-cutting technical role and visibility across country programmes, HSIS should be considered the primary business partner for PSI in shaping partnerships aligned with Gavi HSS priorities and with CDD engaged to ensure country relevance, ownership and successful implementation. **The Strategy team should also be engaged when a partnership carries organisation-wide strategic implications**, given its reach across the Secretariat.

Rationale	Findings 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14; Comparator analysis (Global Fund, UNICEF, CEPI) Lessons 1, 2, 3 and 4
Timing	The operationalisation plan should be developed in 2027 following strategy endorsement, with the Executive sponsor driving the development of the operationalisation plan.
Responsibility	PSI/RM, Strategy team, HSIS, CDD

Innovation and scale-up approach

Recommendation 5. The PSE strategy should define its approach to innovation which distinguishes between experimentation, scale and long-term ownership, and which identifies the 'buyer' in the pathway to adoption and scale.

This recommendation recognises development of the Innovation SUF during the 5.0 period (although an evaluation of the SUF is not in scope), in response to challenges in scaling INFUSE and other innovations. Reflecting the work underway, the PSE strategy should:

(i) **Differentiate between innovations** early in the value chain intended to generate evidence, and more mature innovations intended to be scaled, recognising that these **require different governance, risk tolerance and exit logic**. A small proof of concept grant and a multi-million scale-up commitment should not be governed as points on the same continuum: the innovation pipeline needs permission to fail cheaply, while scale-up capital needs discipline.

(ii) **Define what scale means for Gavi and for each innovation portfolio at the outset.** There are different concepts at play here including scale (deepening coverage within a country) and replication (extending a model to other country contexts). The second is between programmatic sustainability (embedding activities in country systems) and financial sustainability (transitioning from Gavi grant funding to domestic or commercial financing).

(iii) **Link INFUSE explicitly to the Innovation Scale-Up Facility, Gavi Market Shaping, HSIS and country funding opportunities**, and Gavi's innovation strategy, and **identify a single named owner accountable for a solution's progression from INFUSE evidence generation through to scale-up**. The intended buyer should be identified at design and may take different forms: government adoption and procurement, continued commercial operation by the partner, uptake by non-governmental organisation (NGO) or civil society actors, or market mechanisms; not every partnership requires a government financing pathway to be sustainable. **Blended finance models** may be considered keeping in mind issues regarding fund scope, generating a credible pipeline, requirements of catalytic grant funding alongside commercial capital, need for supporting technical assistance (TA) to facilitate successful investments, specialist skills set requirements, balance between private sector and development finance institution (DFI) capital and interest, amongst others.

(iv) **Apply explicit entry, continuation and exit criteria through the partnership lifecycle**, including scalability criteria assessed at entry and the discipline to discontinue support when milestones are not met. Exits should be structured to preserve the relationship: communicated against transparent criteria applied consistently across the portfolio, so that discontinuing one engagement does not foreclose future collaboration.

Rationale	Findings 2, 11, 12, 13 and 14; comparator analysis (all), operating models review (blended finance) Lessons 2, 5 and 6
Timing	Innovation and scale-up approach to be defined within the PSE Strategy in 2026, aligned with the design of the Innovation Scale-Up Facility.
Responsibility	Strategy team at lead, with PSI/RM, HSIS and CDD as support

Performance measurement and MEL

Recommendation 6. Develop a strategy level MEL framework that measures Secretariat performance, PSE outcomes and supports strategic decision-making, continuous improvement and resource mobilisation.

(i) **Develop a comprehensive and yet right-sized MEL framework** to ensure robust measurement of PSE projects and the portfolio, supporting both results measurement and strategic decision-making, and fully aligned with the strategic positioning and prioritisation outlined in Recommendation 1.

- Project-level indicators could be grouped by Gavi strategic focus area/ HSIS priority, with some common indicators and benchmarks to measure return on investment through both quantitative and qualitative assessment (as has been done in this evaluation, for example).
- **Capture non-financial value explicitly** – e.g. capture advocacy value both quantitatively and qualitatively, consider imputed value of in-kind contributions as well as metrics on efficiencies such as cost savings, etc.
- Use portfolio learning and regular portfolio reporting to inform partnership selection, portfolio management, strategy adaptation and governance oversight, so that MEL evidence is actively used in decision-making rather than only measured and reported.
- Ensure **adequate resource capacity** to deliver effectively on MEL.

(ii) Build the evidence capability needed to engage evidence-driven funders, including robust impact and cost-effectiveness data.

(iii) **Ensure shared KPIs across Gavi functions/ teams to support shared accountability and measurement**.

Rationale	Finding 8 Lessons 7 and 8
Timing	Common Secretariat KPIs agreed in 2026 alongside strategy adoption; the full MEL framework developed in 2027 as part of operationalisation, with MEL resourcing confirmed in the same decision
Responsibility	PSI/ RM and MEL function

Appendix A **PSE STRATEGY 2021-25 THEORY OF CHANGE**

Figure A.1: PSE Strategy Theory of Change



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Appendix C INTERVIEW LIST AND TOOLS

Appendices C.1 – C.5 provide the list of stakeholders consulted in the inception and core phase, including the comparator analysis amendment work. Appendices C.6 – C.8 provide interview tools for consultations with the Secretariat, external PSE partners and stakeholders, and for case studies.

C.1. INCEPTION PHASE CONSULTATIONS

Table C.1: Inception phase stakeholders interviewed

Organisation	Name	Title
Gavi	Marie-Ange Saraka-Yao	Chief Resource Mobilisation & Growth Officer
Gavi	Augustin Flory	Managing Director, Innovative Partnerships and Development Finance
Gavi	Alex De Jonquière	Director HSIS
Gavi	Tamer Farag	Head, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
Gavi	Bertrand Pedersen	Senior Manager, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
Gavi	Meredith Baker	Senior Manager, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
Gavi	Bineta Mbacke	Senior Manager, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
WHO Foundation	Moz Siddiqui	Director of Partnerships, WHO Foundation

C.2. CORE PHASE CONSULTATIONS

Table C.2: Core phase stakeholders interviewed

Organisation	Name	Title
Gavi Secretariat		
Gavi	Thabani Maphosa	Chief Country Delivery Officer
Gavi	Pascal Barollier	Chief Engagement & Information Officer
Gavi	Amy LaTrielle	Chief Grants Management Officer
Gavi	Maria Thestrup	(former) Chief Ethics, Risk & Compliance Officer
Gavi	Augustin Flory	Managing Director, Innovative Partnerships and Development Finance
Gavi	David Kinder	Director, Innovative Finance & Development Finance
Gavi	Sebastian Meaney	Director, Donor Relations Europe and Canada
Gavi	Johannes Ahrendts	Director, Strategy
Gavi	Jessica Crawford	Head of Grants Management
Gavi	Tamer Farag	Head, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
Gavi	Bertrand Pedersen	Senior Manager, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
Gavi	Meredith Baker	Senior Manager, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
Gavi	Bineta Mbacke	Senior Manager, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
Gavi	Sarah van Beers	Manager, Public-Private Partnerships and Social Innovation
Gavi	Kate Fendler	Senior Legal Counsel, Legal
Matching Fund Donors		
UK FCDO	Alex Brush	Senior Immunisation Policy Adviser
Gates Foundation	Nima Abbaszadeh	Interim Deputy Director and Senior Program Officer
Gates Foundation	Amy Whalley	Senior Program Officer
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Sterre van Campen	Policy Officer

Organisation	Name	Title
PSI Partners		
Bayer Foundation	Stefan Wilhelm	Director for Social Innovation; Head of Impact Measurement and Management
ELMA Philanthropies	Thomas McPartland	CEO
ELMA Philanthropies	Peter Morrison	Director of Programs
Children's Investment Fund Foundation	Abhinav Verma	Global Nutrition Team
Aga Khan Foundation	Jasmin Jahanshahi	Deputy Global Director of Institutional Partnerships
Arm	Fran Baker	Impact Engagement Lead
LDS Church	Eric Wunderlich	Consultant Manager, Healthcare and Disability Programs
Project Last Mile / Next Mile Ventures	Alexandra Scott	Managing Director

C.3. CASE STUDY CONSULTATIONS

Table C.3: Case study stakeholders interviewed

Organisation	Title
La Caixa Foundation	
Gavi	Head, Donor Relations & Campaigns
Gavi	Manager, Donor Relations & Campaigns (Southern Europe)
La Caixa Foundation	Program Manager, International Department
ISGlobal, Barcelona Institute for Global Health	Director of Translation and Impact
Zipline and UPS Foundation	
Gavi	Senior Manager, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
Gavi	Senior Manager, Health Systems & Immunization Strengthening
Gavi	Senior Country Manager
Zipline	CEO
Zipline	Rwanda Country Director
UPS Foundation	Global Health and Humanitarian Relief Director
Ministry of Health, Rwanda	Director General, Clinical and Public Health Service Governance
Ministry of Health, Rwanda	Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) Manager
Rwanda Biomedical Centre	Head of Blood Transfusion Service
Society for Family Health	Executive Director
Sand Technologies	Director of Operations and Central Enablement
University of Birmingham / National Health Service, England	Professor of Infectious Diseases and Global Health
Simprints	
Gavi	Senior Manager, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
Gavi	Senior Country Manager
Gavi	Senior Country Manager
Simprints	CEO
Simprints (formerly)	Former Country Director / Bangladesh Lead
Simprints (formerly)	Former Evidence and Learning Manager
World Health Organization (WHO) Bangladesh	National Professional Officer (Immunization)
Gavi civil society organisation (CSO) Steering Committee Steering Committee	Executive Director, Shastho Shurokkha Foundation (SSF). Chair, Gavi CSO Steering Committee

Organisation	Title
	Member of National Immunization Technical Advisory Group (NITAG), Bangladesh
International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b)	Emeritus Scientist (National)/ Senior Researcher Health Systems and Population Studies Division (HSPSD)
Ghana Health Service	Ministry of Health EPI representatives
Bangladesh Ministry of Health (formerly)	Former Ministry of Health representatives
Unilever / Keluarga SIGAP	
Gavi	Senior Donor Manager
Gavi	Senior Manager
Gavi	Senior Country Manager
Gavi	Program Manager
Gavi	Consultant / Former Senior Country Manager
Gavi (formerly)	Private Sector Engagement Lead
The Power of Nutrition	Funding, Partnerships and Programme Manager
Ministry of Health, Indonesia	Directorate of Health Promotion, partnership and community empowerment team
Ministry of Health, Indonesia	Directorate of Health Promotion, surveillance team
Ministry of Health, Indonesia	Communication, Information and Education for Priority Programmes
Ministry of Health, Indonesia	Communication, Information and Education, Health Priority Programme
Ministry of Health, Indonesia	Surveillance team, Directorate of Health Promotion
WPP Media	Lead, Social Impact vertical
WPP Media	Lead, Unilever/Gavi portfolios
WPP Media	Donor Management
VaxSocial	
Gavi	Senior Manager, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
Gavi	Senior Manager
Gavi	Senior Programme Manager
Gavi	Programme Manager
MSD (Advancing Health Online sponsor)	Executive Director, Health Equity and Partnerships
Geneva Global / Global Impact	Managing Director
Rabin Martin (formerly) / Gavi (formerly)	Former Partner at Rabin Martin / former Gavi private sector partnerships team member
National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA)	Focal desk for new vaccines introduction / HPV vaccine focal point
Mastercard Wellness Pass	
Gavi	Head, Transition Countries
Gavi	Senior Manager, Private Sector Partnerships and Innovation
Gavi	Senior Manager, Health Systems & Immunization Strengthening
Mastercard	Head of Markets and Partnerships Execution
JSI Ethiopia	Country Director
JSI Ethiopia	Activity Manager, Wellness Pass Solution Project

C.4. COMPARATOR CONSULTATIONS

Table C.4: Stakeholders from relevant peer or comparator organisations interviewed

Organisation	Title
UNICEF	Chief of Innovation, Market Shaping and Sustainability
UNICEF	Global Private Resource Mobilisation & Partnerships Lead
Global Fund	Head, Private Sector Engagement
Global Fund	Deputy Head of Department, Private Sector Engagement
CEPI	Executive Director, Access and Business Development

C.5. AMENDMENT TASKS CONSULTATIONS

Table C.5: Stakeholders for amendment tasks

Organisation	Title or Department
Grand Challenges Canada	Strategy and Partnerships
Microsoft, AI for Good Lab	AI for Good Lab
Microsoft, AI for Good Lab	AI for Good Lab
Google.org	AI for Social Good
Novo Nordisk Foundation	Public Affairs
Novo Nordisk Foundation	Global Health
Nestlé	Corporate Affairs & Internal Engagement
GiveWell	Research
Anthropic	Research
UNICEF	Lead, Strategic Partnerships, Global Innovation Office
UNICEF	Head of Venture Fund / Crypto Fund, UNICEF Office of Innovation
IRC	Vice President, Philanthropy, Foundations, and Global Board Engagement
IRC	Co-Senior Director, Foundations & Trusts
IRC – Airbel	Innovation Strategy Lead
Save the Children	Head of Global Health
Save the Children	Director of Innovative Finance and Ventures
Save the Children	Corporate Partner Lead
Save the Children	Government & Multilateral Partner Lead
Save the Children	Senior Policy and Advocacy Advisor: Immunisation and Access to Medicines
WFP	Global Chief of Corporate Partnerships
WFP	Special Assistant to the Director, Private Partnerships Services
WFP – Innovation Accelerator	Partnerships Officer
British Investment International (BII)	Investment Manager
BII	Investment Manager
Billion Scale Health	CEO

C.6. GAVI SECRETARIAT INTERVIEW GUIDE

Background to this interview: CEPA and Philanthropy Advisors have been appointed by Gavi to conduct the PSE strategy (2021-25) evaluation. This interview guide sets out questions for discussion in support of this evaluation. The **purpose** of the evaluation is to (1) assess the relevance, performance and sustainability of the PSE 2021-2025 Strategy and (2) develop actionable lessons and recommendations to inform the design of the next PSE Strategy. **All responses will remain confidential and presented in an aggregated and anonymised fashion in the report.**

The questions below serve as a general guide for discussion; not all will apply to every interviewee, and the guide will be adapted based on the interviewee's role and prior document review.

Thank you in advance for taking the time to inform this evaluation.

I. Relevance and Strategic Alignment

1. How well did the PSE strategy and modalities (e.g. financing, advocacy, innovation, expertise-based partnerships) align with Gavi's priorities under Gavi 5.0 and 5.1, especially equity, zero-dose children, sustainability, as well as align with country needs?
2. How well did the PSE approach respond to the changing external and internal environment during this period, including COVID-19, shifts in global health funding and impact on Gavi, and evolution of the private sector ecosystem?
3. Are Gavi's PSE modalities and approaches appropriate for effective engagement with the private sector?

II. **Efficiency, Governance, and Coordination**

4. How are private sector opportunities identified and prioritised in practice? To what extent are they driven by country and programme needs versus partner-led opportunities?
5. How well is PSE coordinated across the Secretariat including in terms of partnership design, approval, implementation, and review? Are roles, responsibilities, and decision-making clear and appropriately defined across PSI, Resource Mobilisation, programme teams, country teams, and leadership? What tends to slow things down, and where are the biggest opportunities for efficiency gains?
6. What is your perception of the cost effectiveness of the PSE strategy implementation? Does the team deliver in a nimble and agile way and are project timelines reasonable?
7. The evaluation of the last PSE strategy 2016-20 made several recommendations, which have been listed for convenience below (page 2). Were these well considered for PSE 2021-25, and if not, why?

III. Effectiveness and Results

8. What do you see as the main results of the PSE strategy between 2021 and 2025 /specific partnerships? Beyond money raised, what other value has PSE created for Gavi and countries, for example through advocacy, expertise, innovation, stronger delivery, or broader systems impact?
9. Which partnerships or types of partnerships have been most effective/ exhibited strong return on investment, and what made them work well? Which type have been more difficult and why?

IV. Sustainability, Scale, and Replication

10. To what extent have partnerships been designed with sustainability, scale, or replication in mind from the start? What are reasons for this?
11. Which types of partnerships seem most promising for scale or replication across countries, and under what conditions? What are the main barriers to sustainability, scale, or replication, for example financing, country ownership, operational complexity, or alignment with national systems?

V. Lessons and the Way Forward for Gavi 6.0

12. What are the most important lessons from the 2021–2025 period for Gavi's next Private Sector and Innovation Strategy?
13. Given the current financing environment and a leaner Secretariat, where should Gavi focus its private sector engagement going forward?
14. What risks, trade-offs, or strategic choices should shape the next PSE strategy — for example innovation versus scale, number of partnerships versus focus, or speed versus compliance?

How should the PSE approach evolve under Gavi 6.0 and the Gavi Leap priorities, especially putting countries first, strengthening partnerships, and making better use of innovation?

C.7. PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNER INTERVIEW GUIDE

Background to this interview: CEPA and Philanthropy Advisors have been appointed by Gavi to conduct the PSE strategy (2021-25) evaluation. This interview guide sets out questions for discussion in support of this evaluation. The **purpose** of the evaluation is to (1) assess the relevance, performance and sustainability of the PSE 2021-2025 Strategy and (2) develop actionable lessons and recommendations to inform the design of the next PSE Strategy. **All responses will remain confidential and presented in an aggregated and anonymised fashion in the report.**

The questions below serve as a general guide for discussion; not all will apply to every interviewee, and the guide will be adapted based on the interviewee's role and prior document review.

Thank you in advance for taking the time to inform this evaluation.

Scene setting: Please briefly describe your organisation's engagement with Gavi's PSE approach (e.g. type of partnership, duration, and level of involvement).

I. Relevance and Strategic Alignment

1. How relevant is Gavi's PSE approach to your organisation's engagement with Gavi? What value does it bring?
2. How well has Gavi's PSE approach adapted to changes in the external environment over the past 5 years (e.g. COVID-19, shifts in funding and impact on Gavi, evolution in the private sector ecosystem)?
3. How appropriate are Gavi's main PSE modalities (financing, advocacy, expertise, innovation) for engaging the private sector effectively?

II. Efficiency, Governance, and Coordination

4. How are private sector opportunities identified and prioritised in practice? To what extent are they driven by country/programme needs versus partner-led opportunities?
5. How efficient is the implementation of the PSE approach (e.g. use of resources, timeliness, and agility)?

- The evaluation of the last PSE strategy 2016-20 made several recommendations.[25] Have these been well considered for PSE 2021-25, and if not, why?

III. Results, Sustainability, Scale

6. What have been the main results of the PSE strategy between 2021 and 2025, or of specific partnerships? Beyond financial contributions, what value has it created for Gavi and countries (e.g. using innovation/expertise to solve delivery challenges, advocacy)
7. Which types of partnerships have been most and least effective? What factors explain their performance?
8. To what extent are partnerships designed for sustainability and scale? Which models show the most potential for scale or replication, and what are the main barriers?

IV. Lessons and the Way Forward for Gavi 6.0

9. What are the key lessons from the 2021–2025 period for Gavi's future PSE strategy?
10. Given the current financing environment and a leaner Secretariat, where should Gavi focus its private sector engagement going forward? What risks, trade-offs, or strategic choices should shape the next PSE strategy — for example innovation versus scale, number of partnerships vs focus, or speed vs compliance?
11. How should the PSE approach evolve under Gavi 6.0 and the Gavi Leap priorities, especially putting countries first, strengthening partnerships, and making better use of innovation?

[25] Recommendations from the Evaluation of Gavi's PSE approach 2016-2020 included the following areas: (i) clarifying responsibilities and capacities across the Secretariat; (ii) integrating/aligning PSE MEL; (iii) tracking costs to support VFM optimization at project and portfolio level; (iv) strengthening learning, including on PS partnerships and scale up.

C.8. CASE STUDY INTERVIEW GUIDE

Background: CEPA and Philanthropy Advisors have been appointed by Gavi to conduct the PSE strategy (2021-25) evaluation. As part of the evaluation, the team is conducting in-depth case studies of six selected partnerships spanning the three main PSE modalities: funding and advocacy, expertise-based partnerships, and innovation.

The purpose of these case studies is not to assess project performance, but to understand how the partnership was designed, how it functioned in practice, and what it reveals about the way Gavi's PSE model works. We are equally interested in what worked, what was difficult, and why.

All responses will remain confidential and presented in an aggregated and anonymised fashion in the report.

The questions below serve as a general guide for discussion; not all will apply to every interviewee, and the guide will be adapted based on the interviewee's role and prior document review.

Thank you in advance for taking the time to inform this evaluation.

I. Partnership origins and rationale

1. Please describe how this partnership initially come about. What problem or opportunity was it intended to address in terms of technical area and country need?
2. What was the motivation for the partnership, and what specific value did each partner bring?
3. How well did the partnership align with Gavi 5.0 priorities, and country priorities? To what extent were there adaptations to respond to the changing external and internal environment during this period - including COVID-19, shifts in global health funding and impact on Gavi, and evolution of the private sector ecosystem?

II. **Partnership design and governance**

4. How did the partnership develop in terms of timeline and process, from initial ideas to approval and implementation?
5. How was the partnership structured in practice with regards to roles, responsibilities, and governance arrangements? Which Gavi teams were involved in developing and managing the partnership?

III. Partnership implementation

6. What activities or interventions were implemented through this partnership?
7. How were the partner's capabilities integrated into Gavi programmes or country operations?
8. Were there implementation challenges or delays? What caused them?
9. From your perspective, how resource-intensive was it to establish and manage this partnership?

IV. Results and contribution

10. What outputs or outcomes resulted from this partnership?
11. What value did the private sector partner bring that would not otherwise have been available?
12. How were results or success defined and measured for this partnership?

V. Enablers and constraints

13. What factors enabled this partnership to work well?
14. Were there main challenges or constraints that affected the partnership, such as institutional or procedural barriers?

VI. Sustainability, scalability and lessons

15. Has the partnership been sustained, expanded or replicated? Why or why not?
16. What conditions would be necessary for this type of partnership to scale?
17. Based on this experience, what lessons should inform Gavi's future private sector engagement strategy?
18. If Gavi were designing this partnership today, what would you do differently?

Appendix D EVIDENCE SOURCE MAPPING TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS

This table lists the evidence sources for each evaluation question.

Table D.1: Evidence mapping by evaluation question

Evaluation pillar and question	Evaluation methods	Details on document and KII evidence
Relevance 1. To what extent were the private sector objectives and modalities aligned with Gavi's 5.0/5.1 strategic priorities, given the evolution of the Strategy over this period?	*Document review, KIIs, case studies, data analysis*	**Documents:** • Gavi (2019), Gavi 5.0 Measurement Framework 2021–2025 • Gavi (2020), Immunisation Supply Chain Strategy 2021–2025 • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement: Expertise-Based Partnership Supply and Demand Framework • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement: Implementation Landscape • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement: Theory of Change • Gavi (2021), Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy • Gavi (2022), Digital Health Information Strategy 2022–2025 • Gavi (2022), Gavi 5.0 Innovation Strategy and Innovation Approach • Gavi (2022), Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance Strategy 2021–2025 (updated version for 2023–2025) • Gavi (2024), Operationalising Gavi's Innovation Strategy. **Number of KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 16 • Matching Fund donors: 4 • PSI Partners: 7 **Case study KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 20 • Private sector / technical partners: 15 • Government stakeholders: 10 • Implementing partners: 3
Relevance 2. To what extent are the existing private sector modalities and processes appropriate for effective engagement with the private sector?	*Document review, KIIs, case studies, megatrends analysis*	**Documents:** • Gavi (2017), Guidelines on Private Sector Engagement, version 2.0 • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement: Expertise-based partnership supply and demand framework • Gavi (2021), Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy • Unlock Aid (2024), Unlocking Downstream Innovation to Improve Health Outcomes: Recommendations for Gavi and the Global Fund. **Number of KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat (including former staff): 17 • Matching Fund donors: 4 • PSI Partners: 8 **Case study KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 20 • Private sector / technical partners: 15 • Government stakeholders: 10 • Implementing partners: 3
Performance 3. To what extent were PSE modalities effectively coordinated across the Gavi Secretariat? Which governance, management, and coordination processes within the PSE Strategy	*Document review, KIIs, case studies, comparator analysis, data analysis, operating model review*	**Documents:** • Gavi (2017), Private Sector Engagement Guidelines, version 2.0 • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement: Expertise-based partnership supply and demand framework • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement: Implementation landscape • Gavi (2021), Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy. **Number of KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat (including former staff): 18 • Matching Fund donors: 2 • PSI Partners: 7 **Case study KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 14 • Private sector / technical partners: 10 • Government stakeholders: 6 • Implementing partners: 2

Evaluation pillar and question	Evaluation methods	Details on document and KII evidence
were perceived to enable or limit achievement of results?		**Comparator analysis KIIs:** • Comparator organisations: 6
Performance 4. To what extent was implementation of the PSE Strategy, including different PSE modalities, done in a timely, cost-effective manner? Were there opportunities for efficiency gains, if any?	*Document review, KIIs, case studies, comparator analysis, data analysis, operating model review*	**Documents:** • Gavi (2017), Private Sector Engagement Guidelines, version 2.0 • Gavi (2021), Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy • Gavi (2026), Donor contributions database (donor tracker) • Gavi (2026), ELT Sub-Group: Resource Mobilisation • Gavi (2026), PSI Projects Profile (project tracker) • Available case-study concept notes/NBC papers, project proposals, grant and progress reports, partner reporting and evaluations. **Number of KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat (including former staff): 18 • Matching Fund donors: 4 • PSI Partners: 8 **Case study KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 20 • Private sector / technical partners: 15 • Government stakeholders: 10 • Implementing partners: 3 **Comparator analysis KIIs:** • Comparator organisations: 5
Performance 5. To what extent were recommendations from the previous PSE evaluation (2016–2020) implemented, and to what extent have they influenced results under 5.0/5.1?	*Document review, KIIs, case studies, data analysis, operating model review*	**Documents:** • Gavi (2017), Private Sector Engagement Guidelines, version 2.0 • Gavi (2019), Gavi 5.0 Measurement Framework (2021–2025) • Gavi (2020–2026), PSE project documentation • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement, Expertise-based Partnership Supply and Demand Framework • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement, Implementation Landscape • Gavi (2021), Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement Theory of Change • Gavi (2021–2025), Annual Progress Reports • Gavi (2025), Update on Measurement, Evaluation and Learning • Gavi (2026), Donor Contributions Database • Gavi (2026), Draft Private Sector Engagement Standard Operating Procedures • Gavi (2026), PSI Projects Profile • Mott MacDonald (2021), Evaluation of Gavi's Private Sector Engagement Approach 2016–2020. **Number of KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat (including former staff): 18 **Case study KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 20 • Private sector / technical partners: 15 • Government stakeholders: 10 • Implementing partners: 3
Performance 6. To what extent were the PSE Strategy outputs and outcomes achieved? Specifically, how effective were the PSE modalities and activities in contributing to results at Secretariat,	*Document review, KIIs, case studies, comparator analysis, data analysis, megatrends analysis,*	**Documents:** • Gavi (2018), INFUSE 2018, CEO Debrief • Gavi (2019), Gavi 5.0 Measurement Framework (2021–2025) • Gavi (2020–2026), PSE project documentation, including available project evaluations, progress reports and results reporting • Gavi (2021), Gavi 5.0 Innovation Strategy • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement, Expertise-based Partnership Supply and Demand Framework • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement, Implementation Landscape • Gavi (2021), Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement Theory of Change • Gavi (2021–2025), Annual Progress Reports • Gavi (2022), Innovation Approach for Gavi 5.0 • Gavi (2024), Operationalising Gavi's Innovation Strategy • Gavi (2025), Update on Measurement, Evaluation and Learning • Gavi (2026), Donor Contributions Database • Gavi (2026), List of INFUSE Pacesetters with Projects • Gavi (2026), PSI Projects Profile.

Evaluation pillar and question	Evaluation methods	Details on document and KII evidence
partner, and country levels, including: (a) funding, (b) advocacy, (c) innovation and technology, (d) expertise?	*operating model review*	**Number of KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat (including former staff): 18 • Matching Fund donors: 4 • PSI Partners: 8 **Case study KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 20 • Private sector / technical partners: 15 • Government stakeholders: 10 • Implementing partners: 3 **Comparator analysis KIIs:** • Comparator organisations: 5
Performance 7. To what extent did the PSE Strategy facilitate sustainable partnerships, including mechanisms for replication, institutionalization, or scale-up? Which partnerships have the most potential to be scaled or be replicated across countries and what are the enabling and contextual factors to consider when doing this?	*Document review, KIIs, case studies, comparator analysis, data analysis, operating model review*	**Documents:** • CGD (2024), A Bigger Role for Gavi in Scaling Innovations for Immunization and Health Systems • Gavi (2018), INFUSE 2018, CEO Debrief • Gavi (2020–2026), PSE project documentation • Gavi (2021), Gavi 5.0 Innovation Strategy • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement, Expertise-based Partnership Supply and Demand Framework • Gavi (2021), Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement Theory of Change • Gavi (2022), Innovation Approach for Gavi 5.0 • Gavi (2023), The US$500 Million Challenge: Gavi Launches INFUSE 2.0 to Scale Up Innovations in Immunisation • Gavi (2024), Call for Innovations • Gavi (2024), Operationalising Gavi's Innovation Strategy • Gavi (2026), List of INFUSE Pacesetters with Projects • Gavi (2026), PSI Projects Profile • Gavi (2026), Strategic Brief: Innovation Scale-Up Facility • Mott MacDonald (2021), Evaluation of Gavi's Private Sector Engagement Approach 2016–2020 • Unlock Aid (2024), Unlocking Downstream Innovation to Improve Health Outcomes: Recommendations for Gavi and the Global Fund. **Number of KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat (including former staff): 18 • Matching Fund donors: 4 • PSI Partners: 8 **Case study KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 17 • Private sector / technical partners: 12 • Government stakeholders: 9 • Implementing partners: 3 **Comparator analysis KIIs:** • Comparator organisations: 5
Performance 8. Which partnerships under the PSE Strategy were perceived to be most effective for delivering against Gavi's objectives and what were the enabling/limiting factors contributing to their success? What are implications for assessing	*Document review, KIIs, case studies, comparator analysis, data analysis, operating model review*	**Documents:** • Gavi (2019), Gavi 5.0 Measurement Framework (2021–2025) • Gavi (2020–2026), PSE project documentation, including available budgets, evaluations, progress reports and results evidence • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement, Expertise-based Partnership Supply and Demand Framework • Gavi (2021), Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement Theory of Change • Gavi (2021–2025), Annual Progress Reports • Gavi (2025), Update on Measurement, Evaluation and Learning • Gavi (2026), Donor Contributions Database • Gavi (2026), PSI Projects Profile • Gavi (2026), Strategic Brief: Innovation Scale-Up Facility • Mott MacDonald (2021), Evaluation of Gavi's Private Sector Engagement Approach 2016–2020. **Number of KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat (including former staff): 17 • Matching Fund donors: 4 • PSI Partners: 8 **Case study KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 17 • Private sector / technical partners: 14 • Government stakeholders: 10 • Implementing partners: 1

Evaluation pillar and question	Evaluation methods	Details on document and KII evidence
which partnerships will achieve good RoI?		**Comparator analysis KIIs:** • Comparator organisations: 5
Lessons for 6.0 9. Overall conclusions and lessons from 5.0 PSE Strategy, implementation and results: What key lessons from the 2021–2025 period could best inform the next Private Sector and Innovation Strategy?	*Document review, KIIs, case studies, comparator analysis,* data *analysis, megatrends analysis, operating model review*	**Documents:** • CGD (2024), A Bigger Role for Gavi in Scaling Innovations for Immunization and Health Systems • Euro Health Group (2023), Evaluation of the Operationalisation of Gavi's Strategy through Policies, Programmatic Guidance and Funding Levers • Gavi (2017), Private Sector Engagement Guidelines, version 2.0 • Gavi (2019), Gavi 5.0 Measurement Framework (2021–2025) • Gavi (2020–2026), PSE project documentation • Gavi (2021), Gavi 5.0 Innovation Strategy • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement, Expertise-based Partnership Supply and Demand Framework • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement, Implementation Landscape • Gavi (2021), Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement Theory of Change • Gavi (2021–2025), Annual Progress Reports • Gavi (2022), Gavi Strategy 2021–2025, updated for 2023–2025 • Gavi (2022), Innovation Approach for Gavi 5.0 • Gavi (2024), Operationalising Gavi's Innovation Strategy • Gavi (2025), Update on Measurement, Evaluation and Learning • Gavi (2026), Donor Contributions Database • Gavi (2026), Draft Private Sector Engagement Standard Operating Procedures • Gavi (2026), List of INFUSE Pacesetters with Projects • Gavi (2026), PSI Projects Profile • Gavi (2026), Strategic Brief: Innovation Scale-Up Facility • Mott MacDonald (2021), Evaluation of Gavi's Private Sector Engagement Approach 2016–2020 • Unlock Aid (2024), Unlocking Downstream Innovation to Improve Health Outcomes. **Number of KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat (including former staff): 18 • Matching Fund donors: 4 • PSI Partners: 8 **Case study KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 20 • Private sector / technical partners: 15 • Government stakeholders: 10 • Implementing partners: 3 **Comparator analysis KIIs:** • Comparator organisations: 6
Lessons for 6.0 10. Strategic considerations going forward: What risks, opportunity costs, trade-offs and strategic considerations should guide the design of PSE Strategy in Gavi 6.0?	*Document review, KIIs, case studies, comparator analysis,* data *analysis, megatrends analysis, operating model review*	**Documents:** • CGD (2024), A Bigger Role for Gavi in Scaling Innovations for Immunization and Health Systems • Gavi (2020–2026), PSE project documentation • Gavi (2021), Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement Theory of Change • Gavi (2024), Gavi 6.0 Strategy, Annex B: Narrative for Gavi 6.0 • Gavi (2024), Operationalising Gavi's Innovation Strategy • Gavi (2025), Gavi 6.0 Strategy One-Pager (2026–2030), Annex A • Gavi (2026), CEO Update including Gavi Leap • Gavi (2026), Donor Contributions Database • Gavi (2026), Draft Private Sector Engagement Standard Operating Procedures • Gavi (2026), Gavi 6.0 Immunisation Supply Chain Strategy • Gavi (2026), PSI Projects Profile • Gavi (2026), Strategic Brief: Innovation Scale-Up Facility • Gavi (2026), 6.0 Global/Regional Solutions, GMD SteerCo Alignment • Gavi (n.d.), Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning for Immunisation Programmes • Mott MacDonald (2021), Evaluation of Gavi's Private Sector Engagement Approach 2016–2020 • Unlock Aid (2024), Unlocking Downstream Innovation to Improve Health Outcomes. **Number of KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat (including former staff): 18 • Matching Fund donors: 4 • PSI Partners: 8 **Case study KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 20 • Private sector / technical partners: 15 • Government stakeholders: 10 • Implementing partners: 3

Evaluation pillar and question	Evaluation methods	Details on document and KII evidence
		Comparator analysis KIIs: • Comparator organisations: 6
Lessons for 6.0 11. PSE and overall Gavi 6.0 alignment: How should the PSE approach evolve to remain impactful, scalable, and aligned with Gavi 6.0 priorities?	*Document review, KIIs, case studies, comparator analysis,* data *analysis, megatrends analysis, operating model review*	**Documents:** • Gavi (2021), Report to the Board: Private Sector Engagement Strategy • Gavi (2021), Private Sector Engagement Theory of Change • Gavi (2024), Gavi 6.0 Strategy, Annex B: Narrative for Gavi 6.0 • Gavi (2024), Operationalising Gavi's Innovation Strategy • Gavi (2025), Gavi 6.0 Strategy One-Pager (2026–2030), Annex A • Gavi (2026), CEO Update including Gavi Leap • Gavi (2026), Draft Private Sector Engagement Standard Operating Procedures • Gavi (2026), Gavi 6.0 Immunisation Supply Chain Strategy • Gavi (2026), Strategic Brief: Innovation Scale-Up Facility • Gavi (2026), 6.0 Global/Regional Solutions, GMD SteerCo Alignment • Gavi (n.d.), Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning for Immunisation Programmes • Gavi (n.d.), Immunisation Supply Chain Strategy, draft • Unlock Aid (2024), Unlocking Downstream Innovation to Improve Health Outcomes. **Number of KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat (including former staff): 18 • Matching Fund donors: 4 • PSI Partners: 8 **Case study KIIs:** • Gavi Secretariat: 20 • Private sector / technical partners: 15 • Government stakeholders: 10 • Implementing partners: 3 **Comparator analysis KIIs:** • Comparator organisations: 6

Table D.2: Mapping of conclusions/ lessons to supporting findings

Conclusion/ lesson	Supporting findings
1. The Gavi PSE 5.0 strategy was conceptually sound, but there was a gap in shared understanding and operationalisation by the Secretariat.	**Finding 1**. Gavi's PSE strategy objectives and modalities were conceptually relevant to Gavi's strategy and mandate as a public private partnership (PPP), offering a broad framework for harnessing private sector comparative advantage in service of immunisation objectives. **Finding 2**. While the PSE Strategy was conceptually relevant, shared understanding of its strategic positioning and operationalisation across Gavi was limited. This compromised the strategy's relevance and coherence. **Finding 3**. Private sector partners value Gavi's credibility, government relationships and convening power above all else — but consistently report friction in the partnership experience. This may affect future engagement if not addressed. **Finding 4**. Several governance and management related challenges within Gavi have constrained the efficiency of PSE implementation.

Conclusion/ lesson	Supporting findings
	Finding 8. MEL for PSE remained underdeveloped during Gavi 5.0, constraining Gavi's ability to demonstrate and assess the full value of private sector engagement.
2. Country demand was the strongest determinant of partnership performance and sustainability.	**Finding 2**. While the PSE Strategy was conceptually relevant, shared understanding of its strategic positioning and operationalisation across Gavi was limited. This compromised the strategy's relevance and coherence. **Finding 4**. Several governance and management related challenges within Gavi have constrained the efficiency of PSE implementation. **Finding 11**. Expertise-based partnership results: Gavi successfully mobilised a diverse range of expertise-based PS partnerships to tackle key immunisation bottlenecks. Results varied according to how well partnerships have (i) built on the partner's comparative advantage and long-term business model; and (ii) matched private-sector supply to a clearly articulated country demand. **Finding 12**. Innovation-based partnership results: Gavi's PSE work on innovations has piloted some impressive solutions to key immunisation bottlenecks. The case studies illustrate different innovation trajectories, reflecting varying levels of country traction, market-shaping considerations and wider adoption and scale-up. **Finding 13**. Gavi demonstrated strength in identifying and piloting innovative private sector solutions to immunisation bottlenecks. The greater challenge was translating successful pilots into institutionalised and sustainable scalable models, as pathways to adoption, financing and scale were not systematically embedded in partnership design. **Finding 14**. Partnerships generated the greatest strategic return where multiple forms of value accumulated. Return also increased as partnerships matured and progressed towards sustainability and scale.
3. Institutional incentives and organisational processes influenced how partnerships were prioritised and managed across the Secretariat.	**Finding 2.** While the PSE Strategy was conceptually relevant, shared understanding of its strategic positioning and operationalisation across Gavi was limited. This compromised the strategy's relevance and coherence. **Finding 4.** Several governance and management related challenges within Gavi have constrained the efficiency of PSE implementation. **Finding 5.** The PSE portfolio evolved through a combination of strategic priorities and emerging partnership opportunities. As the portfolio grew, there was increasing need for more systematic portfolio-level prioritisation to optimise Secretariat effort and strategic impact. **Finding 7.** The recommendations made under the PSE Strategy evaluation for 2016-20 remain relevant. Progress was limited overall, also reflecting the challenging internal and external circumstances for Gavi PSE.

Conclusion/ lesson	Supporting findings
4. Gavi's internal processes were sub-optimal and streamlining them is a precondition for the partnership ambitions of 6.0.	**Finding 3.** Private sector partners value Gavi's credibility, government relationships and convening power above all else — but consistently report friction in the partnership experience. This may affect future engagement if not addressed. **Finding 4**. Several governance and management related challenges within Gavi have constrained the efficiency of PSE implementation. **Finding 6.** Across the project life cycle, several opportunities have been identified to reduce avoidable administrative burden within Gavi's internal processes. **Finding 7.** The recommendations made under the PSE Strategy evaluation for 2016-20 remain relevant. Progress was limited overall, also reflecting the challenging internal and external circumstances for Gavi PSE.
5. The 5.0 period lacked explicit portfolio criteria, different strategies for different partner types, and the management burden was too high relative to team size.	**Finding 5.** The PSE portfolio evolved through a combination of strategic priorities and emerging partnership opportunities. As the portfolio grew, there was increasing need for more systematic portfolio-level prioritisation to optimise Secretariat effort and strategic impact. **Finding 6.** Across the project life cycle, several opportunities have been identified to reduce avoidable administrative burden within Gavi's internal processes. **Finding 14.** Partnerships generated the greatest strategic return where multiple forms of value accumulated. Return also increased as partnerships matured and progressed towards sustainability and scale.
6. Sustainability, scale and risk appetite were never defined nor actively considered during project design.	**Finding 5.** The PSE portfolio evolved through a combination of strategic priorities and emerging partnership opportunities. As the portfolio grew, there was increasing need for more systematic portfolio-level prioritisation to optimise Secretariat effort and strategic impact. **Finding 7.** The recommendations made under the PSE Strategy evaluation for 2016-20 remain relevant. Progress was limited overall, also reflecting the challenging internal and external circumstances for Gavi PSE. **Finding 12.** Innovation-based partnership results: Gavi's PSE work on innovations has piloted some impressive solutions to key immunisation bottlenecks. The case studies illustrate different innovation trajectories, reflecting varying levels of country traction, market-shaping considerations and wider adoption and scale-up. **Finding 13.** Gavi demonstrated strength in identifying and piloting innovative private sector solutions to immunisation bottlenecks. The greater challenge was translating successful pilots into institutionalised and sustainable scalable models, as pathways to adoption, financing and scale were not systematically embedded in partnership design. **Finding 14.** Partnerships generated the greatest strategic return where multiple forms of value accumulated. Return also increased as partnerships matured and progressed towards sustainability and scale.

Conclusion/ lesson	Supporting findings
7. Advocacy was a stated 5.0 modality and it delivered real value for sovereign fundraising but was underrecognized.	**Finding 2**. While the PSE Strategy was conceptually relevant, shared understanding of its strategic positioning and operationalisation across Gavi was limited. This compromised the strategy's relevance and coherence. **Finding 8**. MEL for PSE remained underdeveloped during Gavi 5.0, constraining Gavi's ability to demonstrate and assess the full value of private sector engagement. **Finding 10**. Advocacy results: PSE strengthened Gavi's donor-facing narrative during Gavi 5.0, facilitating sovereign donor engagement. These advocacy effects were indirect and not systematically captured or quantified. **Finding 14**. Partnerships generated the greatest strategic return where multiple forms of value accumulated. Return also increased as partnerships matured and progressed towards sustainability and scale.
8. PSE MEL was not meaningfully developed, so PSE could not demonstrate its outputs, its outcomes for beneficiaries, or the value of its non-cash contributions.	**Finding 7.** The recommendations made under the PSE Strategy evaluation for 2016-20 remain relevant. Progress was limited overall, also reflecting the challenging internal and external circumstances for Gavi PSE. **Finding 8**. MEL for PSE remained underdeveloped during Gavi 5.0, constraining Gavi's ability to demonstrate and assess the full value of private sector engagement. **Finding 9**. PSE fundraising in 5.0 demonstrated a substantial increase over previous strategy periods, spurred by COVAX fundraising. Two of the largest new funders are for integrated nutrition and immunisation and demand promotion through social media, highlighting areas where PSE adds particular value to Gavi. **Finding 10**. Advocacy results: PSE strengthened Gavi's donor-facing narrative during Gavi 5.0, facilitating sovereign donor engagement. These advocacy effects were indirect and not systematically captured or quantified.

Table D.3: Mapping of recommendations to supporting evaluation findings and lessons

Recommendation	Supporting evaluation findings and lessons
1. The Gavi 6.0 PSE Strategy should clearly define the purpose and comparative advantage of private sector engagement for Gavi and focus resources on the areas where the private sector brings the greatest additional value in a changing development and financing landscape.	**Findings** **Finding 1.** Gavi's PSE strategy objectives and modalities were conceptually relevant to Gavi's strategy and mandate as a public private partnership (PPP), offering a broad framework for harnessing private sector comparative advantage in service of immunisation objectives. **Finding 5.** The PSE portfolio evolved through a combination of strategic priorities and emerging partnership opportunities. As the portfolio grew, there was increasing need for more systematic portfolio-level prioritisation to optimise Secretariat effort and strategic impact. **Lessons**

Recommendation	Supporting evaluation findings and lessons
	Lesson 1: The Gavi PSE 5.0 strategy was conceptually sound, but there was a gap in shared understanding and operationalisation by the Secretariat. **Lesson 5**: The 5.0 period lacked explicit portfolio criteria, different strategies for different partner types, and the management burden was too high relative to team size. **Lesson 7**: Advocacy was a stated 5.0 modality and it delivered real value for sovereign fundraising, but was underrecognized.
2. Manage PSE as a strategic portfolio, focusing on fewer partnerships with greater and longer-term impact.	**Findings** **Finding 5.** he PSE portfolio evolved through a combination of strategic priorities and emerging partnership opportunities. As the portfolio grew, there was increasing need for more systematic portfolio-level prioritisation to optimise Secretariat effort and strategic impact. **Lessons** Lesson 5: The 5.0 period lacked explicit portfolio criteria, different strategies for different partner types, and the management burden was too high relative to team size. Lesson 6: Sustainability, scale and risk appetite were never defined nor actively considered during project design.
3. Develop a dedicated offer for the new generation of technology philanthropy, built around a simple multi-funder mechanism and the evidence base required to be credible to evidence-driven funders.	**Findings** N/A Based on PS megatrends analysis, Comparator analysis (Global Fund, UNICEF) **Lessons** **Lesson 5**: The 5.0 period lacked explicit portfolio criteria, different strategies for different partner types, and the management burden was too high relative to team size. **Lesson 8**: PSE MEL was not meaningfully developed, so PSE could not demonstrate its outputs, its outcomes for beneficiaries, or the value of its non-cash contributions.
4. Gavi should enhance and streamline PSE governance, foster a country-oriented approach by embedding PSE through a formal business-partnering model, with	**Findings** **Finding 2.** While the PSE Strategy was conceptually relevant, shared understanding of its strategic positioning and operationalisation across Gavi was limited. This compromised the strategy's relevance and coherence.

Recommendation	Supporting evaluation findings and lessons
shared accountability across the Secretariat for delivery.	**Finding 3**. Private sector partners value Gavi's credibility, government relationships and convening power above all else — but consistently report friction in the partnership experience. This may affect future engagement if not addressed. **Finding 4.** Several governance and management related challenges within Gavi have constrained the efficiency of PSE implementation. **Finding 6.** Across the project life cycle, several opportunities have been identified to reduce avoidable administrative burden within Gavi's internal processes. **Finding 7.** The recommendations made under the PSE Strategy evaluation for 2016-20 remain relevant. Progress was limited overall, also reflecting the challenging internal and external circumstances for Gavi PSE. **Finding 11.** Expertise-based partnership results: Gavi successfully mobilised a diverse range of expertise-based PS partnerships to tackle key immunisation bottlenecks. Results varied according to how well partnerships have (i) built on the partner's comparative advantage and long-term business model; and (ii) matched private-sector supply to a clearly articulated country demand. **Finding 12.** Innovation-based partnership results: Gavi's PSE work on innovations has piloted some impressive solutions to key immunisation bottlenecks. The case studies illustrate different innovation trajectories, reflecting varying levels of country traction, market-shaping considerations and wider adoption and scale-up. **Finding 14.** Partnerships generated the greatest strategic return where multiple forms of value accumulated. Return also increased as partnerships matured and progressed towards sustainability and scale. **Lessons** **Lesson 1**: The Gavi PSE 5.0 strategy was conceptually sound, but there was a gap in shared understanding and operationalisation by the Secretariat. **Lesson 2**: Country demand was the strongest determinant of partnership performance and sustainability. **Lesson 3**: Institutional incentives and organisational processes influenced how partnerships were prioritised and managed across the Secretariat. **Lesson 4**: Gavi's internal processes were sub-optimal and streamlining them is a precondition for the partnership ambitions of 6.0.
5. The PSE Strategy should define its approach to innovation, distinguishing between experimentation, scale and long-term ownership, and identifying the	**Findings** **Finding 2.** While the PSE Strategy was conceptually relevant, shared understanding of its strategic positioning and operationalisation across Gavi was limited. This compromised the strategy's relevance and coherence.

Recommendation	Supporting evaluation findings and lessons
"buyer" in the pathway to adoption and scale.	**Finding 11.** Expertise-based partnership results: Gavi successfully mobilised a diverse range of expertise-based PS partnerships to tackle key immunisation bottlenecks. Results varied according to how well partnerships have (i) built on the partner's comparative advantage and long-term business model; and (ii) matched private-sector supply to a clearly articulated country demand. **Finding 12.** Innovation-based partnership results: Gavi's PSE work on innovations has piloted some impressive solutions to key immunisation bottlenecks. The case studies illustrate different innovation trajectories, reflecting varying levels of country traction, market-shaping considerations and wider adoption and scale-up. **Finding 13.** Gavi demonstrated strength in identifying and piloting innovative private sector solutions to immunisation bottlenecks. The greater challenge was translating successful pilots into institutionalised and sustainable scalable models, as pathways to adoption, and financing and scale were not systematically embedded in partnership design. **Finding 14.** Partnerships generated the greatest strategic return where multiple forms of value accumulated. Return also increased as partnerships matured and progressed towards sustainability and scale. **Lessons** **Lesson 2**: Country demand was the strongest determinant of partnership performance and sustainability. **Lesson 5**: The 5.0 period lacked explicit portfolio criteria, different strategies for different partner types, and the management burden was too high relative to team size. **Lesson 6**: Sustainability, scale and risk appetite were never defined nor actively considered during project design.
6. Develop a strategy-level MEL framework that measures Secretariat performance and PSE outcomes and supports strategic decision-making, continuous improvement and resource mobilisation.	**Findings** **Finding 8.** MEL for PSE remained underdeveloped during Gavi 5.0, constraining Gavi's ability to demonstrate and assess the full value of private sector engagement. **Lessons** **Lesson 7:** Advocacy was a stated 5.0 modality and it delivered real value for sovereign fundraising, but was underrecognized. **Lesson 8:** PSE MEL was not meaningfully developed, so PSE could not demonstrate its outputs, its outcomes for beneficiaries, or the value of its non-cash contributions.

Appendix E PSE PROCESS MAPPING

Under Gavi 5.0, the private sector engagement team sits within the RM department of the Gavi Secretariat.

The key governance body is the NBC, chaired by the Managing Director for Resource Mobilisation and includes representation from other Secretariat teams.[26] The NBC approves due-diligence outcomes for new partnerships over US$50,000, which are then also subject to approval by an internal ad hoc committee of Managing Directors and ultimately the CEO. The NBC also revies all ongoing PSE.

The process for developing, approving and delivering private sector partnerships and their coordination across the Secretariat is outlined in Figure E.1. This is not documented anywhere but based on our understanding from discussions with the Secretariat and review of case studies. There may be some marginal differences in processes across PSE.

Most partnerships originate within PSI/RM, although opportunities may also emerge from country programmes or elsewhere in the organisation, as illustrated by Kaduna State, Nigeria interest in Zipline or historically by sovereign donor relationship managers/RM (e.g. Tony Chocoloney partnership).

Changes to this process are currently being considered as part of Gavi 6.0.

Figure E.1: Overview of Secretariat coordination and process for PSE projects[27]



[26] Gavi Private Sector Engagement Guidelines, version 2.0, Dated 2017.

[27] New partnerships may be seen earlier by the NBC before a concept is fully designed, such as where there could be a reputational risk.

Appendix F EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ACROSS CASE STUDIES

Table F.1 summarises the six case study partnerships, including countries of operation, partnership history, and key data relevant to assessing efficiency. Efficiency analysis focuses on one country per case study and covers the 2021–2025 evaluation period only, although four partnerships were established prior to Gavi 5.0.

Table F.1: Efficiency inputs for PS case studies

Partnership countries (case study focus countries are bolded)	Year partnership began[1]	Capital raised (estimated; some co-financing values unavailable)[3]	Perceived PSI level of effort, 2021–25	Key milestones over 2021-25		Efficiency comments
				Approx. time from concept note/NBC to contracting	Implementation duration	
La Caixa[2]	2008	~US$106.9m	Low	Not applicable – ongoing financing partnership		Not an inefficiency: the model requires sustained partner engagement.
Zipline **Rwanda**, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya	2016	~US$13.7m+ (some co-financing sources not available: includes UPS foundation catalytic grants, Côte d'Ivoire ITU, matching funding from the Elton John AIDS Foundation in Nigeria)	Low-Medium (Rwanda N/A)	• 1-2 months for initial 2024-25 health post pilot (per NBC 2B form) • 12 months for follow-on ITU-funded scale up[4]	• 9 months for initial pilot (delivered as planned) • 12 months planned, compressed to 3.5 months due to delays; 6-month no-cost extension granted	Multi-institution approval cycles identified as key bottleneck
Simprints ***Bangladesh***, *Ghana*	2016/17 via INFUSE	~US$9.9m	Medium	Limited documentation. Consultation evidence cited this varied "9 months to 2.5 years" depending on the particular grant funding	4 years, beginning with technology development prior to proof-of-concept deployment	
Keluarga / SIGAP (Unilever) ***Indonesia***, *India, Pakistan*	2022	~US$6.5m	Medium	~21 months from agreement (Dec 2021) to district launch (Sep 2023).	~2 years (district launch Sep 2023 to pilot completion/endline Aug 2024, followed by scale-up phase through 2025–26).	Grant signed Dec 2021. Implementation stalled until the project manager joined in Jul 2022 due to COVID/COVAX pressures. The ~21-month gap from contracting to district launch reflects redesign of the India model for Indonesia's government-led delivery system, alongside shifting Gavi-side ownership
VaxSocial (AHO) ***Nigeria***, *India, Indonesia*	2023	US$13m	Low (outsourced management support)	~15 months from concept note to final grantee contracting AHO concept note developed in January 2023 and grantee selection completed in April 2024	~2 years VaxSocial launched in May 2024 and continued into its final year in 2026, with final impact reporting anticipated in late 2026.	Outsourced model reduced Gavi burden. Delayed contracting and country approvals slowed start-up.
Wellness Pass (Mastercard) ***Ethiopia*** *(Mauritania – pre Gavi 5.0)*	2019 for Wellness Pass	US$5.75M (Ethiopia), of total US$10m pledged to Gavi	High	~10-11 months reported for Gavi procurement of local implementing partner	15 months + 2 months evaluation	"A record delay" (Gavi Secretariat)

N/A: not available

[1] Several PS partnerships pre-date Gavi 5.0. Projects which do not overlap with Gavi 5.0 may not be reflected in this table due to data limitations.

[2] La Caixa financing contributes directly to Gavi core, earmarked largely towards PCV in Mozambique.

[3] Financing amounts may vary from reports elsewhere, particularly where there are multiple donors and funding sources. Some Zipline funding has been through Gavi ITU rather than private sector funding.

[4] Gavi HSS ITU funding aims to incentivise countries to scale-up proven innovations through their country applications.

Appendix G ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS AGAINST PREVIOUS EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS

Table G.1: Summary of progress against 2016 – 2020 PSE evaluation recommendations

Recommendation from previous evaluation	PSI assessment of progress	Evaluation assessment
Align to the Gavi 5.0 Strategy Adjust the PSE approach design to address objectives under Goal 2 in the new 5.0 Strategy. Give particular attention to the 5.0 strategic enabler on evidence, evaluations and data to improve policies, programmes and accountability. Align to operationalize plans and innovation / digital health strategies.	Evidence from consultations with the PSI team indicates that this recommendation was reflected in the design of the 2021 to 2025 PSE Strategy. The strategy was described as deliberately high level so that it could adapt during and after COVID, while remaining relevant to reaching zero dose children, supporting new vaccine introductions, and strengthening health systems and immunisation services. PSI consultations also indicated that country needs had become a stronger part of the approach, particularly for expertise-based partnerships. However, one PSI interviewee noted that PSE was aligned overall, but that "we could have been more aligned if there was more integration with the country team." The PSI evidence therefore points to stronger alignment in design than in implementation.	**Partial progress** The recommendation was incorporated into the formal strategy design. The PSE Strategy Board paper states that, in October 2021, the Programme and Policy Committee recommended Board approval of the principles of Gavi's 5.0 PSE Strategy on the basis that it would be country driven and aligned with Gavi's zero dose agenda, vaccine delivery and immunisation system strengthening. The strategy also set out a country centric approach to guide private sector engagement across fundraising, expertise and innovation. Evidence from consultations indicates that this alignment was uneven in practice. KIIs found that there was a genuine attempt to align PSE with priority programmatic areas, including supply and demand, but that surfacing country demand remained difficult. Evidence also indicated that private sector partnerships were not always mainstreamed into government strategy, and that sustainability planning often came too late. Overall, the evidence supports partial progress, with clearer alignment at strategy design stage than during implementation.
Review Secretariat roles Review roles, responsibilities and incentives for managing and implementing the PSE approach across the Secretariat. Clarify where the lead for each type of	Evidence from consultations with the PSI team indicates that there was some progress in establishing processes to review and coordinate PSE opportunities across teams. PSI interviewees pointed to internal review mechanisms, including a New	**Partial progress** Additional review mechanisms were introduced, but the evidence indicates that these did not fully clarify roles, decision rights or accountability across the Secretariat. Wider consultations reported that

Recommendation from previous evaluation	PSI assessment of progress	Evaluation assessment
engagement best fits in the Secretariat and adjust capacity and incentives to deliver once roles are clear	Business Committee involving RM, country teams, HSIS and communications, with subsequent engagement with HSIS and country teams to support country interface. Consultations also indicated that country needs had become more central to the approach, particularly for expertise-based partnerships. At the same time, PSI interviewees indicated that the recommendation had not been fully implemented. It was highlighted during interviews that the wider organisation had limited understanding of the function and intersecting value of add of private sector engagement. Consultations also highlighted that PSI team was understaffed relative to the breadth of its mandate, with a small team covering fundraising, expertise partnerships, innovation and advocacy "without the staffing or operating model to match." PSI interviewees also recognised an incentive mismatch from housing PSE under resource mobilisation, funding mobilisation as an overarching target could overshadow the impact from in-kind partnerships.	emerging governance improvements, including the Independent Review Committee and "go group," were "not yet embedded in PSE processes." Interviewees also described continued confusion over who should approve, manage and own private sector partnerships, with one consultation noting that "the decision-making rights are not clear." The evidence also indicates that incentive issues persisted, with country teams expected to ensure alignment with country strategy while RM and PSI were perceived as incentivised to secure funding and donor stories. Overall, process architecture improved, but roles, responsibilities, incentives and country accountability were not clarified consistently enough to resolve the issue identified by the previous evaluation.
Invest in a coherent and aligned M&E system Invest in an integrated and aligned MEL system for PSEA projects and the PSE approach as a whole. Clarify responsibilities for carrying out MEL activities to avoid over-stretching private sector partners.	Consultations with the PSI team indicate that the recommendation was not fully implemented. PSI interviewees acknowledged that PSE did not have a systematic measurement framework or consistent approach to tracking value across the portfolio. They reported that there was no systematic ROI tracking system for PSI, including for PSI's contribution to unlocking sovereign pledges. They also noted that expertise-based partnerships lacked a clear valuation methodology, which meant that non-cash value was often under recognised. Innovation partnerships were also seen as difficult to measure consistently, since projects such as INFUSE include very different types	**Minimal progress** The recommendation does not appear to have been meaningfully implemented as an integrated PSE portfolio MEL system. While the PSE Strategy stated that its Theory of Change was intended to guide monitoring, evaluation and learning, evidence from consultations indicates that this did not translate into a consistent framework for measuring PSE performance, value or results across the portfolio. This assessment is reinforced by both PSI and wider consultation evidence. PSI interviewees acknowledged that there was no systematic ROI

Recommendation from previous evaluation	PSI assessment of progress	Evaluation assessment
	of innovations. PSI interviewees therefore pointed to the need for stronger life cycle and evidence management, particularly for innovation partnerships and scale decisions.	tracking system, no clear valuation methodology for expertise-based partnerships, and no consistent way to measure diverse innovation initiatives such as INFUSE. Wider consultations made the same point. One interviewee noted that "not having a common MEL framework for PS" allowed partners to define MEL for their own projects.
Consider and capture costs Consider commissioning 'total cost of ownership' studies. Since there appears to be little emphasis on capturing project costs against standardised cost categories and managing cost drivers during the project implementation phase, there may have been lost opportunities to increase VFM, as well as challenges in assessing cost-efficiency, cost-effectiveness and 'total cost of ownership' for governments wishing to adopt solutions at scale.	Consultations with the PSI team indicate that this recommendation was not fully implemented. PSI interviewees recognised that private sector engagement remained highly resource intensive, particularly because of due diligence, contracting, partner management and internal coordination. The project approval process was described as lengthy and challenging. PSI consultees also indicated that the portfolio was too broad for the size of the team, with around 100 partners seen as too many for a small team to manage effectively. The PSI assessment therefore points to a recognised cost and capacity issue, but not to a systematic approach to tracking project and portfolio costs.	**Minimal progress** The underlying issue identified by the previous evaluation remained highly visible during the 2021 to 2025 strategy period. Wider consultations consistently pointed to high transaction costs, heavy Secretariat workload and opportunity costs linked to managing multiple small or bespoke partnerships. Interviewees noted that even where private sector funding was available, partnerships still required country team time and extensive relationship management.
Improve structured learning Strengthen the emphasis on structured learning with emphasis on a) different types of partnership; b) project themes; and c) approaches to scale-up. Consider establishing a forum for sharing lessons on private sector engagement with other global health partners.	Consultations with the PSI team indicate that there was some learning from individual partnerships and from the innovation pipeline, but that the recommendation was not fully implemented as a structured portfolio learning approach. PSI interviewees pointed to examples where partnerships generated evidence, learning or scale, including Zipline, Simprints, UPS, Unilever and La Caixa. They also noted that some partnerships had begun to scale and increase impact, including Zipline's expansion in vaccine delivery. At the same time, PSI interviewees acknowledged that INFUSE was paused after one round, which affected the innovation pipeline until	The evidence indicates that Gavi generated learning through individual partnerships but did not consistently translate this into a structured approach across the PSE portfolio. The 2021 to 2025 PSE Strategy included an intention to create an Alliance wide private sector Community of Practice to share lessons, provide technical guidance and support the learning agenda. However, consultation evidence indicates that learning was not consistently institutionalised across partnership types, project themes or scale decisions. Wider interviewees reported that many pilots showed promise, but fewer had clear pathways for scale, replication or

Recommendation from previous evaluation	PSI assessment of progress	Evaluation assessment
	2024. They also noted that the team had limited capacity for new innovator partnerships during COVID. Consultations pointed to the need for stronger portfolio discipline, including a clearer view of which partnerships to scale, which to stop, and how INFUSE should link to the Scale Up Facility.	sustainability. Consultations also pointed to the need for a more deliberate portfolio approach to assess where private sector engagement could add most value. Overall, the recommendation was partly implemented through project learning and selected examples of scale, but not through a consistent system for structured learning and scale decision making.

Appendix H ANALYSIS OF INFUSE RESULTS

This Appendix provides an analysis of INFUSE results and scale, in support of EQs 6 and 7.

INFUSE (Innovation for Uptake, Scale and Equity in Immunisation) is Gavi's innovation platform for identifying and supporting proven or high-potential innovations that can strengthen vaccine delivery systems. Launched at Davos in 2016, INFUSE was designed to connect high-impact innovations with countries that need them, and then "infuse" them with capital and expertise to support scale-up. Selected innovations are designated as INFUSE Pacesetters and receive focused support from Gavi and partners.[28]

INFUSE 1.0 predates the Gavi 5.0 evaluation period, with Pacesetter cohorts selected between 2016 and 2019. It should therefore not be treated as a Gavi 5.0 result in itself. However, it remains relevant because follow-on funding, and scale-up effects which continued into and were reported during the Gavi 5.0 period. Across the four INFUSE 1.0 cohorts, 21 Pacesetters were selected. In the 2023, Gavi reported that initial investments in INFUSE 1.0 totalled more than US$60 million and led to more than US$200 million in follow-on funding for global health innovators.

Table H.1: INFUSE 1.0 cohorts and Pacesetters[29,30]

Year	Thematic focus	Selection process	Pacesetters
2016	Improving immunisation systems' data availability, quality and usage	• 70 innovations • 18 participated in INFUSE workshop • **7 selected**	Akros; BroadReach; Energize the Chain; IRD; Khushi Baby; Nexleaf Analytics; Shifo
2017	Tech-enabled innovations to address equity gaps and immunise all children	• 100 innovations • 18 participated in INFUSE workshop • **7 selected**	Flowminder; GiftedMom; Logistimo; Medic Mobile; mPedigree; Parsyl; Zenysis
2018	Digital technologies for finding, identifying and registering vulnerable children	• 200 innovations • 10 participated in INFUSE workshop • **4 selected**	Element; iCivil Africa; ONA; Simprints
2019	Urban immunisation and rapid urbanisation	• 110 innovations • 10 participated in INFUSE workshop • **3 selected**	Praekelt.org / VillageReach; Premise; ZMQ Development

Gavi's public reporting provides selected examples of INFUSE 1.0 Pacesetters moving beyond selection into operational use or wider partnership development.[31] Zenysis, a 2017 Pacesetter, was reported as supporting data and analytics work in Pakistan and Mozambique, including work to identify and target zero-dose children and integrate fragmented information systems. Gavi's 2022 Annual Progress Report also reported that Parsyl had scaled temperature-monitoring work across Senegal, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, Simprints had expanded from Bangladesh to Ghana, and ZMQ had worked in India's urban slums to support immunisation demand and community mapping. These examples indicate that INFUSE 1.0 contributed to Gavi's innovation pipeline and helped attract additional investment around selected innovators.

[28] Gavi (n.d.). INFUSE. https://www.gavi.org/investing-gavi/infuse.

[29] Gavi (2024). Call for innovations. https://www.gavi.org/investing-gavi/infuse/call-innovations.

[30] Gavi (n.d.). INFUSE community. https://www.gavi.org/investing-gavi/infuse/infuse-community.

[31] Gavi (2020 – 2025). Progress reports. https://www.gavi.org/about-us/progress-reports.

Consultations support this interpretation. Stakeholders generally viewed INFUSE as a useful mechanism for sourcing, convening and validating innovators, and as one of Gavi's more recognisable innovation platforms. It was described as useful for identifying "something new" and creating a pipeline of potential solutions. However, stakeholders also emphasised that innovation sourcing is only the first step. The main challenge was converting selected innovations into country-owned implementation and scale, particularly where country integration, transition pathways, implementation bandwidth and sustainability planning were not strong enough. Stakeholders also linked this to how country demand was identified. Countries may not always know what private sector solutions are available and therefore may not ask for them directly. For INFUSE, the key issue was whether innovation scouting was closely connected to country teams, clearly identified country problems and realistic implementation pathways.

INFUSE 2.0 falls within the Gavi 5.0 evaluation period but remains too recent to assess in terms of sustained results or scale. INFUSE 2.0 was designed to match investors with innovators and entrepreneurs, simplify connections between innovators, communities and the private sector, and help start-ups and investors better track and amplify the impact of their innovations. Gavi stated that, by 2030, INFUSE 2.0 expected to secure at least US$500 million in private investment to promote access to new and under-used vaccines and immunisation innovations.[32] At launch, INFUSE 2.0 included commitments from private sector and philanthropic partners. This included Google.org with US$25 million in donated Search advertisements and expertise, US$1.5 million from The Coca-Cola Foundation through Project Last Mile, and US$2 million from Alwaleed Philanthropies.

In 2024, Gavi used INFUSE to focus specifically on climate mitigation and resilience. The INFUSE 2024 call sought innovations to help health systems manage resilient and climate-adaptive responses to climate threats, including by supporting low-carbon and sustainable health care systems and strengthening the capacity of the health workforce to anticipate and respond to disruptions. Following a two-day workshop in Nairobi funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, Gavi selected four INFUSE 2024 Pacesetters from over 100 applicants. Pacesetters selected were Atlas AI, Causal Foundry, Figorr and Signalytic.

[32] Gavi (2023). The US$ 500 million challenge: Gavi launches INFUSE 2.0 to scale up innovations in immunisation. https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/us-500-million-challenge-gavi-launches-infuse-20-scale-innovations-immunisation.

Table H.2: INFUSE 2.0 Pacesetters[33, 34]

Pacesetter	Background	Pilot
Atlas AI (USA)	Geospatial AI platform using big data to identify last-mile populations, including zero-dose children and missed communities. Gavi frames it as supporting geotargeting and shock prediction.	**India — implemented** Uses satellite imagery, machine learning and field data to map communities, facilities, immunisation coverage, access and outbreak/vulnerability risk.
Causal Foundry (Spain)	Adaptive AI platform using personalised recommendations, resource allocation tools and weather insights to support immunisation planning.	**Rwanda — under consideration / to be confirmed (TBC)** Proposed Clean Loop pilot would use vaccine delivery vehicles for outbound vaccine delivery and return-leg medical waste collection.
Figorr (Nigeria)	Cold-chain technology company providing real-time temperature, humidity and location monitoring for temperature-sensitive products. Its website reports prior use by Nigeria's NPHCDA to distribute about 4.2 million COVID-19 vaccine doses.[35]	**Nigeria — under consideration / TBC** Proposed Figorr Planner Tool would map cold-storage facilities and support cold-chain mapping, route optimisation and stock visibility.
Signalytic (Uganda)	Solar-powered digital health infrastructure for remote health facilities. Its website reports expansion across Nigeria, Rwanda, Kenya and Burundi by end-2024, connecting over 200 facilities to seven healthcare applications.[36]	**Rwanda — implemented.** Aim to deploy the S+ Platform across 150 health facilities, prioritising rural health posts, to support digitisation, electrification and immunisation goals.

Overall, INFUSE provides evidence of Gavi's innovation pipeline and partner-mobilisation function. INFUSE 1.0 was associated with follow-on financing and selected examples of uptake, while INFUSE 2.0 shows renewed activity within the Gavi 5.0 period. However, the evidence from INFUSE demonstrates partnership facilitation, innovation incubation and funding mobilisation more clearly than sustained scale.

[33] Gavi (2024). Gavi harnesses innovation to mitigate the effects of climate change on global health. https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/gavi-harnesses-innovation-mitigate-effects-climate-change-global-health.

[34] Gavi (2026). List of INFUSE Pacesetters with projects.

[35] Figorr (nd). How our cutting-edge technology facilitated the successful delivery of 4.2 million vaccines across Nigeria. https://figorr.com/blog/how-our-cutting-edge-technology-facilitated-the-successful-delivery-of-4-2-million-vaccines-across-nigeria.

[36] Signalytic (nd). The story of Signalytic. https://www.signalytic.ca/about.



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